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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the Australian public right to fish. This includes an analysis
of historical sources of the right in English law. This thesis describes evolution in the
Australian right from those English sources. Key influences on that evolution have been
the emergence of Indigenous rights and the adoption of fisheries management policies
promoting sustainability and economic efficiency.
Recent legal cases have increased uncertainty about the strength and effect of the
Australian public right. Specific areas of uncertainty reviewed in this thesis include; the
attitude of Australian courts to the utility of the right, the degree to which Australian law
requires a clear intention to abrogate the right by legislative implication, the degree to
which the right is derived from prerogative rights of the Crown, and how wholly
abrogating (or extinguishing) the right affects the balance between competing interests in
the marine domain.
This thesis recommends against an overly abstract concern with the strength of the
Australian common law right. It recommends that emphasis should be placed on
contextual factors underlying the relationship between the public right and the legislative
schemes involved. In providing a guide to the appropriate stance to take on the impact of
those contextual factors, this thesis applies a natural-resource management perspective.
This perspective emphasises the importance of management to maximise the benefits
from vulnerable, but renewable, natural resources.
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CHAPTER 1: THE PUBLIC RIGHT
A. The Public Right to Fish
The English common law public right to fish1 is an ancient2 public right to fish in
tidal waters and the sea. The public right extends from the high watermark outward and
includes tidal rivers3 and the shores of those rivers (collectively termed the ‘marine
domain’ in this thesis).4 The right has been described as the ‘paramount right to fish
vested in the public’,5 a ‘skeletal principle’ of the law6 and ‘unquestioned law’.7 The
unanimous decision of the High Court in 1987 in Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries
(‘Harper’)8 confirmed the reception of the right from English law into Australian law.9
The right has a number of legal attributes that underpin the use of, and access to, the
marine domain. In Harper, these attributes were described as: the right of fishing cannot
be taken away without competent legislation,10 no restriction can be put upon the right by
an exercise of the prerogative,11 the public right of fishing is not limited by concerns over
the resource,12 the right is ‘freely amenable’ to regulation or abrogation,13 the right of the

1

The English common law doctrine of the public right to fish is referred to as ‘the right’ where the context
makes it clear I am referring only to that right. The terms ‘the public right’ and ‘the public right to fish’ are
used where clarity requires.
2

For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘ancient’ refers to a time before the Magna Carta (1215). See,
use of the term ‘ancient’ in NSW v Commonwealth (‘Seas and Submerged Lands Case’) (1975) 135 CLR
337. 487(Jacobs J).
3

But see Bernard Walrut, ‘The Public Rights to Use the Sea and Rivers’ (2003) 20 Environmental Planning
Law Journal 423. Walrut canvases early English cases which leave open the question whether a public
right can exist in a non-tidal navigable river. Walrut suggests at 438 that the Murray River might be
covered by a public right to fish based on the Crown having encouraged exploitation by fishers and being
parens patrie obliged to then protect those fishers.
4

Under English common law, as received into Australian law, the landward boundary is the mean hightide mark and includes all tidal lands below this mark. Astronomical high tides which occur less frequently
may encroach further inland, but the lands affected by them are not considered ‘tidal lands’. See Warwick
Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008) 83-4.
5

Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (1989) 168 CLR 314, 329 (Brennan J).

6

Yarmirr v Northern Territory (No 2) (1998) 82 FCR 533, 593 (Olney J).

7

A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153, 170. Cited with approval in Harper (1989) 168
CLR 314, 329 (Brennan J).
8

(1989)168 CLR 314.

9

Ibid, 325-336 (Brennan J).

10

Ibid 329-30.

11

Ibid 330.

12

Ibid 330-1.

13

Ibid 330.

5

owner of the soil over which tidal waters flow is qualified by the right to fish,14 the right
is public and not private,15 and the competence of the state to regulate fishing is not
dependent on the state having proprietary rights to the subsoil.16
Although the existence of the right in Australia has been repeatedly confirmed, the
relative strength of the right has been questioned. The High Court in Commonwealth v
Yarmirr17 declined to confirm the right as a ‘skeletal principle’ of law, noting instead that
it was ‘not profitable … to consider what principles of the legal system are, or are not,
part of its “skeleton”’.18 The Full Federal Court in Gumana v Northern Territory noted
that ‘they [public rights] cannot properly be described today as fundamental rights …
whatever may have been their significance to coastal communities in earlier ages … this
is particularly so of the public right to fish with all its attendant uncertainties.’19 The right
has been described as being a ‘difficult question’.20 In England, the right (and other public
rights to the foreshore) have been described in the Supreme Court as ‘more controversial
than one may have expected’.21 In 2003, the Scottish Law Reform Commission
recommended abolishing the public right (and other public rights) and their replacement
with statutory rights.22
This thesis demonstrates how different conclusions on the legal characteristics of
right have been drawn from the different purported origins of the right. In some detail, it

14

Ibid 329.

15

Ibid 330.

16

Ibid. Brennan J notes that there was ‘some support’ for the proposition that the public right to fish
might be ‘sustained’ by a right to the subsoil citing Mayor of Carlisle v Graham (1869) L.R. 4 Exch 361. In
fact Mayor of Carlisle v Graham (1869) L.R. 4 Exch 361 does not provide support this proposition, see
discussion below in Chapter 7 C.
17

(2001) 208 CLR 1.

18

Ibid, 68 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

19

(2007) 158 FCR 349, 375 (French, Finn and Sundberg JJ). See also Tom Appleby, ‘The Public Right to Fish:
Is it Fit for Purpose?’ (2005) 16(6) Journal of Water Law 201.
20

Georgeski v Owners Corporation SP49833 (2004) 62 NSWLR 534, [49] (Barrett J). Quoted by the Full
Federal Court of Appeal in Gumana v Northern Territory (2007) 158 FCR 349, 372. The quotation by the
Federal Court included the statement by Barrett J that ‘it is not possible to make, with any degree of
confidence, a complete and exhaustive statement of the common law rights of the public in relation to
tidal waters and the foreshore’.
21

R v East Sussex County Council [2015] UKSC 7, [28] (Neuberger and Hodge LL).

22

Scottish Law Commission, ‘Report on Law of the Foreshore and Sea Bed (Scot Law Commission No 190)’
(Scottish Law Commission 2001) 12.
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canvasses the legal history of the right and arguments over the legal consequences of the
right.23 Questions of attributes and origin are of particular significance where the right
conflicts with rights of a novel nature. Although the High Court in Harper24 confirmed
the reception of the right into Australian law, it left open questions about the status of the
right. In particular, Justice Brennan held it was unnecessary to resolve the relationship
between the public right and the interests of the Crown.25 Instead, Justice Brennan noted
that the fishery in dispute was ‘public property’,26 which left open whether the public
right was dependent on Crown ownership or if it had an independent origin.
This thesis situates the common law history of the right in a wider context to explain
why questions about the origin of the right have proven so problematic to resolve.
Questions of origin, and disputes over the right, can be dated back to the late 1200s.27 The
origin of the right has been variously attributed to; the Magna Carta,28 a presumed past
exercise of the rights of the Crown in favour of the public29 and the responsibility of the
Crown to protect the interests and rights of its subjects.30 American authors have claimed
that the origins of the English public right to fish lie as far back as Roman Civil Codes
compiled in the 500s under the authority of Emperor Justinian.31 A key conclusion of this
thesis, arising from an analysis of the sources of the right, is that a search for a single
‘origin’32 is misguided. There are multiple sources of the right. Some, but by no means

23

See for example, A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153.

24

(1989)168 CLR 314.

25

And the question raised in argument as to whether the wild abalone in question were owned by the
Crown. See, Harper (1989) 168 CLR 314, 320 (Bale QC) (during argument).
26

Harper (1989) 168 CLR 314, 335 (Brennan J).

27

See below, Chapter 2 C 2.

28

Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155. A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153.

29

Stuart Archibald Moore and Hubert Stuart Moore, The History and Law of Fisheries (Stevens and Haynes,
1903), 115.
30

A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153, 169.

31

See, e.g., Robert Abrams Haskell, ‘Walking the Beach to the Core of Sovereignty: The Historic Basis for
the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Goeckel’ (2007) 40 University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform 861, 877; Michael C Blumm and Erika Doot, ‘Oregon’s Public Trust Doctrine: Public Rights in
Waters, Wildlife and Beaches.’ (2012) 42(1) Environmental Law 375, 376. This approach has been criticised
in James L Huffman, ‘Speaking of Inconvenient Truths – A History of the Public Trust Doctrine’ (2008) 18
Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 1.
32

This thesis uses both the terms ‘source’ and ‘origin’ in describing the history of the public right to fish.
Both refer to significant elements of the legal history of the right. Where the term ‘origin’ is used it signifies
an emphasis on a specific event claimed as fundamental to the right’s emergence. In the case of ‘source’
the emphasis is on a particular legal text relevant to the right’s development. For example, one would

7

all, of the conflict in academic and judicial opinion over the right can be reconciled once
the assumption of a single origin is discarded. Later chapters use this insight to assist in
the development of a guide to the application of the right. This guide takes into account
novel developments in Australian law since the 1980s, including the recognition of
Indigenous rights and the adoption of new legal forms of fisheries regulation. Finally,
notwithstanding recent doubts over the strength of the Australian right, this thesis
proposes that the right retains a useful legal role in providing a common starting point to
guide the resolution of priorities between the many competing uses and users of the
marine domain.
To establish these conclusions, the first major component of this thesis, in Chapters
2 and 3, is an assessment of the various origins claimed for the right. These chapters
review the right’s history and highlight how the sources claimed for the right have
changed over time. In Chapter 2 and 3, different accounts of the origin of the public right
to fish are grouped into three broad categories: the ‘Bracton/Natural Law’,
‘Birthright/Magna Carta’ and ‘Crown Ownership’ accounts. This thesis outlines how the
right’s long and disputed history provides fertile ground for different conclusions to be
drawn on its legal effect.33 Divergent authorities provide ample opportunities for the
exercise of what legal scholar Julius Stone termed ‘leeways of choice’ in judgement.34
For example, in the constitutionally significant case New South Wales v Commonwealth
(“Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case”)35 on the marine boundaries of the States and
Commonwealth of Australia,36 the public right to fish was cited as support in judgements
in the majority37 and minority,38 with a putatively different origin asserted in each

state that ‘the right did not have its origin in Roman Law’ and that ‘Chapter 16 of the Magna Carta (1225)
was one source of the right to restrict royal prerogatives’.
33

Richard A Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory (Harvard University Press, 2001) 165, ‘(history) is almost
always a mask, because of the indeterminacy of most historical enquiries … and behind the mask may be
a pragmatist’.
34

Julius Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of Common Law Growth (Butterworths, 1985).

35

(1975) 135 CLR 337. Respectively, Stephen J at 421 and Jacobs J at 487. Although the public right and
its origins were discussed in this case, this was by way of illustration of arguments in relation to the
jurisdictional boundaries between the States of Australia and the Commonwealth of Australia. That the
right can be cited to support opposing arguments highlights the divergence of judicial opinion on the right.
36

On these boundaries and jurisdictional arrangements see Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4.
The jurisdictional arrangements put in place are between the Commonwealth and the States (and
Northern Territory of Australia) and are generally known as the ‘Offshore Constitutional Settlement’, ibid
47-8.
37

(1975) 135 CLR 337, 487 (Jacobs J).

38

(1975) 135 CLR 337, 421 (Stephen J).
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instance.39 In more contemporary terms, the history of the right provides for a wide range
of ‘constructional choices’ open to the courts.40 The NT Fishing Cases,41 discussed in
Chapters 4 and 5, provide more recent examples of a wide range of judicial opinion on
the right and of continuing disagreement on the sources and the legal attributes of the
right. Legal argument over the history of the right is also argument about the current
legal effect of the right.
The second major component of this thesis, in Chapters 4 and 5, is a review of the
impact on the right of key developments in Australian law and policy from the late 1980s.
These chapters focus on the effect of the recognition of Indigenous rights to the marine
domain42 and the effects of changes in fisheries law and policy.43 The interaction between
the right, Indigenous rights and fisheries legislation was central to legal disputes over
access to, and use of, the foreshore and tidal waters in the Northern Territory of Australia
that were the subject of the NT Fishing Cases.44 These disputes demonstrated the
difficulties that arise when reconciling the public right to fish with other interests in the
marine domain. Despite extensive litigation, a practical resolution to conflicts over longterm access to the Northern Territory tidal zone has proven to be elusive more than 10
years45 after the Blue Mud Bay Case.46

39

See discussion in Chapter 3.

40

Samantha Hepburn, ‘Statutory Construction and Native Title Extinguishment: Expanding Constructional
Choices’ (2015) 38(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 587.
41

The ‘NT Fishing Cases’ for the purpose of this thesis being: Yarmirr v Northern Territory (No 2) (1998) 82
FCR 533; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2000) 101 FCR 171; Yarmirr v The Northern Territory [2000] FCA 48;
Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust v Director of Fisheries (2000) 170 ALR 1; Director of Fisheries (Northern
Territory) v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust [2001] FCA 98; Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141
FCR 457; Gawirrin Gumana v Northern Territory of Australia (No 2) [2005] FCA 1425 ; Gumana v Northern
Territory (2007) 158 FCR 349; Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24.
42

Following Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1.

43

Referred to in this thesis as ‘rights-based management’. See a definition of and more detailed review of
‘rights-based management’ in Chapter 4 B. A seminal document in establishing policy in this regard was
the White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries Management
in the 1990s (Commonwealth of Australia, 1989). Legislative reforms to support rights-based management
had preceded this paper, for example the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT), in particular Part IV of that Act providing
for management plans and Schedule 2 providing for allocation of quotas under those plans.
44

See above n 41.

45

Gary Shipway, ‘Push to Restrict Barramundi Fishing as Parties Clash Over Inter-Tidal Fishing Access’, NT
News (Northern Territory), 21 September 2017.
46

(2008) 236 CLR 24.
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The third and final component of this thesis is contained in Chapters 6 to 8. Based on
the discussion of recent Australian cases in the previous chapters, these chapters assess
the effect of those cases on the interpretation and application of fisheries law in
Australia’s marine jurisdictions. Even if the right may now be classified as a lesser
common law right,47 it is an accepted part of the legal background against which fisheries
legislation has been framed.48 In some Australian jurisdictions, commercial rights to fish
may be substantially or wholly based on statutory schemes of management, but
recreational schemes are rarely as comprehensive. Accordingly, the rights of access of
most recreational fishers, and that of many commercial fishers, are linked to the public
right. The loss of the public right leaves gaps in fisheries law, particularly in relation to
recreational fishing.
This thesis argues that classification of the right as a lesser common law right,49
combined with an excessive emphasis on its susceptibility to abrogation, can undermine
consistency in the interpretation of laws governing the marine domain. Statutory
provisions intended to emphasise the authority of the state over fisheries management can
appear to wholly abrogate that right by necessary implication.50 Given that existing
fisheries legislative regimes generally assume the background of the public right,51
abrogation makes the interpretation of existing schemes less certain. The effects of
legislative abrogation could be addressed as part of comprehensive legislative reform of
the right as has been suggested for the United Kingdom.52 For the Australian marine
domain — given the multiplicity of jurisdictions and interests involved — such a task
would prove to be extraordinarily difficult. Furthermore, codification of the right can give
rise to a further set of unanticipated consequences.

47

Dennis Pearce and Robert Geddes, Statutory Interpretation (Butterworths, 8th ed, 2014) 243-5; JJ
Spigelman, ‘Principle of Legality and the Clear Statement Principle’ (2005) 79 Australian Law Journal 769.
48

Fisheries Department of Western Australia, ‘Fisheries Management Paper No 195: Nature and Extent of
Rights to Fish in Western Australia (2005)’ (Fisheries Department of Western Australia, 2005) 14-6;
Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) s 3 (footnote).
49

Pearce and Geddes, Statutory Interpretation (2014), above n 47, 243-5; Spigelman, ‘Principle of Legality
and the Clear Statement Principle’, above n 47.
50

As will be argued occurred in the Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24.

51

For example, Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) s 3 (footnote).

52

For Scotland, see Scottish Law Reform Commission, above n 22. For the United Kingdom as a whole, see
Thomas Appleby, Fisheries Law in Action: An Exploration of Legal Pathways to a Better Managed Marine
Environment (DPhil Thesis, University of the West of England, 2015) <http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/25169>>.
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Where the right has been wholly abrogated53 there are potential impacts beyond that
on fisheries management. The right is a common legal starting point in the interpretation
of multiple overlapping jurisdictions over the marine domain, which have different
classes of users with different interests using the marine domain for different purposes.
Over time, increases in the intensity of use of the marine domain multiply opportunities
for disputes between users claiming different rights. As a long-standing common starting
point for statutory interpretation of legislative regimes in the marine domain, the right has
the potential to contribute to a more consistent and coherent legal framework for resolving
disputes. This would provide greater clarity for establishing user priorities for access to
and use of marine resources.
To advance objectives of coherence and certainty, the approach to the application of
the public right in this thesis is to favour interpretations that support it as part of a coherent
framework of legislation, rather than to assume its abrogation. In assessing the purpose
of legislation in the marine domain, two insights are applied from a natural-resource
management perspective.54 Firstly, the principal objective of fisheries legislation is to
‘strike a balance between exploiting and conserving fish’.55 Only partial abrogation is
necessary to achieve this balance. Secondly, in due partly to the public right, the marine
domain is generally a shared and non-exclusive domain. As a shared domain, overlapping
rights and legislative schemes should be interpreted as far as possible to support
management of the marine domain, not to replace or completely override each other.
This thesis questions the utility of approaches to the right that focus on the
fundamental nature of the right based on conclusions from the right’s history.
Nonetheless, a consideration of the fundamental characteristics of the right can be
appropriate where novel situations arise. Chapter 7 considers largely novel questions that
arise from a finding of a wholly abrogated right across the marine domain. For example,

53

In this thesis, the short hand term for the effect of the judgment on the right in the Northern Territory
— following the Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24 — is to describe the right as having been ‘wholly
abrogated’. The plurality only used the term ‘abrogated’ but emphasised the extent of that abrogation
stating that, ‘but whether and how a person may take fish or aquatic life in the Northern Territory are
questions to be answered by resort to the Act, not any common law public right. The common law public
right has been abrogated.’ Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24, 58 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and
Crennan JJ).
54

See below, Chapter 1 B 2.

55

See above, Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, n 4.
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for exclusive interests gained in the marine domain in the absence of the right,56 what
happens if the original abrogatory event ceases? Does the right return? If so, what happens
to other interests that may have arisen in the marine domain in the meantime? Even where
the public right has been held to have been wholly abrogated, the courts have generally
refrained from referring to it as having been extinguished.57 Another question is whether
or not the right is a form of the prerogative of the Crown. If so, is it subject to statutory
rules of interpretation relevant to the exercise of the Crown’s prerogative?58 If the right
is expressed as wholly abrogated, what happens to rights of access underpinned by the
right, for example, those of recreational fishers? In addressing these questions, the
perspective developed in Chapters 2 and 3 is applied, namely that the right has multiple
sources. A multiplicity of legal sources may have led to confusion over the right, but they
have also contributed to its survival as a public right.
In the final part of this thesis, some of its conclusions are extended beyond a narrow
legal or resource management perspective. For example, Australian courts have generally
been reluctant to acknowledge that the common law right to fish of Australia is now
substantially different than that in England.59 The implications of this difference in
relation to the future development of the right are discussed at the end of the thesis.

56

Here referring to estates that include a right to the subsoil and would give a right to an exclusive fishery,
if not for the public right to fish
57

Although see Akiba v Queensland (No 2) [2010] FCA 643. At [842] Finn J refers to the extinguishing effect
of legislation in Harper (1989) 168 CLR 314 and the Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24 as being case
law on ‘extinguishing’ the public right. It is not clear whether the form of extinguishment Finn J
contemplates is substantively different from abrogation, given the cases cited refer to abrogation rather
than extinguishment.
58

In particular, A-G v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd (‘De Keysers Case’) [1920] AC 508. Cited in the Blue Mud
Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24, 58 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). Also cited in argument,
Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) HCA Trans 722, [4285] [51905] [5270-5], [6050-5] (Gummow J]. In particular, Gummow J at [4285] ‘[y]es, there may be a De Keyser’s
Case lurking in the back here mainly insofar as their prerogative is the source of all of this fishing doctrine
[my emphasis]’.
59

For a relatively recent review of English case law, see generally Richard Barnes, ‘Revisiting the Public
Right to Fish in British Waters’ (2011) 26 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 433.
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B. Research Approach and Scope
1.
The Use of History
a) Doctrinal Analysis and History
The methodological approach of this thesis is doctrinal in nature. Legal history in a
traditional sense60 is used to review the sources of the right in English law,61 then its
reception into,62 and further development in, Australian law. The validity of this approach
rests on the foundational assumption that the public right to fish draws content and
legitimacy from judicial precedents outlining a set of rules creating and evidencing an
underlying common law doctrine.63 It is acknowledged that the common law is not solely
determined by the past but has an inherent generative nature. Legal history, however, is
regularly the subject of judicial commentary and analysis.64 In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, legal history should be regarded as an influence on judicial reasoning. In
Chapter 5, the Blue Mud Bay Case65 is discussed in detail and it is concluded that the
reasoning of the plurality in that case66 appears to be have been influenced by the specific
history and facts of the underlying dispute.67
In this thesis, legal history is used to shed light on the right, but not to seek to rewrite
or judge the past. It is acknowledged that any analysis into the sources of the public right

60

Benjamin N Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press New Haven, 1921) 52,
‘[s]ome conceptions of the law owe their existence almost exclusively to history. They are not to be
understood except as historical growths’.
61

It is English law that was received. Scottish law is different in a number of aspects including access to
the marine domain by the public for recreational purposes. See discussion in R v East Sussex County
Council [2015] UKSC 7, [117-8] (Neuberger and Hodge LL).
62

Reception is not automatic. See generally on reception Bruce McPherson, The Reception of English Law
Abroad (The Supreme Court of Queensland Library, 2007). See also, Baldick v Jackson (1910) 30 NZLR 343.
This New Zealand Supreme Court case found that the English Crown’s right to whales had not been
received into colonial (New Zealand) law.
63

Bradley Selway, ‘Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of Australia’ (2001)
20 University of Tasmania Law Review 129, 132; Enid Campbell, ‘Lawyers’ Use of History’ (1968) 6
University of Queensland Law Review 1, 1; JJ Spigelman, ‘Economic Rationalism and the Law’ (2001) 24
University of New South Wales Law Journal 200, 205; Michael Coper, ‘Legal Knowledge, the Responsibility
of Lawyers, and the Task of Law Schools’ (2007) 39 University of Toledo Law Review 253, 253.
64

See, A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153; Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24.

65

(2008) 236 CLR 24.

66

Ibid, the plurality consisting of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ.

67

For example, the special history of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth)
legislation is summarised by Selway J in Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457. See also
discussion in Gumana v Northern Territory (2007) 158 FCR 349.
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to fish will face inherent limitations when attempting to establish certainty regarding the
distant past.68 Insights from broader historical sources are used to supplement strictly
‘legal’ sources. These supplementary sources help guard against anachronistic
interpretations of old legal texts. As early as 1795, Dalrymple warned that, ‘[i]n inventing
other causes we only deceive ourselves by carrying the refined ideas of our own ages into
ages too simple to be capable of forming them’.69 For example, in Chapter 2
archaeological evidence on English fisheries and academic opinion on the economic and
political context of the time are used to assess the relative strength of competing accounts
of the origin(s) of the public right. The greatest weight has been accorded to accounts of
the source of the public right to fish that are based both in surviving legal texts and are
consistent with other broader sources.70
A further benefit of taking a broad approach to legal history is that it reduces the
inherent bias in the field whereby the authority of a surviving text of a ‘legal’ nature can
easily be overemphasised or where it can induce unduly strong conclusions. These texts
may have survived by chance, or through past decisions on what was considered relevant
for preservation.71 The limited nature of surviving legal archives is especially a concern
in assessing the state of English rights to fish prior to 1200.72 Where documentary
evidence is fragmentary, conclusions drawn from documents that have survived need to
be weighed carefully in the context of the possible loss by chance of other (potentially
contradictory) documents. For example, conclusions on the ‘original’ intent of Chapter
16 of the 1225 version of the Magna Carta have been influenced by the views of Moore
and Moore in their The History and Law of Fisheries.73 Moore and Moore base their
characterisation of the original intent of the Magna Carta on the wording of a small

68

Douzinas usefully classifies these limitations as fourfold: forgetfulness of memory (in other words, only
some documents survive); impurity of the archive; selection of facts by the reviewer; and the ideological
nature of any narrative. Costas Douzinas, ‘Thesis on Law, History and Time’ (2006) 7 Melbourne
International Law Journal 13, 25.
69

John Dalrymple, An Essay Towards a General History of Feudal Property in Great Britain (Miller, First
Published 1757, 1758 ed).
70

For example, James H Barrett, M Locker Alison and Callum M Roberts, ‘The Origins of Intensive Marine
Fishing in Medieval Europe: The English Evidence’ (2004) 271(1556) (Dec. 7, 2004) Proceedings: Biological
Sciences 2417.
71

See above Douzinas, above n 68.

72

S F C Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism (Cambridge University Press, 1976) 1, ‘History
is difficult because people never state their assumptions or describe the framework in which their lives
are lead’.
73

Stuart Archibald Moore and Stuart H Moore, The History and Law of Fisheries (Stevens and Haynes,
1903) (referred to as ‘Moore and Moore’).
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selection of writs issued well after 1225.74 Additional sources cited in Chapter 2 cast
significant doubt on their conclusions.
The broad approach to legal history applied in this thesis can be distinguished from
a narrow ‘legal’ approach to history. A narrow legal approach — as might be applied by
an advocate — has a focus on a particular dispute or set of facts75 and on the ‘controlling
past … [for] instruction on what ought to be done here and now’.76 A broad legal
historical approach, however, is more restricted in scope than a historical approach.77
Common law ‘history’ is not a ‘fact’ that is proved in evidence before a court, but forms
part of the legal reasoning of the court.78 Legal history is typically used for the narrow
purpose of assessing the development of the law and to critique judicial reasoning and
current law. By way of an example drawn from this thesis, the purpose of the Chapter 5
review of the Blue Mud Bay Case79 is not to prove or disprove the historical ‘facts’ cited
by the court. It is instead a legal critique of the reasoning involved, including an analysis
of the quality of the historical texts cited and whether they support the conclusions
reached.80 Based on this analysis, it is argued that there is a weak basis for the conclusions
reached by the plurality in that case, including an implicit classification of the right as a
form of prerogative.81

74

Ibid 16-18.

75

Too narrow an approach can also lead to a ‘teleological bias towards the history of a common law
doctrine, narrowly focusing on only those aspects of the history that are relevant to a current question
and interpreting the full history of the common law doctrine within that perspective. As will be discussed
in Chapter 3, some aspects of the reasoning in 1800s cases such as Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155
arguably suffer from this defect.
76

Campbell, above n 63, 1.

77

Ibid. Campbell describes a historian’s approach as a comprehensive investigation as to ‘how and why
things happened as they did’.
78

Selway, ‘Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of Australia’, above n 63,
146-147. Selway’s article was cited in Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 242 CLR 195, 223
(Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
79

(2008) 236 CLR 24.

80

See Helen Irving, ‘Constitutional Interpretation, the High Court, and the Discipline of History’ (2013) 41
Federal Law Review 95. At 122, ‘[i]t [legal reasoning] does not have to be the last word in historical
interpretation but it needs to be historically authentic’.
81

Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24, 50 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ).
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b) Legal History and Origin Stories
This thesis rejects attempts to frame the legal history of the right based on an
assumed, if now historically obscure, single foundation for the right, what I refer to as an
‘origin story’.82 A legal origin story suggests that there is a single and specific origin of
the right, even if the knowledge of the origin has been corrupted or lost over time. This
specific origin is assumed to influence the legal character of the right into the future.83
Origin stories for the right include whether it derived from a Crown grant with a close
association to the prerogative84 or whether it is a public right based on a broader parens
patriae responsibility of the state to the public.85
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that some of the conflicts over the origin of the right
can be substantially reconciled if it is accepted that the right has developed piecemeal86
from multiple sources. It is further concluded that it is likely that elements of the right
came together as a bundle of public rights later referred to by the general term the ‘public
right to fish’ sometime between 1400 and 1600.87 A further conclusion drawn from the
review of the history of the right in Chapter 2 is that different elements of the right may
have had different sources, which account for their different legal attributes. For reasons
given in Chapters 2 and 3, it is the assumption of a single and simple unitary origin for
the right that obscures its historical emergence, generates unnecessary uncertainty over
its legal attributes and makes its contemporary application problematic.
2.

The Natural-Resource Management Perspective
a) Objectives of Fisheries Management and Law
The natural-resource management perspective applied in this thesis 88 proceeds from
the axiom that there is a public interest in maximising the benefits gained from the use of

82

An origin story can be identified in the repetition of the claim that the English common law public right
to fish descends in a lineal fashion from Roman Law — in particular the Institutes of Justinian. As an
example, see Haskell, above n 31.
83

See, e.g., Tim Bonyhady, (1987). The Law of the Countryside (Professional Books Limited, 1987); A-G for
British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153; Moore and Moore, above n 73.
84

As suggested by Moore and Moore, above n 73

85

A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153.

86

Barnes, ‘Revisiting the Public Right to Fish in British Waters’ above n 59, 450 ‘as a common law
institution, the public right to fish developed piecemeal’.
87

Just as in more recent times the ‘public trust’ in the United States of America has emerged bundling up
the public right to fish with other public rights. See below, Chapter 1 E 4.
88

Mark Sproule-Jones, ‘Public Choice Theory and Natural Resources: Methodological Explication and
Critique’ (1982) 76(4) The American Political Science Review 790.
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limited, but renewable, natural resources. It is a long-recognised defect89 of the English
common law public right to fish that the right is not self-limiting, even where open access
under the right would have the effect of exhausting the available resources.90 Intervention
by the state is justified to restrict the activities of individual fishers, which together would
otherwise lead to unsustainable outcomes. There is an overriding interest of the state91 in
relation to regulating the use of marine resources, even where it may impact on other
rights.92 This concern is reflected in the aims and objectives of contemporary fisheries
legislation.93 Gullet notes that ‘[t]he core aim of fisheries law is to strike an appropriate
balance between exploiting and conserving fish’.94
Since 1988, new fisheries regulatory schemes have been applied in each of the
Australian marine jurisdictions.95 They have attempted to strike a balance between
protection and exploitation.96 Contemporary marine resource management policies
proceed from the assumption that unowned resources with open and unregulated access
are especially susceptible to overuse and degradation. The potential for overuse and
degradation of unowned resources was described by Hardin in 1968 in the ‘Tragedy of
the Commons’.97 Furthermore, a lack of private rights leads to overinvestment and

89

The English courts recognised as early as 1882 that the public’s right to fish could lead to the
‘destruction’ of a fishery. Goodman v Mayor of Saltash (1882) 7 AC 633, 646 (Selbourne LC).
90

Harper (1989) 168 CLR 314, 330 (Brennan J). See also comments as to problems of sustainability and
the right in Adair v National Trust [1997] Times Law Reports (19 December 1997).
91

The Australian states were early adopters of fishing regulation, such as the setting of legal minimum
sizes. See, Daryl McPhee, Fisheries Management in Australia (Federation Press, 2008), 93.
92

Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572, 593 (Kirby J).

93

See, e.g., Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s (1) a, c ; Fisheries Resources Management Act 1994
(WA) s (3) ss (2) e.
94

Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4, 1.

95

All the States of Australia, the Commonwealth and the Northern Territory.

96

Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4, 1-2, 111-138.

97

Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243. By using the analogy of villagers
grazing their cattle on a village common, Hardin posited that the resources of a common would inevitably
be degraded by overuse. Even if an individual sacrifices his or her use of the common for its preservation,
other villagers will not do so. The result is the eventual degradation of the common, despite it being in
the interests of that community to preserve. Hardin expressly includes fisheries in his classification of the
commons. Although Hardin’s primary example is that of cattle grazing on a communal green, traditional
English commons were in fact closely and carefully managed and were not a ‘free-for-all’. See Edward
Palmer Thompson, Customs in Common (Merlin Press, 1991), 108.
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inefficient use of economic resources.98 However, common pool resources99 can be
protected by changing the dynamics of human interactions, including the creation by the
state of private rights to resources.100 In Harper,101 the term tragedy of the commons was
not used by Justice Brennan, but he did note the need for intervention ‘to control the
exploitation of a finite resource to preserve its existence’ through ‘the grant of
licences’.102 The essential features of the natural-resource management perspective were
referred to by Chief Justice Mason and Justices Deane and Gaudron in their concurring
judgement stating that:
The licensing system which the Fisheries Act 1959 (Tas.) and the Sea Fisheries
Regulations 1962 (Tas.) establish in relation to abalone fisheries in Tasmanian waters is
not a mere device for tax collecting. Its basis lies in environmental and conservational
considerations, which require that exploitation, particularly commercial exploitation, of
limited public natural resources be carefully monitored and legislatively curtailed if their
existence is to be preserved.103

To achieve an appropriate balance of environmental and economic objectives in
fisheries management, contemporary approaches have drawn on the field of economics104

98

See H. Scott Gordon, ‘The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource’ (1954) 62(2) Journal of
Policy and Economics 124; Anthony Scott ‘The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership’ (1955) 63(2) The
Journal of Political Economy 116.
99

On the use of the term ‘common pool resources’ see Quentin R Grafton et al, Economics for Fisheries
Management (Ashgate Publishing, 2006). There are two forms of common resources, a ‘common pool
resource’ and a ‘common property resource’. At 143 Grafton defines a ‘common pool resource’ as ‘[a]
resource such as a fishery where use is rivalrous (one person’s use harms other users) and the ability to
exclude users is difficult’. It is distinguished [but not always clearly in other literature] from a ‘common
property’ resource, which is ‘a resource over which a community or group of individuals have access to
and to some extent are able to exclude persons from outside of the group’. The key difference is that
some degree of ability to exclude others converts a true common pool resource into a weak form of
property right.
100

For comment and criticism as to the validity of Hardin’s metaphor in relation to fisheries management
see David Feeny, Susan Hanna and Arthur F McEvoy, ‘Questioning the Assumptions of the “Tragedy of the
Commons Model” of Fisheries’ (1996) 72(2) Land Economics 187.
101

(1989)168 CLR 314.

102

Ibid, 332 (Brennan J).

103

Ibid, 325 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ).

104

The objectives of fisheries legislation may in some cases explicitly include a reference to economic
goals or concepts, see the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s (1) c.
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(including on property rights),105 as well as incorporating perspectives from scholarship
in disciplines such as ecology and the historical development of fisheries.106 A seminal
document in the development of new approaches to fisheries policy in Australia is the
New Directions White Paper of 1990.107 This paper outlined Commonwealth policy on
the management principles appropriate for Australian fisheries and subsequently guided
the incorporation of those principles into Commonwealth legislation. Although not a term
used in that paper, the practice of allocating fishers more secure and predictable rights108
has since been termed the ‘rights-based’ management of fisheries in Australia.109 There

105

See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, ‘The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interactions’
(2002) 26 Harvard Environmental Law Review 281; Lloyd R. Cohen, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine: An
Economic Perspective’ (1992) 29 California Western Law Review 239; Harold Demsetz, ‘The Exchange and
Enforcement of Property Rights’ (1964) Journal of Law and Economics 11; Harold Demsetz, ‘Towards a
Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57 American Economic Review 347; Curtis H Freese, Wild Species as
Commodities (Island Press, 1998); Eirik G Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, ‘Property Rights and Economic
Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature’ (1972) 10(4) Journal of Economic Literature 1137; Donald R Leal
(ed), Evolving Property Rights in Marine Fisheries (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2005); Gerard J
Mangone, ‘Private Property Rights: The Development of Takings in the United States’ (2002) 17(2) The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 195; Anthony Scott, ‘Property Rights and Property
Wrongs’ (1983) 16(4) The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d’Economique 555; Anthony
Scott, The Evolution of Resource Property Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008); Amy Sinden, ‘The
Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution’ (2007) 78 University of Colorado
Law Review 533; Bruce Yandle and Andrew P Morriss, ‘The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice among
Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons’ (2002) 28 Ecology Law Quarterly 123.
106

See, e.g., James M Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine (University Press of New England, 1988);
James M Acheson, Capturing the Commons (University Press of New England, 2003); Susan S Buck, The
Global Commons (Island Press, 1998); Bonnie J McCay, Oyster Wars and the Public Trust: Property, Law
and Ecology in New Jersey History (University of Arizona Press, 1998); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
107

Commonwealth of Australia, New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries Management in the 1990s,
above n 43. In the foreword to this White Paper, Minister John Kerin states at iii, ‘This policy statement
represents a blueprint for the future management of those fisheries which are under the control of the
Commonwealth.’ The influence of this policy on the Fisheries Management Act (Cth) 1991 is reviewed in
Chapter 6 C 1 (a).
108

Commonwealth of Australia, New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries Management in the 1990s,
above n 43. At x. ‘The Government will formally recognise the ongoing nature of rights in existing
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is a vigorous debate within the fisheries economics field about questions of the efficiency,
efficacy and equity of various tools of management, especially over the allocation of
rights in fisheries.110 Debate about the details and equity of different approaches should
not, however, obscure the extent of a broad consensus on the need for state intervention
and the utility of statutory intervention to create or regulate fishing rights.111
3.
Rights, Uncertainty and Utility
As noted above, the natural-resource management approach applied in contemporary
fisheries management assesses the utility of the public right to fish based on its
effectiveness, amongst other objectives, for enabling sustainability and promoting
economic efficiency. From this perspective, a high degree of certainty for rights to fish
are desirable. Since the late 1980s the Commonwealth Government has promoted longterm rights and has created more secure fishing rights under Commonwealth
legislation.112 Research commissioned by Australia’s Fisheries Research and
Development Corporation113 has highlighted that certainty in rights can maximise
community benefits from fisheries. That research canvassed expert opinion on how to
achieve the best possible outcomes from fisheries management. There was consensus
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amongst 70 experts that achieving clearer rights should be the second highest priority for
Australian fisheries management.114
Certainty does not require a public right to fish. It can also be provided by
comprehensive statutory management schemes implementing rights-based schemes. In
2009, the New Zealand Supreme Court, when reviewing common law rights to fish,
emphasised the comprehensiveness of the replacement statutory scheme in that
jurisdiction, stating that:
It is unnecessary to consider the existence, nature or scope of such a common law right
[the public right to fish] as, in relation to the quota management system, it is clear that the
Act covers the entire ground that would be occupied by such rights. In this respect the
legislation accordingly governs all aspects of rights of the various fishing sector interests
to the exclusion of the common law.115

The review of Australian fisheries regimes in Chapter 6 concludes that in most
Australian jurisdictions, replacement schemes are not comprehensive and that they
assume the existence of an underlying public right to fish. A key complication that arises
from the Blue Mud Bay Case116 is that the plurality held that ‘by necessary implication’117
the public right to fish across the Northern Territory had been abrogated,118 but that the
statutory scheme that replaced the ‘abrogated’ public right was limited in nature.119
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Accordingly, a potential lacuna in the law was created whereby neither a comprehensive
statutory scheme nor the common law applied. The implications of that decision to other
jurisdictions is uncertain given the special circumstances of the case and the lack of
apparent support for the reasoning of the majority in later cases.120 Nonetheless, the
judgment has not been overruled and it contributes to uncertainty in relation to the
interpretation of fisheries legislation.
Uncertainty undermines the objectives of rights-based fisheries management regimes
in a number of ways. Uncertainty reduces the incentive for those involved in fisheries
management to align their actions with the community interest. In their meta-analysis of
the effects of rights-based management schemes, Costello et al noted the importance of
replacing the incentives of fishers to engage in a ‘race to fish’ with ‘stewardship
incentives’.121 Where rights are uncertain, an individual fisher’s actions to preserve the
resource runs the risk that any benefits will be lost to that individual and will instead be
appropriated by other parties. Uncertainty over rights can also provoke non-cooperative
political behaviour when competing for fishing rights.122 Certainty of rights increases
stewardship incentives, as fishers can expect to participate in the future benefits that arise
from their investment in good management.
Uncertainty also undermines economic efficiency by making economically
advantageous transactions costlier. In relation to transaction costs, Ronald Coase in his
1960 article ‘The Problem of Social Cost’123, argued that economically efficient uses can
be achieved by market mechanisms where there is an allocation of rights.124 Social
costs125 can be minimised without requiring direct regulation by the state. Coase pointed
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out that, regardless of the initial allocation of rights, transactions amongst the parties as
to those rights can still lead to an economically efficient (but not necessarily just)
outcome. A key precondition for an efficient outcome is low costs for parties contracting
with each other (known later as ‘transaction costs’126). If transaction costs are too high,
an economically efficient and advantageous transfers of rights will not occur. From this
viewpoint, a clear allocation of rights reduces transaction costs and supports efficiency
gains in resource use.127
C. Overlapping Rights in the Marine Domain
The discussion above focuses on competing rights to fish and access to fish, rather
than the interaction of fishing rights with other interests in the marine domain. In the latter
part of this thesis, discussion extends to the utility of the public right as a general guide
to the interpretation of legislation in the marine domain. In the marine domain, rights of
access to and use of the marine domain under the public right128 provide a common base
from which an assessment can be made of the impact of competing legislative schemes
over marine domain. As Gullett notes ‘[t]he management of Australia’s fisheries takes
place in the broader context of public aquatic spaces in which numerous other activities
also take place’.129 In 2016, the Productivity Commission found that ‘[t]here are
justifiable concerns about the adverse impacts on fishing of coastal developments, marine
infrastructure and the declaration of marine park areas.’130 In Australia’s marine domain,
overlapping statutory schemes for fisheries management lead to increased risks and
costs,131 even before one takes into account overlapping non-fishing legislative schemes,
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such as for petroleum exploration.132 One of Australia’s most senior public servants, in a
recent review, stated that marine jurisdictional arrangements were ‘the most flaky’133 he
had encountered in his experience and, furthermore, that jurisdictional issues over fishing
were ‘absurd’.134
D. Scope of this Thesis
1.
Other Public Rights
The common law doctrine of the public right to fish in Australia is classified as a
public right distinct from other public rights. Different public rights have different origins
and even different legal remedies.135 Their main point of similarity, as common law
rights, is that they are not of a proprietary character. Their common identity is of
relevance, albeit limited, when public rights are discussed as a class, for example in
relation to rules of statutory interpretation.
In the United States of America, public rights to fish and to navigate and doctrines
as to the capture and ownership of wild animals have been grouped together within a
‘public trust’ doctrine.136 The public trust, and particularly the approach favoured by Sax
in a 1970 article,137 has given rise to considerable legal controversy in the United States.
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In 2007, James Huffman estimated that more than 1700 academic articles had been
written on the public trust.138 In Australia, the public trust has received scant judicial
support as a legal doctrine,139 although there has been academic comment of a speculative
nature on the possible existence of a public trust.140 In Australia, the public right to fish
and the right to navigate are separate legal doctrines.141 The public right to fish can be
discussed concurrently with rights — such as the public right to navigate — without the
assertion of a common underlying doctrine, such as a public trust.142 Given the above, the
public trust doctrine in American law is principally relevant in providing a contrast to the
development of Australian law.143
2.
Indigenous Rights and the Public Right to Fish
As noted above, a key influence on the right in more recent Australian cases has been
the recognition of Indigenous rights to fish in Australia. Chapter 5 examines the
interaction between Indigenous rights, common law rights and fisheries legislation.
Questions relating to Indigenous rights have been central to bringing the public right to
fish into legal prominence in recent years. In Commonwealth v Yarmirr the High Court
found that native title rights were inconsistent with the public rights to fish, navigate and
to international obligations for innocent passage.144 The result is that Indigenous rights to
exclusive access to, and use of, the marine domain are not recognised by Australian law.145
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It is acknowledged that the impact on Indigenous rights of this restriction is significant,
but this thesis is focused on the different question, that being the impact of Indigenous
rights on the public right to fish. There is already a wealth of existing literature on
Indigenous rights to fish, the degree to which these rights have been impacted by
Australian law, the extent to which they have been recognised and the degree to which
Indigenous rights may provide benefits to Indigenous Australians.146
It is acknowledged that comparisons have been made between public rights
recognised by the common law and Indigenous rights.147 This is not surprising, since the
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test of whether legislation has extinguished Indigenous rights is expressed in similar terms
to the test of whether the public right has been abrogated by necessary implication.148
Given the similarity in language between extinguishment and abrogation, comparisons
have inevitably been drawn between common law public rights and native title rights
recognised by the common law.149 Australian courts have, however, warned against
making too much of analogies between common law public rights and native title
rights.150 Although native title rights are recognised by the common law, they are not
necessarily analogous to common law rights. Rights in Indigenous fisheries are closer in
kind to private common law rights such as a ‘common of fishery’.151 There are additional
distinguishing features. Firstly, Indigenous rights in Australia are now generally
supported by the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (the ‘NTA’) and cannot be now considered
purely common law rights.152 Secondly, Australian courts have expressed the effect of
legislation on the public right as being one of abrogation, whereas the question for
Indigenous rights is whether legislation has extinguished those rights.153
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Since the decisions of the High Court in Akiba v Commonwealth154 and Karpany v
Dietman155 it is apparent that a statutory scheme must be exceptionally clear in intent to
extinguish Indigenous rights by necessary implication. The closest analogy is to the
degree of clarity required for the extinguishment of proprietary rights by implication,156
not the abrogation of public rights. Chief Justice French and Justice Crennan in Akiba v
Commonwealth specifically rejected an analogy between the effect of abrogation by
regulation of the public right to fish and extinguishment by regulation of Indigenous rights
to fish.157
E. Existing Literature on the Public Right to Fish
1.
Key Sources on the History of the Right
The primary reason for undertaking the extensive review of legal sources of the right
to fish is to inform discussion of the public right to fish as it has evolved in Australia. Due
to the influence of their views,158 this thesis includes an analysis of Stuart Moore’s 1888
book A History of the Foreshore159 as well as the later History and Law of Fisheries160
with Hubert Stuart Moore (also known as H Stuart Moore), published in 1903. Stuart
Moore’s A History of the Foreshore,161 with its detailed consideration of the English
history of the ownership of the foreshore, was a key source for Glenn MacGrady’s
frequently cited 1975 article on the historical development of public rights to
navigation.162 A History of the Foreshore was cited in Attorney General of Canada v
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Attorney General of British Columbia.163 However, in that case the arguments advanced
in A History of the Foreshore did not find favour with the court.164 Hubert Stuart Moore
was also the editor of the fifth edition of Coulson and Forbes on The Law of Waters165
and subeditor of the relevant section on fisheries in the first edition of Halsbury’s Laws
of England. A key passage from the latter source was quoted in the Blue Mud Bay Case.166
In Chapter 2, Moore and Moore’s views on the origin of the right can be criticised
both on the basis of bias167 and on methodological grounds. Nonetheless, Moore and
Moore appear to be a reliable source for relevant materials such as old manuscripts,
charters, case reports and borough rolls. Material has been republished as part of their
work that might otherwise have been lost to all but the most diligent of researchers.168
Their research provides an invaluable source169 for the legal history of fishing and the
foreshore. Their conclusions on the origin of the public right are, however, suspect given
their particular biases.170
Other authors of relevance to the historical analysis of sources of the right in this
thesis are Percy Fenn on the development of fisheries in territorial waters and rivers in
feudal Europe171 and Thomas Fulton on the evolving claims of the Crown of England
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over the sea from the 1100s to the modern era.172 Other sources include analyses of the
Magna Carta173 and commentary on the state of English society and law around the time
of its creation.174
2.
Australian Commentary
Australian cases with the public right as a central topic are scarce. This is
unsurprising given the right received little Australian judicial attention until Harper.175
In 2005 in Gumana v Northern Territory,176 Justice Selway went so far as to claim the
right had been ‘resuscitated’ by Harper177 and Commonwealth v Yarmirr.178 Gullett
attributes this lack of judicial attention to two factors.179 Firstly, there are few land grants
to the low water mark in Australia, so disputes relating to public rights to fish over private
property do not generally arise. Secondly, the impact of extensive fishery regulation has
meant the potential area of operation of the right has diminished. Extensive regulation of
the right is addressed in Chapter 6.
This thesis adds to existing Australian literature through a description of, and
discussion about, the Australian public right to fish to a greater extent than an article or
book section, such as by Gullett,180 Bonyhady181 and Bernard Walrut,182 allows. With its
focus on the public right, it is not practical to extend this thesis to fully cover other topics
such as: Australian fisheries law, Indigenous law, the ownership of wild fish at common
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law and the reception of English law into Australian law. There are already
comprehensive monographs on these subjects from an Australian perspective, being
Gullett on Australian fisheries law (including Australian constitutional and jurisdictional
arrangements governing fishing),183 McPherson on reception184 and Bartlett on native
title.185 Gullett and Walrut each provide reviews of common law rules on the capture and
ownership of fish. 186 Recourse has been made to all of these for this thesis.
Gullet’s text Fisheries Law in Australia187 is an authoritative source on Australian
fisheries law and is used widely in this thesis to provide the general legal context to
arguments about the public right. Gullet’s text, however, predates the decision of the High
Court in the Blue Mud Bay Case,188 although Gullett does consider the decision by Justice
Selway at the first instance.189 Gullett190 and Walrut191 follow a broadly similar
methodological approach when describing the right. For example, they assess legal
historical sources; draw on English cases from the 1800s such as Malcomson v O’Dea192;
refer to Attorney General of Canada v Attorney General of British Columbia;193 and refer
to the canonical statement of the elements of the right in Harper.194 Walrut provides a
more extensive treatment of older English cases.195 Gullett in his text provides a broader
discussion of the interaction between the right and other rights and legislative regimes196
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and comes to the conclusion that there is a general public interest in the law being clarified
in this area.197
In 1987, Bonyhady198 provided an extensive review of the law in England relating to
fish in the context of rights to hunt and fish. Bonyhady highlighted ongoing uncertainty
as to the origin of the public right in tidal waters, but concluded on balance that the public
right to fish is derived from the Crown, based on the line of authority arising from Hale’s
views in De Juris Maris.199 This is one of the sources of the right discussed in this thesis,
although for the reasons given in Chapter 2 and 3, it is likely the source with the weakest
support from legal history. Nonetheless, this account forms part of the public right to fish
and is discussed in Chapter 2 as part of the Crown Ownership account of the origin of the
right.
3.
Contemporary English Sources
Modern English cases, while confirming the existence of the public right, tend to see
it as a common law relic.200 In a recent English Supreme Court Case, it was noted that
‘[t]he state of law relating to public rights over the foreshore of England and Wales is
more controversial than one may have expected’. 201 In 2011, Barnes carried out a broad
review of the English common law right.202 Barnes noted the importance of the public
right as part of the common law underpinning fisheries legislation. He recognised the
relevance of exploring the development of the common law right but also that his review
was ‘one strand of legal development and indicates the complexity that forms part of the
legal context’.203
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As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, the interest of the Crown in England and its
relationship to public rights to fish in England have varied over time. At different times,
the right has been classified as: a restriction on the interest of the Crown, as evidence for
the rights of the Crown to the ownership of the marine domain and as connected in an
undefined way with the rights of the Crown. The current English position appears to be
that the Crown owns the marine domain, its rights deriving from the prerogative of the
Crown. In reviewing the law on this point in 2001, the Scottish Law Reform
Commission204 concluded that:
The predominant modern theory is that the Crown has a proprietary right in the seabed
solum of the seabed and foreshore. While this derives from the prerogative, it amounts to
full ownership of the property … while the Crown has full ownership, it is recognised that
its proprietary rights cannot be exercised in a way which would prejudice the interests of
the public in the sea (including the seabed) and the foreshore.205

There are significant differences in the context for the public right to fish under
Australian law as compared to English law. The ownership interest of the Crown in
England is of a special kind and vested in a specialist agency, the Crown Estate. This
body estimates that it owns over half of the shores of the United Kingdom.206 Exercise of
the prerogative to claim the marine domain did not occur in Australia or its former
constituent colonies prior to responsible government.207 The rights of the Crown in
Australia to the marine domain beyond the low water mark depend on legislative sources
of authority.208 Notwithstanding these significant differences of legal context, however,
the reasoning of the Australian Courts still tends to assume a presumption of continuity
with the common law of England.209 This presumption of continuity has meant that
divergences in Australian law from English law210 have not occurred because of
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differences arising out of Australia’s history as a settled colony, but due to more recent
influences, including the recognition of Indigenous interests and the adoption of new
forms of fisheries legislation and management.
By way of contrast, there is no equivalent in the United Kingdom of Indigenous title
nor has the adoption of new schemes of management had the same impact. The prospect
of an analogous right to Indigenous rights emerging in the United Kingdom seems highly
unlikely. In the case of the Shetland Salmon Farmers Association v Crown Estate
Commissioners,211 the United Kingdom’s High Court expressly rejected a claim by
Shetland islanders to rights against the Crown to the land underlying the intertidal zone
(and beyond) based on traditional or ‘udal’ law peculiar to the Shetland Islands. In relation
to the interaction of the public right and fisheries management schemes, Barnes
questioned whether in English law ‘regulations that effectively reduced fishing to
exclusive private property would be permitted, and if so under what circumstances it
would be deemed to be either politically or legally permissible’.212 For Australia, Harper
clearly established that such regulation is indeed permissible.213
4.
The Public Trust
As noted earlier, in the United States the public right to fish has become an element
of a broader public legal doctrine, that of the public trust. The divergence between
American law and English law214 (and later Australian law) can be dated back to
American cases in the first half of the 1800s on the ownership of tidelands215, which
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became a key support for the public trust doctrine.216 The public trust doctrine in America
provides that ‘tideland and lands below navigable waters are owned by the state in a
special capacity – in the public trust’.217 At its minimum, the nature of the trust requires
clear language, and an expression of intent is required in legislation for the state to
alienate ‘trust’ lands and waters (and even then, with difficulty).218 Goble provides a
useful summary of the American law.219 This has been an active area of American law.
220

American law and Australian law appear to have a superficial degree of similarity in
that clear legislative intent is required for the public right to fish to be abrogated. The
public trust doctrine as proposed by Sax 221 supports judicial intervention to protect the
right and extends the purpose of the right to cover environmental protection.222 In a 1970
paper published shortly after Sax’s paper, William Drayton concluded that ‘[t]he common
law of the foreshore seems to be entering a major period of reformulation’ based on
increasing demand and fixed supply for the resources relating to tidal areas.223 Viewed
narrowly, Sax’s view of the public trust was that there is a strong judicial presumption
against the validity of administrative action that might substantially reduce the enjoyment
of the ‘public trust’. Viewed more expansively, the public trust becomes a difficult-tosurmount restriction on the legislative competence of a state. This expansive approach to
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judicial intervention is difficult to fully reconcile with representative democracy,224 and
would not appear to be consistent with contemporary Australian approaches to
interpretation.225 Hope Babcock — writing in support of approaches based on Sax’s 1970
article — stated that ‘the truth may itself be contested and often is sacrificed to achieve
another purpose’.226
Given the differences noted above, the law in the United States may be useful for
providing a contrast with developments in Australia,227 but is not of general relevance to
the public right to fish.
5.
General Relevance
The above sections have provided a broad overview of the key legal themes of this
thesis and the approach it takes. This thesis focuses on legal history and contemporary
legal issues. It is, however, acknowledged that the right has significance as a ‘right’ in a
general social, as well as in a strictly legal, sense.228 The public right to fish forms part of
a broader narrative as to rights generally,229 including on the interaction of the public right
and Indigenous rights.230 Although not a prime objective of this thesis, the account of the
development of the public right to fish provides an alternative view on the history of the
public right to fish.231
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The public right to fish is of particular relevance to recreational fishers, who fish for
purposes other than to engage in the market economy.232 As the analysis in Chapter 6
demonstrates, the public right remains the basis for recreational access to and use of the
marine domain, albeit in a highly regulated form.233 Recreational fishing is a major social
activity for Australians, with more than three million people fishing recreationally each
year. Nearly a quarter of Australian households include a recreational fisher and estimated
expenditure attributed to recreational fishing was $1.8 billion over a 12-month survey
period (in 2000).234 In Australia, private freehold is only rarely granted down to the low
water mark,235 with tidelands and shores usually managed by or vested in a public
authority.236 The exception in Australia is the tidal zone of the Northern Territory, as
discussed in Chapter 5.
Following its success in gaining exclusive possession to tidal lands in the Northern
Territory in the Blue Mud Bay Case,237 the Northern Land Council immediately provided
for interim access for recreational fishers, and then entered into negotiations with the
Northern Territory government to develop a long-term regime for public access.238 The
council may well have heeded the risk of sparking controversy (and reaction), as occurred
in New Zealand following the decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court in 2003 in
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Ngati Api v Attorney General.239 The possibility that Maori might be able to claim
exclusive rights to intertidal areas lead to a legislative reaction in the form of the New
Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (NZ), aimed at securing public access. 240 This
legislation was later substantially reformed in the Marine and Coastal Area Act (Takutai
Moana) 2011 (NZ). That negotiations between Indigenous interests in the Northern
Territory and the Territory government are still ongoing 10 years later is not only
testimony to the difficulty of achieving a negotiated outcome, but also to the strong
interest of the parties in achieving such an outcome.241 Strong community views on public
–

F. Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1 introduces the background, overall approach and relevance of the research,
as well as the limitations of the methodological approach and key sources used in this
thesis. The ongoing relevance of the right is established, as well as its limitations.
Chapters 2 and 3: Origins of the Right
Chapters 2 and 3 set out the basis for reconsideration of the history of the right and the
consequences for assessment of the legal attributes of the right.
Chapter 2 provides a fresh analysis of the right from pre-Norman times to the late 1700s.
This chapter considers various historical accounts of, and explanations for, the public
right to fish and critically assesses them. This re-evaluation of the history of the doctrine
includes a re-examination of historical, archaeological and legal scholarship on the right,
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and in some cases on fishing more generally. Chapter 2 tracks the emergence and
development of the right in the common law of England in the period up until the late
1500s and early 1600s. It then chronicles the transmission and development of the right
in the late 1500s and 1600s under the influence of early concepts (post-1600) as to the
Crown’s jurisdiction, sovereignty and ownership. From this analysis, it appears that the
right emerged as a bundle of common law principles around 1600, and despite post-1600
overlays, the essential elements of the right remained largely unchanged into the early
modern era (late 1700s).
Chapter 3 reviews the treatment of the right in relation to common law from the late
1700s and its reception into Australian law up to the High Court’s decision in 1989 in
Harper.242 This brings the public right to fish up to the 1980s and early 1990s where it is
considered in the context of cases relating to Indigenous rights. Chapter 3 will review the
issues affecting the development of the public right to fish over this period. It will
establish how, in English and Australian law a presumption of Crown ownership of the
seas (as claimed in the 1600s) became progressively less relevant. Chapter 3 also reviews
how some concepts, such as the ‘public trust’, failed to find significant support in English
law.
Due to the paucity of relevant Australian cases over this period, reference will be
made to developments in other jurisdictions, principally to Canada and England, with a
particular emphasis on the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General for British
Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.243 The influence of this case can be seen in the
leading Australian case on formulation of the right: Harper.244 Harper245 is important not
just for its statement of the elements of the common law right in Australia, but also as a
key modern Australian authority on the effects of fishery legislation.246
Chapter 3 concludes with a statement of the elements of the right in Australian law
in Harper.247 Despite substantial differences of context in which the law operated in
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England and Australia, at least up until 1989, the right appears to have been very similar
in its general expression.
Chapter 4: An Australian Formulation of the Right
Chapter 4 reviews developments in the right between 1975 and 2008. The focus in
this chapter is the effect on the right of the recognition of Indigenous rights to fish and
the effects of new forms of fisheries management and legislation. In Australia, the threeway interaction between the right, Indigenous rights and legislation has effectively
redefined the right. It will also be argued that one of the effects has been that the common
law on the public right in Australia and England has diverged.
Chapter 5: Judicial Treatment of the Right from 2008
Chapter 5 focuses on the majority judgement in the Blue Mud Bay Case.248 The
special circumstances of that case, in which the right was found to be wholly abrogated249
in the Northern Territory are explored. The chapter outlines why the majority may have
resolved competing rights as they did and highlights differences between their approach
and that of the Federal Court at the first instance250 and on appeal.251 The chapter reviews
the interpretation by the High Court of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and critiques the
approach of the majority, including the association of the right with prerogatives of the
Crown.252 Based on this critique, and the treatment of that judgement in later cases,253 the
majority judgement is not a good guide to abrogation of the right in other Australian
marine jurisdictions, raising doubt as to what the impact of fisheries legislation might be
in those jurisdictions.
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Chapter 5 introduces the question of whether the right is derived from the prerogative
of the Crown and the degree to which interpretative rules associated with Attorney
General v De Keysers Royal Hotel Ltd254 should apply.
Chapter 6: Effects of Abrogation
In this chapter, the conclusions drawn from Chapter 5 are applied to contemporary
Australian fisheries legislation. Each of the statutory schemes for management of
fisheries in the States (and Commonwealth) is examined. An assessment is made as to
whether the right survives in those jurisdictions and if so, to what extent. Where the right
has likely been wholly abrogated, relevant legislative schemes are reviewed to assess
whether that loss of the right leaves gaps as to the interpretation or application of that
legislation. It is concluded that the right continues in some, but not all, states of Australia
and certainly continues in waters governed by the Commonwealth’s Fisheries
Management Act 1991 (Cth). Some specific consequences of the loss of the right are
identified. The focus of discussion in this chapter is on fisheries management and fisheries
legislation.
Chapters 7 and 8: Public Policy and Conclusions
These two chapters explore approaches to the interaction between legislation and the
public right to fish from the perspective of natural-resource management, applying the
principles of good marine resource management (including from an economics
perspective). A central concern for the management of resources is the impact of
uncertainty and the principle that, as a general rule, the public good arising from the use
of a resource is maximised under conditions of greater certainty as far as rights are
concerned. These chapters extend the discussion of abrogation beyond its effect on
fisheries management regimes and to other interests in the marine domain. Arising from
this analysis, a guide to improving certainty in the interpretation of marine domain
legislation is developed. This guide addresses uncertainty arising from the Blue Mud Bay
Case.255
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Chapter 8 concludes by summarising key arguments made in this thesis, as well as
proposing a restatement of the Australian public right to fish.
G. Conclusion
This thesis considers the history of the right to fish in detail. The analysis highlights
the richness, complexity and unresolved nature of legal disputes over the right. Relevant
to the contemporary application of the Australian common law right to fish, these disputes
include; the attitude of Australian courts to the utility of the right, the degree to which
common law will require a clear intention in legislation to abrogate the right, the ease to
which common law will find by necessary implication that the right has been wholly
abrogated and the degree to which the right is derived from prerogative rights of the
Crown (and the legal consequences of this association). Not discounting the difficulties
these unresolved issues create, this thesis concludes that emphasis should be placed on
the contextual factors relating to the relationship between the right and the legislative
schemes involved. This thesis does not canvas in detail the enactment of comprehensive
legislation governing the interaction of the rights of the public and other rights in the
marine domain. This avenue is considered unlikely given barriers to such reform in
Australia — including substantial and unresolved jurisdictional issues.256

256

See Borthwick, above n 133-4 and associated text.

42

43

Chapter 2: The Ancient Right
A. Introduction and Relevance to this Thesis
Chapters 2 and 3 review the legal history of the right up to 1975, including its
reception into Australian law. The principal conclusions reached in these chapters form
the base for later chapters, which review the status of the right and make an assessment
of the future of the right in Australian law.
Chapter 2 provides a novel perspective on the history of the right and helps explain
why the origin and legal attributes of the right have been such difficult questions to
resolve. This chapter demonstrates that distinct elements of the right may have had
different sources. Specific rights and privileges257 over public access to, and use of,
fisheries are likely to have merged to form the common law doctrine of the public right
to fish by the mid-to-late 1400s. Expansive claims by the English Crown to the seas and
foreshores in the late 1500s and early 1600s gave rise to an additional account of the
source of the right.
As discussed in Chapter 1, different accounts of the source of the public right to fish
will be grouped into three broad accounts: Bracton/Natural Law, Birthright/Magna Carta
and Crown Ownership. These terms are used for convenience by grouping together
broadly similar claims made about the origin of the public right to fish. It is not intended
to imply by the use of these terms that this thesis is making a specific claim about the
legal characteristics of the right. For example, the reference to the Bracton/Natural
account in this chapter is not an assertion that the right is governed by natural law, but
that Bracton claimed that the right was based on natural law. Where cases or authors draw
specific assertions or draw implications based on a purported origin of the right they are
discussed in more detail. For example, in Chapter 5 and 6 the apparent association of the
right with the Crown Ownership account and its apparent influence in contemporary
cases.
The earlier parts of Chapter 2 focus on the period up to 1570 and critically assess two
key sources of the right attributed to this era, the Bracton/Natural Law and
Birthright/Magna Carta sources. The latter part of Chapter 2 focuses on the emergence

257

Holt, Magna Carta and Medieval Government, above n 173, 203 ‘[r]ights are things which we are
entitled by law. Of the two, “rights” is perhaps the wider term, for “rights” may be enjoyed by custom,
whereas “liberties” are more usually privileges.’
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after 1570 of broad claims of ‘ownership’ of tidal areas and the seas by the monarchs of
England. These later accounts are broadly grouped together as the Crown Ownership
account of the origin of the public right to fish.
B. The Public Right to Fish: Early English Sources
1.
English Fishing Activity 1000–1200
Given the limited documentary evidence on public rights to fish prior to 1200,258 this
thesis reviewed sources that do exist in the context of archaeological evidence of the
fishing activities of the time, as well as academic opinion on the social and political
context in which those fishing activities were undertaken.259 As noted earlier, analysing
this contextual background reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk of drawing
inappropriate conclusions from a narrow base of surviving legal documents.260
Archaeological analysis of the English diet has demonstrated that prior to 1000, most
of the fish consumed in England were freshwater fish. It is only after 1000 that diets
shifted to salt-water fish.261 Archaeological evidence from this time also confirms that
weirs262 were widespread and common in rivers and estuaries.263 Weirs in tidal or
freshwater rivers are an especially efficient means for exploiting valuable migratory
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fisheries such as those where salmon and eels are caught.264 Before the 800s, fishing
activities were likely small-scale, carried out by the use of weirs, locally organised and
largely subsistence in nature.265 Sometime between 800 and 1200, however, control over
weirs became concentrated in the hands of lords and monastic houses.266 Large permanent
structures affixed to the bed of a river (or the coast) would have been relatively easy to
control by local authorities. In any event, the construction of large weirs in rivers and
estuaries would likely have required a level of resources that was more readily available
to large landowners.267 Fishing activity along the shores of the coast appears to have come
under feudal control in England by 1200 (if not earlier). 268 It is a reasonable assumption
that many of the most valuable private ‘rights’ to fishing in this period would have been
those associated with weirs in rivers and tidal areas.
2.
Documentary Evidence of Fisheries 1050–1200
The most significant surviving document describing fisheries in England prior to
1200 is the Domesday Book. The Domesday Book was a comprehensive survey of
England269 compiled in 1086, with a focus on the financial resources available to the
Crown from the estates of England. It reveals the extensive degree to which fisheries were
associated with manors or were the subject of feudal grants. In addition to the many
freshwater fisheries listed in the Domesday Book, Moore and Moore identified 80 tidal
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fisheries.270 The Domesday Book, however, provides scant detail on the feudal271
relationships that governed these fisheries. Moore and Moore found that in only one
instance was there clear evidence of exclusive rights over both access to, and use of, a
fishery.272 A reference in the Domesday Book may merely have indicated the existence
of a weir273 controlled by a local lord. Detail on the likely nature of the ‘right’ to fish at
this time can be drawn from surviving grants, or charters, of estates. Historian CJ Bond
described the charter of the Manor of Tidenham as ‘the most informative of all the preConquest charters’.274 The Tidenham charter covered weirs on the estuaries and rivers of
the Severn and Wye and provided detail on how fisheries were controlled and managed.
The charter, dated to around 1050, provides considerable detail as to the relationships
between the lords of the manor and the local inhabitants.275
Under the terms of the Tidenham charter, the lord of the manor at Tidenham was
entitled to every second fish sourced from the weirs of the estate, as well as all rare fish
(specified as porpoise, sturgeon, herring and sea fish). In addition, the lord of the manor
was to be informed of all sales of fish when he was on the estate,276 a clause that may well
have operated as a right to buy. It appears that the local inhabitants could fish in waters
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adjoining the manor, but were restricted to less valuable fish, and had to share the catch
from the weirs.
The lord of the manor was also entitled to ‘much labour’, which included the
stipulation that inhabitants of Tidenham supply wood for the maintenance of the weir.277
This requirement of labour has particular significance in that it shows that the inhabitants
had an inferior legal status,278 and accordingly any ‘rights’ they held would have been
subject to feudal obligations.279 A significant problem for any proposed origin for a public
right to fish dating from prior to 1200 is that it is likely that only a small percentage of
the population of England were ‘free’, with the rest subject to feudal280 service that was
incompatible with being legally classified as ‘free’.281 Given the inferior legal status of
much of the population, there was no ‘public’ in a contemporary sense.282 That rights may
have depended on unequal feudal relationships did not mean that no rights existed for
those who were not free, but that those rights were of an inferior kind.283 It would be
anachronistic to suggest, therefore, that there was a ‘public right to fish’; at best, there
was nascent ‘rights’ that contributed to the later development of the public right to fish.
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3.
The ‘Regalia of the Crown’
Feudalism, with its regime of lordship and vassalage, held that rights to land flowed
from the sovereign284 in a hierarchy of rights with the sovereign at the peak.285 Reverence
for customary rights could influence how a sovereign or lord dealt with lands,286 but in
practice, it probably would have been difficult for tenants to assert ‘rights’ against a
sovereign or lord. Holt has observed that ‘despite feudal custom, kings behaved on
occasion in as arbitrary a manner as convention and immediate circumstances would
allow’.287 As noted above, many fisheries in England were under feudal control around
1200, but those ‘rights’ existed within a legal and social system that was oriented to rights
and relationships in land with an emphasis on possession of land.288 Grants over areas
permanently covered by water, such as fisheries in rivers, estuaries and the seas, were
special privileges and prerogatives described as ‘regalia’ of the Crown.289 A sovereign’s
power to make grants of fisheries did not appear to require, or depend on, ownership of
the underlying soil in rivers or the sea, or prior ownership of the fisheries themselves,290
but derived from these regalia. The extensive grants discussed above do not constitute
evidence that English sovereigns of the 1200s asserted ownership of rivers, tidal areas
and the sea, but merely that they asserted the power to make grants relating to them.291 It
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appears that it was not until the late 1300s that the sovereign power to make grants
evolved into a claim of ownership.292
4.
Rights to fish prior to 1200
Concluding this survey of early evidence, fisheries in the form of weirs were
substantial and widespread along tidal rivers (and most likely in tidal areas along the
English coast) before 1200. Archaeological evidence points to the relative importance of
weirs and of freshwater fisheries at the time. Manorial controls over these fisheries were
extensive, but local inhabitants may still have had relatively free access to fish. The
fragmentary nature of the surviving documentary evidence, however, means that
definitive conclusions cannot be drawn as to the degree to which the exclusive right to
fisheries, in terms of both access and use, was asserted by lords and monastic houses. It
is reasonable to assume that the degree of control over access and priority of use varied
depending on local practicalities, the terms of any grant and local custom. 293 English
rights to fish in 1200 were likely, therefore, to fall into one of four categories: those
subject to a manorial grant, those the subject of a special grant of a liberty or privilege to
a community,294 those arising out of a customary right later classified as a ‘common of
fishery’295 and ‘rights’ which represented activities that were not worth the expense and
effort of controlling.296
C. Emergence of the Public Right 1200–1472
After 1200, but prior to 1472, two broad accounts emerge of the source of the public
right to fish. The first of these accounts entails the public right to fish having its origin in
a melding of civil (Roman) law and natural law concepts, and their incorporation into
English law. The prime source is The Laws and Customs of England, attributed to
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Bracton,297a royal judge of Henry III, which was compiled around 1256–1258298 The
proposition that the public right to fish has natural law and Roman law antecedents will
be referred to generally as the Bracton/Natural Law account. The second account depends
on the gradual emergence in English common law of a public right to fish over an
extended period from 1200 to 1472. The Magna Carta’s significance to this account as
part of the foundation for the right grows stronger the closer one gets to 1472. The view
that the public right to fish developed over this period, with the Magna Carta as a key
influence, will be referred to as the ‘Birthright/Magna Carta’ account. 299
1.
Natural Law and Bracton
The laws of the late Roman Empire outlined communal ownership of shores and
rivers and are some of the earliest legal sources cited for the public right to fish.300 In
particular, the Institutes compiled in the 500s under the authority of Emperor Justinian301
have been cited as supporting the existence of a public right to fish.302 The antiquity of
Roman law303 provides a level of superficial attractiveness to the view that it is the source
of the public right to fish. The problem with this explanation is that prior to the late 1100s
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‘all trace of Roman law [had] virtually vanished’ for five centuries304 in Northern Europe
in general and England in particular.
The long break in the application of Roman law in England means there is a want of
evidential backing for narratives that imply that the common law public right to fish
descended in some unbroken line from the remnants of legal regimes of Roman Britain.305
Roman law as such306 is unlikely to have had a significant influence on the development
of English law until the late 1100s.307 A more plausible role for Roman law is as a
collateral influence on the development of English law, but only after 1150. Certainly,
Roman law influences are evident in Bracton’s The Laws and Customs of England.308
As noted above, The Laws and Customs of England is traditionally attributed to
Bracton, a royal judge of Henry III. Bracton draws on both the Institutes of Justinian309
and on an abridgement of Roman law by the medieval writer Azo in his Summa Azonis.310
In The Laws and Customs of England 311 Bracton outlined the nature of rights in rivers,
seashores, ports and the sea, as well as the broad rights of the king over wildlife and fish.
Examination of Bracton on these points shows that in the mid-1200s the Crown did not
claim general ownership of either fish or fisheries. Bracton is less clear on the ownership
of shores and rivers, which has implications for the ownership of the foreshore of
England, as described in later parts of this chapter.
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In a section headed ‘Of acquiring the dominion of things’, Bracton outlined the king’s
extensive privileges in wildlife. Bracton stated that the king has:
[I]n preference to all others in his realm, privileges by virtue of the jus gentium [law
of nations]. [By the jus gentium] things are his which by the jus naturale [natural law]
ought to be the property of the finder, as … great fish, sturgeon … things said to belong to
no-one. Also by jus gentium [things] which by natural law ought to be common to all, as
wild beasts and undomesticated birds. 312

Bracton outlined natural law principles on the ownership of wildlife but qualified
them significantly — quite likely due to the reality of the extensive rights of the king at
the time. In contrast to the king’s ownership of wildlife generally, Bracton’s examples of
the rights of the king to fish were limited to ‘great fish and sturgeon’.313 That Bracton
accorded fish a different legal status to wildlife in general is clear from an earlier reference
where he distinguished the activity of fishing from hunting.314 Bracton’s differential
treatment of fish and wildlife is good evidence that fish were not, at that point in time,
subject to a claim of general ownership by the Crown,315 although as outlined above, the
Crown could still grant an exclusive fishery as part of the ‘regalia’ of the Crown.
Bracton states that ‘the sea, and the shores of the sea, as though accessories of the
sea’ are ‘common to all’.316 This statement is consistent with Roman law and, taken in
isolation, would suggest the existence of something analogous to a public right to fish.
Bracton’s statement is, however, not consistent with the limited rights of much of the
population and clear evidence of the existence of widespread feudal grants of fisheries
over rivers and tidal areas. Senior officials of the Court must have been aware of
widespread grants by the Crown over the shores and coasts. When describing legal
interests in the shore (tidal areas), Bracton appears to have adapted Roman law principles
to the realities in England at the time.317 Bracton omitted a statement from the original
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Institutes of Justinian318 that ‘seashores are regarded the property of no-one … as being
the same legal status as the sea itself’.319 Roman law provided that where private
structures were built on the shore, access to the structure on the shore was no longer
common, but the soil itself remained in common ownership. Bracton departed from the
Roman model and stated that structures built along a shore and the property in the soil
under them accrued to the owner of the building.320 Finally, in describing the shores of
the sea, Bracton used a cryptic term ‘litora’ not used by Azo nor is it in the Institutes of
Justinian.321 Samuel Thorne, in his translation, noted that the meaning of this term ‘has
long been a difficulty’.322
Bracton also stated in The Laws and Customs of England that the right to fish in
rivers and ports was ‘common to all persons.323 Again, this statement conflicts with
archaeological and documentary evidence of the extensive grants of fisheries in rivers,
noted above. Bracton appears to have been prepared to modify Roman models for tidal
areas and the shore, but less prepared to do so for public rivers and ports.324 There are
possible explanations for this inconsistency, for example, if all the rivers Bracton had in
mind were tidal, there might be no significant contradiction. A conclusion of this nature,
however, would be speculative and no clear solution to this anomaly is apparent from the
text itself.
The Laws and Customs of England325 does not support the proposition that the public
right to fish arose out of Crown ownership of the seas. As noted earlier, Bracton outlined
only a limited right of ownership of fish or fisheries by the kings of England in relation
to Royal Fish. In addition, common rights of access to fish are described as arising from
natural law, not by virtue of a grant of privilege or liberty by the Crown. As noted above,

318

Thomas, above n 301, vii. Promulgated in 533 under Emperor Justinian.

319

MacGrady, above n 162, 556. Moore, above n 159, 32. Moore provides a table comparing the relevant
passages (in Latin).
320

Bracton, above n 308, 40.

321

Thomas, above n 301, vii. Promulgated in 533 under Emperor Justinian.

322

Thorne, above n 308, note on 40.

323

Bracton, above n 308, 40.

324

The authority of Bracton as to the laws of England when unsupported by custom/the common law is
certainly contested. In Ball v Herbert (1788) 100 ER 560, 563 in relation to rights of passage in non-tidal
rivers, Buller J criticises Bracton on rights of passage in non-tidal rivers, stating that (at 563) [this element
of The Laws and Customs of England] ‘plainly seems to have been taken from Justinian and is only part of
civil law’.
325

Bracton, above n 308.

54

the kings of England already had the power to grant exclusive fisheries by authority of
the ‘regalia’ of the Crown, a right that did not depend on ownership by the Crown.
Summing up, The Laws and Customs of England 326 is a central support for the
argument that the public right to fish derived from principles of Roman and natural law,
albeit for the reasons given earlier, Roman law was not a major influence on the
development of English law prior to 1150. The Bracton/Natural Law account has,
however, proved to be less influential in English and Australian law than the
Birthright/Magna Carta account described below. Nonetheless, assertions based on the
Bracton/Natural Law account continue to be made, especially in the United States where
the public right to fish is cited as the authority for the existence of a broad public trust in
relation to environmental management.327
2.

English Birthright: Magna Carta
a) Introduction
The public right to fish has also been associated with the Magna Carta (1215) by
legal writers and academics328 as well as by authors from other disciplines and
backgrounds.329 The Magna Carta was the key legal authority for the public right to fish
in the 1863 decision of the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea.330 The Magna Carta
was also referred to by the Privy Council in 1918 in Attorney General of British Columbia
v Attorney General of Canada.331 Justice Brennan’s judgment in Harper332 also refers to
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the Magna Carta, as does the plurality judgement of the High Court in the Blue Mud Bay
Case.333
In America in the 1800s, the moral authority of the Magna Carta was a notable feature
in the evolution of the public trust doctrine.334 In Australia, although it has no direct
legislative authority, the attraction or mythos of the Magna Carta make it a powerful icon
for the general community.335 Although the Magna Carta is an iconic336 document, there
is, however, no specific mention of either fishing rights or fisheries in it. It is unlikely that
the Magna Carta was originally intended to protect the public right to fish; nonetheless,
the provisions of the Magna Carta provided fertile grounds for the later development of
the right. It is appropriate, therefore, to first explore the original meaning of the text and
then to describe how the Magna Carta was recruited as a key legal support of the public
right to fish.
b) Magna Carta: General Background
After 1066, William the Conqueror, though his conquest of England, had many
estates at his disposal with which to reward his supporters. As noted above, a central
element of feudal relationships was that they related to land and estates. Later rebellions
under William’s successors, William II and Henry I, created further opportunities to raise
finance and reward supporters out of the confiscated lands of rebellious lords. As England
became more politically settled, this source of rewards (and finance) eventually dried
up.337 Land was, however, not the only source of rewards or finance available to the
Crown. Privileges of the Crown could also be granted out (for reasons of patronage), or
sold to raise finance.338 By the time of John I’s reign (1199–1216), the sale of privileges
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involved ‘the permanent and final alienation of the rights of the crown’.339 These
transactions included control over rivers and fisheries.340 The liberties created by the sale
of these privileges might notionally be permanent, nonetheless the holders of these
liberties still had to vigorously maintain and defend them against later grants or from the
actions of the king’s successors.341 Although his predecessors also sold privileges, John I
made a practice of exercising his royal prerogatives as ‘political weapons’; his use of the
prerogatives of the Crown in this manner helped fuel the rebellion that eventually led to
the signing of the Magna Carta at Runnymede in 1215.342
Prior to the discussion of the Magna Carta below, a source of possible confusion
should be addressed. The original Runnymede version of the Magna Carta in 1215 almost
immediately went through a series of revisions. This proliferation of versions easily gives
rise to confusion.343 The Charter on which Coke made his influential commentaries344 is
not, in fact, the 1215 Charter but the Great Charter of Henry III in 1225, confirmed under
Edward I in 1297.345 The 1297 edition of the Charter, essentially the 1225 edition, was
the form entered in the Statute Rolls of England.346 The 1225347 version is preferred when
considering the legal influence of the Charter. Reference to the 1215 version is only
relevant when the ‘original’ intent of the Charter is in question.348
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c) Chapter 16: Putting Rivers in ‘defence’
A possible source for a public right to fish lies in Chapter 16 of the Magna Carta.
Chapter 16 restricted the prerogative of the Crown to issue writs preventing all others
from approaching and using riverbanks until a king had done so, called putting a river ‘in
defence’. Chapter 16 reads:
Nulla riparia decetero defendatur, nisi ille que fuerunt in defenso tempore regis
Henrici ave nostril, pereadem loca et esodem terminus sicut esse consueverunt tempore
suo.349
No banks shall be defended henceforth, but such as were in defence in the time of
King Henry our Grandfather, by the same place and the same bounds as they were wont to
be in his time.350

In the 1215 Charter, the reference to putting rivers in defence was part of Chapter 47
(1215):
Omnes foreste que afforestate sunt temper nostro, statim deafforestentur; et ita fiat de
repariis351 que per nos tempore nostro posite sunt in defenso.352
All forests that have been made such in our time shall forthwith be disafforested; and
a similar course shall be followed with regard to riverbanks that have been placed in defense
by us in our time.353

Chapter 48 (1215),354 which followed, referred to the wardens of rivers along with
other king’s officers when it spoke of restraining ‘evil customs’. Considering the political
context in which it was written, it would appear likely that the intended effect of Chapter
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47 (1215) was to provide relief from the exercise of royal prerogatives as to forests and
riverbanks (or their threatened use) and the consequent exactions of royal officers in
enforcing such prerogatives. Accordingly, Chapter 16 was likely about access to
riverbanks, and only incidentally access to the fish in those rivers.
The earliest reference citing Chapter 16 as a source for the protection of rights to fish
does not come until the late 1200s in the book The Mirror of Justices.355 The Mirror of
Justices achieved belated prominence in relation to the development of a public right to
fish when Sir Edmund Coke (1552–1634) referred to The Mirror of Justices356 in his
analysis of the Magna Carta.357 Coke in his Institutes of the Laws of England358 cited The
Mirror of Justices as authority for the proposition that protection of access to rivers for
fishing was an original objective of Chapter 16. Coke also extended the restrictions in
Chapter 16 to cover all riverbanks and their owners, not just those riverbanks held by the
Crown. Coke’s Institutes has been described as ‘an unhistorical but profoundly influential
commentary on the Magna Carta’.359 Nonetheless, Blackstone360 generally follows
Coke’s views on the effects of Chapter 16, and Coke is a key authority cited in the
influential case of Malcolmson v O’Dea.361 Coke’s broad views on the Magna Carta have
influenced the development of the public trust doctrine in the United States.362
Moore and Moore questioned whether there was any relationship at all between
Chapter 16 and fishing activities. Their account is of interest given the influence of their
1903 text.363 Moore and Moore analysed writs exercising the prerogative referred to in
Chapter 16 of putting rivers ‘in defence’. Based on their analysis of writs granted after
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1215 (in 1234 and under a different king), they question whether there was an original
connection at all between Chapter 16 and fishing.364 Moore and Moore concluded that it
was likely that writs putting rivers ‘in defence’ related only to the prevention of
interference with hunting, especially that of birds. Their conclusion that Chapter 16 was
not originally intended to create or confirm public rights to fish appears reasonable, 365
albeit based on limited evidence.
Moore and Moore, however, carried their assertions further, and maintained that not
only did the Crown have the original power to put rivers ‘in defence’, but that their
analysis proved that the existence of those powers confirmed the Crown was ‘vested’ with
the right of fishing in tidal waters and rivers. They further concluded that the ‘privilege
for the public [to fish] at that period was a mere tacit license revocable at will’.366 Their
argument has three key weaknesses. Firstly, as they noted themselves, the evidence is
scant367 and their argument is speculative in nature.368 Secondly, as noted above, fisheries
could be granted out as ‘regalia’ of the Crown and grants did not require the prior
ownership of the Crown.369 Finally, their conclusion is not consistent with the authority
of Bracton on the limited rights of the Crown regarding fish in the 1200s, as described
earlier.
Moore and Moore’s conclusions as to the antiquity of the ownership of the Crown of
tidal rivers and fisheries depend, therefore, on an over-reliance on the wording of later
writs putting rivers ‘in defence’ without appropriate weight given to other sources and
historical context. Their methodology reveals the risks of a narrow antiquarian
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approach370 focused on surviving legal documents, rather than a broader approach that
takes into account a diverse set of sources. Certainly, research by Fenn into the origin of
rights to the territorial sea371 does not support their conclusions. Moore and Moore
themselves acknowledge that exclusive fisheries could be granted out by the Crown based
on its ‘regalia’.372
Moore and Moore’s conclusions on the Magna Carta and Crown ownership, although
unsound, appear to have influenced both legal scholars373 and judges374 and may have
misled them over the degree of ‘ownership’ by the Crown of tidal fisheries. Moore and
Moore were cited as a source in the Blue Mud Bay Case.375 The majority judgment also
referred to the first edition of Halsbury’s Laws of England.376 As H Stuart Moore was the
editor of the fisheries section,377 this is effectively a citation back to the same source. In
the influential case of Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for
Canada,378 it is difficult not to see criticism of Moore and Moore’s approach in the
judgment, delivered by Lord Haldane, that some of the arguments presented were ‘a
matter of historical and antiquarian interest only’.379
Taking into account the limitations of the surviving sources, all that can be said with
confidence on the original intent of Chapter 16 of the Magna Carta is that the Crown was
forced to concede its prerogative to restrict access to riverbanks. Regardless of its original
meaning, however, Chapter 16 became a key authority for the proposition that after 1215
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the Crown could not create private fisheries in England.380 Although not necessarily
representing an accurate statement of the law at the time, The Mirror of Justices381
demonstrates that, as early as the late 1200s, the argument that Chapter 16 protected the
public right to fish was being advanced.
d) Chapter 23: Fishing Weirs and Fishery Protection
Another possible source for a public right to fish lies in Chapter 23 of the Magna
Carta. The argument for Chapter 23 as a source is that it imposed a restriction on the
construction of fishing weirs.382 This in turn prevented the creation of new private
fisheries. Over time this specific restriction evolved into a more general right of the public
to fish.383
Chapter 23 provides that:
Omnes kidelli deponanturde cetero penitus per Tamisiam et Medweyam et per totam
Angliam nisi per costeram maris.
All Kydells for the future shall be removed altogether from Thames and Medway, and
throughout all England, except upon the seashore.384

Chapter 23 does not mention fisheries or fishery protection directly. This does not
mean that it was unrelated to fisheries, but the prime motivation behind Chapter 23 was
likely the removal of fishing weirs that had become an obstruction to navigation.385 The
City of London had a clear interest in navigation on the Thames and it was a key supporter
of the rebellion that led to the signing of the Magna Carta. Prior to 1215, the city had
purchased rights over the Thames from Richard I, and no doubt resented that it had to
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again pay John I to have these rights confirmed.386 Holt specifically attributed the
inclusion of Chapter 23 to ‘the Londoners’.387 Supporting the argument that navigation
was the principal concern of Chapter 23, an earlier document, the Anglo Saxon
Constitution (likely written between 1150 and 1175), referred only to a royal duty to
destroy obstructions on navigable waterways.388 Further support for the proposition that
Chapter 23 was directed towards the protection of navigation along rivers can be found
in the broad exemption provided for weirs on the coast.389 Given the extent and economic
importance of weirs at the time, it is unlikely that Chapter 23 was intended to require the
removal of all weirs. Later legal opinion was that the prohibitions in Chapter 23 were
directed only to new weirs.390
The question is, therefore, how did Chapter 23 come to be a support for the public
right to fish? Anthony Scott outlined a plausible argument connecting Chapter 23 to
public rights to fish in his book, The Evolution of Resource Property Rights.391 According
to this account, the restriction on weirs in the Magna Carta started a chain of
circumstances whereby a prohibition on weirs became a royal undertaking not to grant
further rights to fish using fixed fishing apparatus (in other words, equipment fixed to the
subsurface soil). This prohibition was progressively extended to ‘all rivers, and hence, all
tidal waters, including coastal water’, eventually evolving into ‘a positive obligation to
protect and enforce today’s public right of fishing’.392
There was certainly regular legislative attention to fisheries protection from 1278
onwards. Rights to fish developed in conjunction with developments in the regulation of
fisheries, a point relevant to later discussions on the interaction of rights to fish and
legislation. In part two of their text, Moore and Moore cite 14 instances of legislative
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action to protect fisheries between in 1278 and 1558, and further observe that local courts
of admiralty exercised jurisdiction with bylaws on mesh size, fishing engines and closed
times in ports and rivers.393 Corporations associated with ports and rivers and lords of
manors on the coast had similar courts.394 It was not until 1403, however, that legislation
appeared explicitly connecting restrictions on weirs with the goal of the protection of
fisheries.395 In 1472 legislation expressly linked the Magna Carta to both navigation and
fisheries protection.396
This being the case, what was the likely influence of Chapter 23 of the Magna Carta
on the development of the public right to fish? The protection of navigation was almost
certainly the original concern behind the inclusion of Chapter 23. Given the evolution of
English legislation up until 1472, the logic suggested by Scott whereby Chapter 23
evolved into a more general public right is plausible, but it is best seen as but one
contributing element to the development of a public right to fish. Past legal authority,
such as Malcolmson v O’Dea397, relies on Chapter 16, and legislation did not show a clear
link between the regulation of fisheries and the Magna Carta until 1472, over two
centuries after its signing.
e) Access and Use: Chapters 16 and 23
Regardless of its intent, Chapter 23 had the practical effect of protecting use rights
to fisheries by restricting further private appropriation of fisheries through the
construction of new weirs. A right to fish in a tidal river is of little value if extensive weirs
have already appropriated all the fish going past. Chapter 16 was a limitation on powers
of the Crown to restrict access to the banks of rivers, and hence protected access rights to
fisheries. Accordingly, both rights of use and access were protected in the Magna Carta,
if not to the degree later claimed. A narrative that proposes simplistically that the public
right to fish was established by the Magna Carta cannot be justified, however, these
elements of the Magna Carta provided fertile grounds for the development of the English
public right to fish.
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D. The Emergence of a Public Right to Fish?
1.
The Evolving ‘Public’ 1215–1500
The development of English rights to fish from the late 1200s to the 1500s must be
considered in the context of changes in ‘rights’ more generally. At the beginning of this
period, the inferior legal status of many people would have meant that they did not have
direct access to the royal courts, but only manorial courts,398 a significant disadvantage in
claiming rights against their lord. It is only in the context of feudal relationships waning
in importance that it is sensible to speak of a ‘general public’ in relation to rights to fish.
By way of example, the right to a trial in the Magna Carta was initially restricted to those
who had the status of ‘free men’, but by 1354, these rights were extended to all men of
‘whatsoever estate’.399
Notwithstanding a significant extension of rights by 1500, it should not be assumed
that there was a consistent advance in rights across all areas of the law. After the Magna
Carta was issued, some feudal powers and controls were in fact strengthened, and in the
period up to the 1400s, general access to the wastelands of manors (land not used for
cultivation or pasture, presumably including fisheries) may have been reduced by
manorial lords.400 Some aspects of feudalism were maintained well into the 1500s.401
Nonetheless, by 1286 it has been estimated that likely half the peasants of south central
England had gained their legal freedom402 and by 1500, ‘distinctions of status still basic
in many communities in 1348 had largely gone by 1500, together with labour service and
other manifestations of servility’.403
2.
Emergence of public rights to fish
Supplementing the questionable support for the Magna Carta as a source for the right
in The Mirror of Justices,404 there is evidence by the early 1300s of the Magna Carta’s
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emerging relevance to the protection of fishing rights. In 1302, a commission of enquiry
was set up into the construction of weirs in Oxford, Buckinghamshire, Berks and Surrey.
The terms of the commission specified that the weir’s impact on fish was against the
Magna Carta.405 Thompson cites this enquiry as evidence for a ‘popular attitude’ that
Chapter 23 and fishing were associated.406 The terms of the enquiry certainly suggest a
link with fisheries, and the Magna Carta had some degree of credibility by this time.
Given that, after 1297, the Magna Carta was required to be ‘read before the people twice
a year’,407 it is plausible that novel views could have arisen in the general population as
to the meaning of its provisions.
In the early 1300s the Magna Carta was cited in a complaint, described by Moore
and Moore, in an ongoing dispute over fishing and navigation rights between the citizens
of York and the Earl of Cornwall.408 The dispute dated back at least to 1280. In 1282, the
citizens of York received an initial verdict in their favour that ‘from time of memory they
were free to every one of the people to fish’. The dispute did not end there. In 1314, the
citizens of York made a further petition to the ‘king in parliament’, now with an added
reference to the Magna Carta, stating that the river had been put into defence (made
exclusive) against the terms of the Magna Carta (presumably, in this context, Chapter 16).
Moore and Moore’s research did not uncover a record of the outcome of this petition, and
the case was possibly decided against the City of York, given that they found evidence of
rents relating to the fishery being paid until 1438.409 Regardless of the outcome, this
dispute demonstrates that by 1314 (but possibly not as early as 1280) the Magna Carta
was cited as supporting rights to fish.
In summary, even if in the late 1200s The Mirror of Justices410 may not have reflected
a widespread view as to the effect of the Magna Carta, by the early 1300s there is evidence
that those pursuing ‘rights’ to fish were enlisting the Magna Carta as support for their
cause. Certainly, in 1314 the citizens of York believed that a reference to the Magna Carta
would improve their chances. Considering the limitations of historical enquiry as outlined
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in Chapter 1, this does not prove that the law had changed, or was in the process of
changing, but it is certainly suggestive of the latter possibility.
3.
A probable date — 1472?
Although claims were made connecting rights to fish to the Magna Carta before 1472,
the evidence of a legal claim is not evidence that such claims were officially or widely
accepted. As noted above, however, in 1472 legislation specifically linked the Magna
Carta with the goal of fisheries protection.411 Furthermore, societal and legal shifts more
generally made it plausible that there was a ‘public’ to which ‘public’ rights to fishing
could accrue. By 1472, therefore, two critical elements had come together; there was an
emerging ‘public’, and an expectation that the Crown had a duty to take action (i.e. by
legislation mandated by the Magna Carta) to protect rights to fish. The late 1400s seems,
therefore, a reasonable date for the emergence of a public right to fish being recognised
by the common law, in a manner consistent with the Birthright/Magna Carta account of
the origin of the public right to fish. A date later than 1500 for the emergence of the right
is possible, given that clear judicial support for the common law doctrine of the public
right to fish did not emerge until the late 1600s.412 Dates later than the early 1500s,
however, seem unlikely given that the right was apparently assumed as a generally
accepted legal doctrine by Digges in 1567.413
This does not mean that fishing by the public was universally or even broadly ‘free’
in 1472. Any public rights coexisted with the extensive private rights associated with
manorial estates, as well as with rights to fisheries granted directly by the Crown. An
insight as to how the interaction between exclusive rights regarding specific fisheries and
the activities of local inhabitants might have coexisted in practice (albeit later, in 1599)
is seen in the report of Sir John Constable’s Case. 414 In the report, Chief Justice Popham
stated:
I have seen weirs which at full sea are two leagues out in the sea, and which have
always been demised … as parcel of the manor; and at low water they were clear of the
sea, and the copyholder had the fishery there; but at full sea it is common for any man to
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fish there as in the sea, and then neither the lord nor the copyholder has anything to do
there.415
This comment illustrates how coexisting uses of fisheries might have been resolved
at a local level. The prior and exclusive legal right of the adjacent landholder to use the
fishery by means of weirs remained, but there was coexisting access and use by local
fishers.
E. Crown Ownership 1472–1680
A further possible source of the public right to fish is that it derives from an assumed,
exercise of the prerogative of the Crown in favour of the public. No specific documentary
evidence for such a grant has been found. There is, however, little documentary material
of any kind on the development of the common law doctrine of the public right to fish
from 1472 until 1570.416 The policy of the English Crown at this time was to encourage
fishing, including that by foreign fishers. In his review of the history of the claims of the
English Crown over sovereignty of the seas, Fulton observed that it was only in 1570 that
he could find records of English complaints against the activities of these foreign
fishers.417 He contrasted this relaxed approach in England with resistance to foreign
fishing in Scotland over the same period.418
In 1570, a new account of the source of the public right to fish emerged based on
claims by Tudor and Stuart kings and queens to the ownership of the seas surrounding
England. Expansive claims by the Crown in relation to ownership of the seas were to find
their apogee in the writing of John Selden in his text Of the Dominion or Ownership of
the Sea, published in English in 1652, but composed some time earlier.419 The theory that
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the public right to fish is sourced in prior Crown ownership, and represents a privilege
granted, or assumed to have been granted, by the Crown, adds to the Bracton/Natural Law
and Birthright/Magna Carta accounts of the origin of the public right to fish.
Notwithstanding shifts over time in English public policy,420 claims by the Crown to
ownership of the seas were recognised by the courts and, with significant modification,
were incorporated into later accounts of the public right to fish.
F. Claims by the Crown 1570–1680
1.
The Crown’s Right to the Shore
After 1570, explicit claims emerged that the Crown owned the seas, foreshores and
tidal rivers of England. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to dwell on the shifts in
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the seas that led to this change in public policy (and the
subsequent contraction of these claims). These issues have been covered by others.421
Instead, the focus of the rest of this chapter is on the aspects of those claims that directly
influenced the development of the public right to fish.
Thomas Digges made the first clear claim in favour of the Crown’s legal ownership
of shores of tidal rivers and the sea in 1567 or 1568.422 Digges presented his arguments
in a treatise entitled ‘Proofs of the Queen’s Interest in Lands left by the Sea and the Salt
Shores Therof’.423 Digges’ position was not that of a disinterested party; he was a ‘title
hunter’424 who, through undermining the title of others in favour of the Crown, sought to
claim for himself title by a later grant or patent from the Crown.425 Notwithstanding the
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historically questionable arguments made by Digges,426 English law did come to
incorporate a presumption that the shores adjacent to estates belonged to the Crown, at
least unless the adjacent owner could provide proof that the shore had been granted out
prior to the operation of the Magna Carta.427 A key point for the later development of the
public right to fish is that areas subject to Crown ownership were (or later became) subject
to rights of public access. To the extent there was a right of access by the public to the
shore, both the interests of the public and the Crown were aligned against private claims
of ownership and exclusive access. It is possible that a side effect of this extension of
Crown ownership under the Tudors and Stuarts aided the preservation and extension of
public access to the shores of England.
After these claims had been made, a general right of access by the public to the shore
was asserted in 1622 in a series of law lectures on rivers and drains delivered by Robert
Callis. These lectures had a long-lasting influence, with the last printed edition published
some 250 years after their delivery.428 In relation to the shore, Callis distinguished English
law from Roman law on the question of whether the shore was common to all.429 Callis,
like Digges, held that the Crown generally owned the shore (using the Latin word
proprietatem), but he also stated that the public was entitled to the use of the shore.430
Callis gave as an example the right of fishers to load and unload boats and to dry their
nets.431 He further stated that any private rights a subject could acquire in the shore by
prescription were subject to such public use. The significance of this limitation is that for
a private person to gain an exclusive right by prescription,432 the interest claimed must
have been capable of having originated in a lawful grant.
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If the Crown’s interest was limited in favour of the public in the manner suggested
by Callis, it is only a very short step to the proposition, well accepted by the 1800s,433
that grants from the Crown to the low watermark could not exclude rights of use by the
public. It is possible that one of the legal attributes of the common law doctrine of the
public right to fish — the rule that a Crown grant over the shore (to the low watermark)
would not normally include a grant of exclusive rights — dates to this period.434
2.
The Crown’s Right to Fisheries
In 1568 or 1569, in the course of seeking support for his (then novel) argument as to
the ownership by the Crown of the shores, Digges also commented on property in the seas
by stating that the Crown had:
benne content to suffer fishermen Jure gentium … such fish as … they can in the
Englishe Seas take, Yet haue the Kings of England for remembrance of this their favoure
that the memoire of their propertie in the seas shoulde not be extinguished, alwaie
res(er)ved to themselves the Chief fishe as Sturgeon Whale &c. 435

Digges relies on the existence of a limited interest by the Crown in royal fishes
(whales and sturgeon) to provide support for a broader claim, that of the ownership by
the Kings of England of the English seas. Rights to fish had not hitherto been justified as
being dependant on, or flowing from, the Crown’s ‘propertie in the seas’. This novel
argument by Digges appears to be the first recorded instance of a new original source for
the public right to fish, that of a right created out of Crown property.
Later in 1611, the Crown’s rights to fisheries, and the connection to its ownership of
tidal rivers and the seas, was considered in The Case of the Royal Piscarie of the Banne.436
The report of the case states that:
Every navigable river as high as the sea flows and re-flows in it is a royal river, and
the fishery of it is a royal fishery, and appertains to the King by his prerogative … The
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reason why the King has interest in such a river is because such river partakes of the nature
of the sea, and is called an arm of the sea as far as it flows … the sea is of the ligeance of
the King as of his crown of England, but it is also his proper inheritance … And that the
King has the same prerogative and interest in the arms of the sea and navigable rivers as
high as the sea flows and re-flows in them as he has in the high sea is manifest in many
authorities [none actually cited].437

This case distinguished between the rights of the king emanating from the Crown of
England and those that are his ‘proper inheritance’, with the latter presumably closer in
nature to private property (and hence less susceptible to supervision by parliament). The
case is somewhat equivocal on the extent (as opposed to the existence) of such
prerogatives. Rather than outlining the extent of such prerogatives, it found they were the
same as in the ‘high sea’. This case was heard in a time of expansive claims over the
extent of the powers and prerogatives of the Crown.438 Furthermore, these claims were
made during a period of controversy over the degree to which courts were independent
of the Crown and the degree to which the Crown was subject to the authority and scrutiny
of parliament. The authority of this case should be considered weak on these grounds.
The special legal status of the River Banne fishery also reduces the weight of
authority that is appropriate to attribute to this case. The record of the case makes it clear
that this fishery had already been granted out to a private subject by a charter from the
Crown.439 The fishery had then come back into the ownership of the Crown440 and so was
in this sense a ‘royal’ fishery, regardless of any broader claim by the Crown. As has been
noted earlier, the feudal right to grant fisheries relied on the ‘regalia’ of the crown, not
prior ownership. There is an apparent conflation in the case of questions relating to the
Crown’s general interests in seas and rivers with the Crown’s ownership of this discrete
fishery established by charter. Even Hale, who later supported an expansive view of the
interests of the Crown (and referred to this case as a key support for his views),
commented that the Banne river was a royal river as one of the ‘fluvii regales’ under the
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king’s care and protection, rather than the river being royal due to the ‘propriety of the
river’.441
This case appears to be the principal, and earliest, legal precedent for later arguments
that the Crown originally owned all fisheries in the navigable rivers of England, as well
as fisheries in the seas surrounding England. The case is certainly evidence of the
strengthening of claims by the Crown to fisheries in tidal rivers. The authority of this case
for the proposition that the Crown originally owned all these fisheries is weakened by
uncertainty as to what the dispute was in fact about. That fisheries in tidal rivers are
inherently royal fisheries and owned by the Crown garnered little later judicial support.
The proposition that the Crown owned the soil of the shores, tidal rivers and seabed
around England did come to be generally accepted.442
3.
Lord Hale and De Juris Maris
Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice between 1671 and 1676,443 was a pre-eminent
authority of his time on English law, including the law of the sea.444 Sometime before his
death in 1679, Hale prepared a manuscript titled A Treatise De Juris Maris et
Brachiourum Ejusdem (‘De Juris Maris’).445 This manuscript was not intended for
publication and was not published until 1787 by Francis Hargrave.446 The delay in
publishing Hale’s treatise is significant in considering its influence on the law. 447 Written
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long before Blackstone completed his Commentaries in 1769,448 delayed publication of
De Juris Maris makes it likely that its principal legal influence occurred after the first
publication of Blackstone’s treatises.449 Blackstone had instead followed the earlier
approach of Coke in relation to rights to fish, and does not refer to the prerogatives of the
Crown consistently with Hale.
On the rights of the Crown, Hale in De Juris Maris stated that:
In this sea the King of England has a double right, viz, a right of jurisdiction which he
ordinarily excerciseth by his admiral and a right of propriety or ownership. The latter is
that which I will meddle with … the right of fishing in this sea and the creeks and arms
thereof is originally lodged in the crown, as the right of depasturing is originally lodged in
the owner of the waste whereof he is lord, or as the right of fishing belongs to him that is
the owner of a private or inland river.450

It was a well-accepted English legal doctrine that rights of fishing in an inland
(freshwater and non-tidal) river flowed from private ownership of the underlying soil.451
Hale drew a direct analogy between these rights and the rights that the Crown452 had in
the sea. For this proposition, Hale cited Selden in Mare Clausum453 as having provided
authority ‘abundantly proved’ for the proposition that the sea adjoining England454 was
part of the ‘waste and demesnes and dominions’ of the King of England.455 Hale proposed
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an account of the source of the Crown’s rights to the sea, tidal areas and rivers,456 which
did not depend on special rights such as the ‘regalia’ of the Crown, asserting that the
Crown is the owner of the sea as if it were land. The cases used by Hale as authority for
his propositions, however, do not appear to justify such a broad claim; certainly, not one
made in such definitive terms.457 Nonetheless, Hale’s description of the public right to
fish cited above has been influential;458 although as noted above, the influence of De Juris
Maris should be dated to after its publication in 1787.
Hale’s analogy to feudal lands, however, begins to fray when he describes the rights
that the Crown, the public and private landowners have in the seas. Given that Hale took
the position that the king owns the seas as a logical legal consequence, the common
people of England would have a mere ‘liberty’459 to fish at will from the Crown. Hale
does indeed classify the public right to fish as a ‘liberty’, but he then immediately
qualifies the Crown’s interest (emphasis added):
But though the King is the owner of this great waste, and as a consequence of his
propriety hath the primary right of fishing in the sea and the creeks and arms thereof; yet
the common people of England have regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea and creeks of
the sea as a publick common of piscary, and may not without injury to their right be
restrained of it, unless in such places or creeks or navigable rivers, where either the King,
or some particular subject hath gained a propriety exclusive of that common liberty.460

Hale’s legal logic here is problematic at best. If the Crown had the primary right, then
the Crown should not need to show it had gained a ‘propriety’ exclusive of that ‘common
liberty’. Indeed, a presumption against the Crown is at odds with the general presumption
in favour of the right of the Crown over the foreshore unless it had been specifically
granted out to the owners of adjoining manors.461
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Hale’s description of the legal attributes of the interest of the Crown shows a broad
similarity to the earlier treatment of this subject by Callis (in 1622).462 In his lectures,
Callis stated that the Crown has ‘the property, profit and possession’ in the sea, but when
he later provides details of that interest, he gives very limited examples, including lands
relinquished by the sea, and ‘wreck, flotsam, jetson, ligan and great fishes’.463 Callis starts
with a broad general statement as to the interests of the Crown, but the details suggest
that only a limited interest was recognised at the time.
Elsewhere in De Juris Maris, Hale describes the kind of ownership the king might
have in the seas in significantly less emphatic terms than he used earlier:
for he [the king] is in a capacity of acquiring the narrow and adjacent sea to this
dominion by a kind of possession [emphasis added]which is not compatible to a subject;
and accordingly the king hath regularly that property in the sea: but a subject hath not nor
indeed cannot have that property in the sea, through a whole tract of it, that the king hath;
because without a regular power he cannot possibly possess it. 464

In this passage, Hale again appears to have acknowledged that there is a difference
between the type of ‘ownership’ that flows from sovereignty of the sea and that ‘kind of
possession’ which is associated with private property and private ownership.
Hale did accept that in some circumstances a private subject could obtain an interest
in the sea, but he limited this possibility to that part of the sea that is immediately adjacent
to the shore, a ‘districtus maris … as he may reasonably possess’.465 Once again, if the
king’s rights to the sea were truly the same as that of a private property owner in a river,
there seems to be no reason at law why the king could not have granted ownership of the
sea to a subject (notwithstanding the practical difficulties involved).
4.
Conclusions on Sovereignty and Ownership
Four conclusions can be drawn from Hale’s exposition on sovereignty and ownership
in De Juris Maris.466 Firstly, even under the most expansive view of the interests of the
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Crown, there is still a public right to fish. Secondly, the prerogatives of the Crown must
be specifically, and ‘lawfully’, exercised to exclude this public right. Thirdly, the
language used by Hale is not consistent with a proposition that the public right to fish is
a mere licence at will extended by the Crown. The analogy Hale makes between the public
and a ‘common of piscary’ suggests the rights of the public are analogous to customary
rights rather than representing mere permission through default prohibition.467 Fourthly,
Hale recognises only a very limited private right capable of being recognised in the sea.
Hale’s views should be read in the appropriate context. Hale’s account reconciles
official Crown policy with what was likely already established law and practice
surrounding the public’s right to fish. Ironically, the policy context for Hale’s views had
radically changed by the time his text became publicly available. By 1787, English public
policy supported the freedom of the seas and recognised very limited claims of
sovereignty.468 In Chapter 3, the approach of English courts in the 1800s and early 1900s
to the type of ownership the Crown might have in fisheries will be examined in more
detail.
G. Conclusions: The Right to 1680
Prior to 1000, archaeological evidence suggests that the most important right to fish
in England was the right to fish in rivers and estuaries and the right to construct weirs to
do so. It is likely that by 1200, rights of access to and control over rivers and estuaries
had been widely granted as part of manors. There appears to have been a degree of shared
access, based on the Tidenham charter. At this time, however, to speak of manorial rights
as coexisting with a ‘public right’ to fish would be premature, given evidence on the broad
extent of grants that had been made and the inferior legal status of much of the population.
Between 1200 and 1500, the sources of two potential accounts of the origin of the public
right can be identified. The first of these accounts relies on Bracton/Natural Law as
evidence of an early form of a public right to fish. Bracton wrote that the seas and shores
were ‘common’,469 albeit he adapted Roman law to acknowledge the reality of widespread
grants over the shore. Notwithstanding Crown assertions at the time of ownership of
wildlife generally, Bracton described only limited rights of the Crown over fish and
fisheries.
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The second potential source for the public right to fish is outlined in Birthright/Magna
Carta accounts. The Magna Carta features strongly in these accounts, either as the origin
for the public right to fish, or as a base for the later legal development of it. There seems
to be little evidence that the Magna Carta was originally intended to create public rights
to fish, yet by the early 1300s there is evidence that the Magna Carta was being linked to
‘rights’ relating to fishing. In 1472, the Magna Carta was cited in legislation directed to
the protection and regulation of fisheries. Given rights in general had become more
widely extended by this time, 1472 seems a reasonable date by which a ‘public’ right to
fish can be said to have become broadly accepted as part of the common law.
By 1570, a new account of the source of the public right to fish emerged based on
claims of ownership by the Crown (and its supporters) over the seas and foreshores of
England. Written in 1679, but published in 1787, Hale’s De Juris Maris supported the
existence of a public right to fish, but now on the basis that it flowed from the prior
ownership by the Crown. The practical effect of this new account was that, following
Hale, claims for an exclusive fishery in tidal rivers and the sea would need to succeed not
just against a public right to fish, but also against a presumption of prior ownership by
the Crown.
This survey shows that there has been a variety of disparate influences on the
development of the right, from late Roman law to English claims to sovereignty and
ownership over the seas. Rather than the existence of a simple narrative resting on a single
historical source, each of these three sources contributed to the development of the public
right to fish. Indeed, there may even be different historical sources for the different
elements of the common law doctrine of the public right to fish.470 In later chapters, this
nuanced view of the origins of the common law doctrine of the public right to fish will
be applied in considering the more recent development of the right. These chapters will
also demonstrate how later writers and jurists, by giving different weight to the three
primary accounts for the origin of the right to fish, come to very different conclusions on
the nature and extent of the right.
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CHAPTER 3: THE RECEIVED RIGHT
A. Introduction
This chapter reviews the evolution of the right from 1700 to 1975. The first part of
this chapter focuses on developments in English law from 1700–1914 drawing on
reported cases and key authorities. This part highlights unresolved conflicts over the
source of the right. The second part focuses on the reception of the right into Australian
law.471 Due to a lack of early Australian cases on the public right,472 alternative sources
are used to demonstrate the reception of the right into Australian law. In the final part of
this chapter, it is concluded that the public right to fish was received into Australian law
in the 1800s with its principal features, as laid out by the Privy Council in 1914.473
Disputes over origin and source outlined by the authors and cases cited in this chapter,
however, were not resolved by the Privy Council nor by the High Court in 1975 in NSW
v Commonwealth (‘Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case’).474 Questions about the source
and legal attributes of the right re-emerged after 1987, when novel competing interests
arose based on Indigenous rights and new forms of statutory fishing schemes.
In this chapter, two key contextual factors are of significance: shifting public policies
on the ownership of the seas and the influence on the development of English law of cases
involving ancient estates.475 Australia, in contrast with England, was colonised after
public policy shifted to favour the freedom of the seas. Furthermore, there is no Australian
equivalent to English ancient estates over the marine domain. These differences detract
from the authority of case law from this period and cast doubt on the utility of relying on
statements of contemporaneous legal writers. A key conclusion of this chapter and of this
thesis more generally is that differences in context should be recognised along with the
potential for Australian adaptation of the right.
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B. The Right 1680 – 1914
1.
Political History and the Right
As noted in the introduction, the period reviewed in this chapter saw significant shifts
in public policy towards the interests of the state in the marine domain and on the
ownership of the sea. Justice Jacob in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case noted that
the history of shifts in the claims by the English Crown over the seas ‘lies not in legal
history but in political history’.476 A full account of these shifts are beyond the scope of
this thesis, however, some broad observations are made below to guide the interpretation
of legal sources from this period. Over the period covered by this chapter, England
developed into an imperial sea power and its public policy shifted from claims of
ownership of the seas477 to support for the freedom of the seas, with limited territorial sea
rights.478 Notwithstanding a public policy shift away from expansive claims to territorial
rights to an emphasis on the freedom of the seas, the English Crown never formally
abandoned its claims of ownership of the seas surrounding the British Isles.479 Much of
the marine domain of England is held by the Crown Estate,480 and many coastal areas and
tidal rivers are still held by private landholders whose rights derive from ancient estates.
Finally, in reviewing cases for the period 1688–1914, it should be noted that the
underlying dispute is often over private rights claimed to have been established by an
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ancient royal grant.481 These cases have a focus on the extent and validity of old royal
titles and ancient fisheries.482 This focus obscures significant political, legal and social
changes affecting the context in which the public right to fish was exercised. These
changes include; the devolution of the management rights of the Crown to state
agencies,483 increasing regulation of both private and public fisheries in England since
the mid-1830s484 and, from the 1800s, increasing interest in relation to recreational use of
the marine domain.485 These shifts are little discussed in the cases, with Blundell v
Catterall486 being a notable exception.
2.

English Cases 1688–1863
a) Cases before 1787 — A Common Formula
Chapter 2 concluded with Lord Fitzwalter’s Case in 1674 in which Lord Justice Hale
stated that ‘the common sort of fishing is common to all’.487 The late 1600s and early-tomid-1700s saw further judicial elaboration on the public right to fish, and how the public
right might be excluded.488 In none of these cases was the existence of the public right to
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fish in contention, nor was it presented as being sourced in an exercise of the prerogative
of the Crown. Cases from this period are significant as they date to the period after the
Glorious Revolution in England in 1688, but before the publication of De Juris Maris in
1787.489
Warren v Matthews in 1703,490 Ward v Creswell491 in 1741 and Carter v Murcot in
1768492 all provide evidence of the acceptance of three key legal propositions that were
accepted prior to the publication of De Juris Maris in 1787.493 Firstly, there was a public
right to fish in the sea, tidal areas and navigable rivers.494 Secondly, the public right could
only be excluded by grant or prescription.495 Finally, the public right was subject to
regulation, for example that the public must use ‘lawful nets’.496 These propositions have
much in common with those outlined in 1989 in Harper v Minister of Sea Fisheries
(‘Harper’).497
These cases do not, however, give clear guidance on the relationship between the
rights of the Crown and the rights of the public. The cases tend to provide support for the
proposition that the public right to fish did not derive from the Crown, but they do not
provide unambiguous guidance on this point. Warren v Mathews is reported in both
Salkeld’s Reports498 and the Modern Reports.499 The Modern Reports500 is the more
detailed and in it Chief Justice Holt stated that ‘the King’s grant cannot bar them [the
public] thereof but the Crown only has a right to Royal fish, and that the King only may
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grant’.501 In Carter v Murcot,502 Lord Mansfield stated that ‘the fishery is common: it is
prima facie, in the King, and is public’.503 Only Justice Yates in Carter v Murcot504
referred to ‘ownership’ by the King when referring to seas and navigable rivers,505 but he
also stated that those rights were both in the ‘King and the public’.506 As noted in Chapters
1 and 2, it is only after the publication of Hale’s De Juris Maris in 1787507 that the
proposition that the right was preceded by a property-like interest of the King received
explicit, if conditional, judicial support.
b) Cases between 1787 and 1863
After 1787, Hale’s influence can be discerned in the Law Reports, both from
arguments of counsel and in the judgments themselves.508 Hale’s De Juris Maris is
referred to extensively in Blundell v Catterall.509 The judgments in this case were
noteworthy for directly addressing the question of the public interest in access to the
foreshore.510 In Blundell v Catterall, the majority declined to support a general right of
access to the shore for non-fishing purposes (such as bathing). By doing so, it protected
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the interests of private property owners in the marine domain. 511 Justices Holroyd and
Bayley did accept there was a public interest in access for purposes such as bathing, but
assumed that bathing would be permitted in areas that had not been specifically granted
out by the King.512
On the relationship between the public interest and the interest of the King, there was
a divergence of opinion in the court. All judges of the court referred to Hale and the
ownership by the King of the marine domain, but they described the ownership by the
King in different ways. Justice Holroyd stated that ‘by common law … the shore as well
as the sea … belongs to the King, yet it is true the same are also … clothed with a public
interest’.513 Justice Holroyd cited Hale as authority on ownership of the shore by the
King,514 but he appeared to conceive of the interest of the King as being of a special and
limited nature rather than being analogous to private ownership. In a similar vein, Justice
Bayley stated, ‘the property [the shore] is prima facie in the King’ but qualified this by
further stating that ‘many of the King’s rights are to a certain extent for the benefit of his
subjects’.515
Justice Best, in the minority, was prepared to recognise a common law right to bathe.
At the beginning of his judgment, Justice Best stated that ‘[i]t is agreed by all, that the
sea-shore was at first appropriated to the King, from whom the right to it must be
derived’.516 This statement is consistent with the views of Hale in De Juris Maris. Justice
Best, however, then qualified the interest of the King using the term ‘public trust’:
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Blundell v Catterall (1821) 106 ER 1190, 1206 (Abbott CJ) ‘Public convenience, however, is, in all cases,
to be viewed with a due regard to private property.’
512

Blundell v Catterall (1821) 106 ER 1190, 1202 (Holroyd J), 1204 (Bayley J).

513

Ibid, 1201.

514

Ibid, and Hale is also cited by him earlier at 1197.

515

Ibid, 1203 (Abbott CJ). Abbott CJ did not express an opinion on the source of any purported public right,
rejecting the public right to bathe principally on the legal ground that it was a novel proposition
unsupported by the common law. At 1205, ‘If the right exist now, it must have existed at all times; but we
know that sea bathing was, until a time comparatively modern, a matter of no frequent occurrence.’
516

Ibid, 1193.

84

it [the shore] was holden by the King, like the sea and the highways, for all his subjects.
The soil could only be transferred, subject to this public trust; and general usage shews that
the public right has been excepted out of the grant of the soil.517

Justice Best found that any grant from the King would, by ‘general usage’, be subject
to the foreshore being ‘left open as a common highway between the sea and the land’.518
It appears he had in mind a general interpretative rule to be applied to grants. Justice
Best’s use of the term ‘public trust’ is of interest, given its similarities to the language
used in American cases from this period519 on the ownership of the shore and tidal waters.
It is possible that, if the views of Justice Best had prevailed, the foundations for the
development of a public trust doctrine might have been more firmly outlined in English
law.
Despite differences in approach, each of Justices Holroyd, Bayley and Best found
that there was material difference between the nature of the interest of the King and that
of the private owner.520 The nature, if any, of the Crown’s ownership is relevant to the
issue raised in later chapters as to whether the public right is sourced in the prerogatives
of the Crown, and subject to limitations of the prerogative, or is a public right of a broader
kind.
3.

United Kingdom Cases: 1863 to 1914
a) Of a ‘Legal’ Origin
The three cases from the early 1700s discussed above confirm the existence of a
public right to fish.521 Furthermore, it was clear that for those intending to exclude the
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public, the onus of proof was on them to demonstrate an exclusive private right.522 The
reported judgments, however, did not set out in detail the evidence that might be required
to establish an exclusive private right. This issue was central to the dispute in Malcomson
v O’Dea.523 Up until the decision of the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea,524 it was
a legally tenable argument525 that a royal grant of an exclusive fishery might have been
valid up until the late 1600s and early 1700s.526 For example, in De Juris Maris, Hale
referred to grants of private fisheries in the present tense, as if the king still had the power
to grant them.527 The first of the tests applied in Malcomson v O’Dea528 was that there
had to be evidence that a private fishery had been in existence for a long time. Secondly,
that there was the possibility a royal grant had been made before the Magna Carta.
Together these are the test of whether or not the fishery had a ‘legal origin’.529 The
evidence required by the House of Lords to meet this test of a ‘legal origin’ does not seem
to have been particularly rigorous. In this case the House of Lords found that a grant
before the time of Henry II was possible, notwithstanding that the earliest unequivocal
written evidence of a grant was under Elizabeth I. The court construed the earlier evidence
by ‘the light of subsequent user’. The House of Lords noted that there was ‘no
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improbability’ of an even earlier appropriation by the ‘Ostmen’ (Vikings) or Irish
princes.530
Given there are no old royal grants in Australia, ownership based on such grants
would merely be of antiquarian significance, except that this case touched on the
underlying nature of the interest of the Crown in the foreshore, tidal waters and out to the
sea.531 The requirement for an exclusive fishery to have its legal origin in an ancient
Crown grant was confirmed by the Privy Council in 1914 in a Canadian case.532 The
requirement of a ‘legal origin’ to support a claim for an exclusive fishery has had a
significant impact on Australian law and has limited the recognition of exclusive
Indigenous rights to the marine domain.533 This point will be considered in detail in later
chapters.
The judgment by the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea534 is consistent with the
Birthright/Magna Carta account of the origin of the public right,535 whereby the power of
the Crown to restrict a pre-existing public right to fish was restrained by the Magna
Carta.536 There is no reference by the Court to the Bracton/Civil Law account of the origin
of the right,537 nor to the public right being sourced in a presumed past exercise of the
prerogative.538 Later chapters will explore the implications of these different accounts of
the public right to fish, for example, whether the public right to fish can revive after
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having been wholly abrogated. For the time being, it is relevant that one of the most
influential cases539 on the right rests solely on the Birthright/Magna Carta account of its
origin.
b) Malcomson and the Magna Carta
As noted above, the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea540 held that it was the
Magna Carta that restricted the power of the Crown to create exclusive fisheries. A valid
private right of an exclusive fishery in tidal waters had to trace its lineage to a grant from
the Crown created before the end of the reign of Henry II (1189).541 That a ‘legal origin’
had to date to before 1189 is of significance to the question of which chapter of the Magna
Carta the House of Lords was relying upon. 1189 is the year that Chapter 16 (1225)542
declared relevant to the prohibition on the closure of riverbanks.543 Chapter 23 (1225)
acted only prospectively from the date of the Magna Carta.544 Accordingly, if the right
arose out the removal of weirs, then the relevant date would be 1215, the date of the first
edition of the Magna Carta. This does not mean that the provisions relating to weirs have
been irrelevant to the development of the right, merely that the earliest legal origin of a
restriction on the Crown is associated with Chapter 16 (1225).
Tracking legal title to a fishery back to 1189 appears to present a high evidential
burden, however, in practice this meant only that some form of documentary evidence
was required to support a ‘legal’ grant; there did not need to be an unbroken documentary
chain of evidence extending back to before the Magna Carta. On this point, the Court
stated that:
If evidence be given of long enjoyment of a fishery, to the exclusion of others, of
such a character as to establish that it has been dealt with as of right as a distinct and
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separate property, and there is nothing to show that its origin was modern, the result is,
not that you say, this is a usurpation, for it is not traced back to the time of Henry II, but
that you presume that the fishery being reasonably shown to have been dealt with as
property, must have become such in due course of law, and therefore must have been
created before legal memory.
As noted in Chapter 1, the public right to fish has been associated with the Magna
Carta, as part of the Birthright/Magna Carta account, since the early 1300s. The House of
Lords stated that the Magna Carta was the source of a prohibition on the restriction of the
right, but did not claim it was the source of the right itself.545 In Malcomson v O’Dea the
House of Lords held that the public right was separate to the ownership interests of the
Crown, such as of the soil under tidal rivers, but that it coexisted with such interests.546
The historical accuracy of the views expressed in Malcomson v O’Dea,547
particularly on the significance of the Magna Carta, was criticised by Lord Blackburn
some 20 years later.548 Lord Blackburn put forward the argument, later outlined by Moore
and Moore in detail,549 that the Magna Carta was not originally intended to have such a
wide-reaching effect.550 Lord Blackburn noted that Hale spoke in the present tense of the
right of a King to give a grant to a subject, as if the King still had that power at that
time.551 Lord Blackburn, however, concluded that the matter had been settled552 by
Malcomson v O’Dea,553 and considered himself bound by it.
c) Rejection of Ownership of the Seas
The late 1800s saw the zenith of English judicial recognition of imperial policies as
to the freedom of the seas and their impact on claims by the Crown to the seas around
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England.554 Chief Justice Cockburn stated in 1876 in R v Keyn that these ‘vain and
extravagant pretences [of the Crown to the seas]’555 had been swept away. The views
Chief Justice Cockburn expressed did not ultimately prevail, as is demonstrated by the
survival of the extensive interests of the Crown Estate in the seas around the United
Kingdom. Nonetheless, R v Keyn was a key precedent cited in the majority in the
constitutionally significant Australian case, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case,556
and accordingly, its later treatment warrants discussion.
If read narrowly, R v Keyn557 only decided that the criminal law of England did not
extend below the low watermark.558 Read more widely, it is authority for the proposition
that the realm of England, and its common law, stopped at the low watermark.559
Supporting a narrow reading of this case, it had little apparent impact on cases in the late
1800s and early 1900s on the ownership of the seabed beyond the low watermark,560 for
example, in 1904 in Parker v Lord Advocate.561 This was a decision of the House of Lords
on appeal from the Scottish courts. At issue was the right to grant exclusive mussel beds
in Scottish waters.562 In the course of deciding this issue, the House of Lords commented
on the interests of the Crown in the soil below the low watermark, and the relationship of
the interests of the Crown to public rights to fish. The House of Lords affirmed the
Scottish Court’s decision 563 that held that the Crown owned the soil under the estuary of
the Clyde River,564 and hence the mussel beds affixed to that soil. As the beds were within
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an estuary, this case could have been distinguished on the basis that it related to internal
waters and not the sea. The decisions of the Scottish appeal courts565 did not draw such a
distinction, and the analysis by the House of Lords on this point proceeded as if the rights
to the estuary were of the same nature as the rights of the Crown extending to the limit of
the territorial sea.566 Although technically a Scottish and not an English case, Lord
Chancellor Halsbury declared there was not ‘any difference in law applicable to those
Crown rights between the laws of England and the law of Scotland’.567 It appears from
the report that at no stage in the proceedings was the general existence of the public right
to fish, or its extension to the three-nautical-mile limit, questioned. The relevant question
was a narrower one, the public right to fish mussels attached to the soil of the seabed.
R v Keyn568 and Parker v Lord Advocate569 therefore set out contradictory
propositions. On the one hand, the extent of the realm of England for the purposes of the
common law is limited to the low watermark, and the public right beyond that
demarcation must then have other sources of authority. On the other hand, the Crown
owned the underling soil and the seas above in a proprietorial sense,570 although this was
subject to the public right. In the second case, the public right to fish might be more easily
classified as arising from a past exercise of royal prerogative in favour of the public.571 A
partial reconciliation of these conflicting sources can be achieved through the recognition
of the special legal status of the English Crown Estate. The Crown Estate is an interest in
the foreshores, tidal areas and seas that falls somewhere between private property and
property of the state (held by the Crown). Accordingly, the English Crown’s interest in
the marine domain partakes of both a private (proprietary) and public (state) character.572
For English law, the relevant aspect appears to depend on the legal question being
considered.

trustee of the public’. At 330, Kincairney L found that the Magna Carta did not apply to Scotland, but he
did not reject that a public right to fish did not exist.
565

As summarised in Parker v. Lord Advocate [1904] 1 AC 367.

566

Ibid, 372-3 (Lord Kincairney).

567

Ibid, 368 (Halsbury LC).

568

(1876) 2 Ex D 63.

569

[1904] 1 AC 367.

570

Ibid, 375 (Kincairney L). Kincairney L was of the view that the property the Crown held in the sea was
‘res publicae’, inalienable except in certain circumstances.
571

As suggested by Moore and Moore, above n 73. See generally above, Chapter 2 C 2 (c).

572

See above, n 480.

91

4.
Conflicting Texts from the 1800s and 1900s
As noted above, the courts of the United Kingdom in the 1800s and early 1900s
expressed contradictory views on the source of public rights, and the nature and
geographic extent of the rights, of the Crown. Legal texts of the 1800s and early 1900s
also reveal a diversity of opinion on the public right to fish, especially on its source and
relation to rights of the Crown. A brief review of these texts is warranted given that
several these writers have been cited in recent cases, for example Moore and Moore573 in
the Blue Mud Bay Case574 and Angell575 in Gumana v Northern Territory.576
Consideration of these texts also helps to pinpoint when English and American legal
approaches to the public right to fish diverged, as noted in Chapter 1. These texts are
considered in a chronological order below, but this does not imply that the law developed
consistently over this time or that the more recent texts are necessarily preferred or more
authoritative.
Schultes, first published in 1811, read judicial, royal and scholarly expressions of
‘supreme dominion’ to mean merely ‘jurisdiction’ over the sea, and wrote that the ‘free
and universal right’ to fishing and navigation originally (in this context, prior to feudal
restrictions) belonged to the subject under the Crown’s jurisdiction and protection.577
Schultes rejected the view that the public right to fish depended on a past grant or
franchise of the Crown578 and stated that such a theory was an ‘imaginary principle’.579
Chitty, writing in 1820 on the prerogatives of the Crown, included in those
prerogatives property in the soil (or solum) under public waters. More specifically,
however, he rejected the view that public rights to fish were derived from some ‘regal
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franchise’ holding that the seas, tidal waters and foreshores had never been ‘vested
exclusively’ in the Crown in the first place.580
Hall in 1830 581 generally followed Hale’s views on the ownership of the seas and
shores by the Crown. On the question of the origin of the public right, Hall canvasses
three possible options. These are that the right was granted by the King; the right had
always been held by the people and that the right was a ‘natural and necessary right’.582
These propositions align broadly with the three principal accounts of the right in this
thesis: the Crown Ownership account, the Bracton/Natural Law account and the
Birthright/Magna account. Hall stated that the question of origin was ‘immaterial’, as the
conclusion was the same — that ‘in point of title it is admitted to be held and enjoyed by
common right, i.e. by the common law, and the custom of the realm’.583 Hall’s equivocal
views on the nature of ownership by the Crown are demonstrated in his discussion on the
private ownership of the marine domain. Hall stated that the presumption against private
ownership in favour of the Crown was justified on the basis of ‘pro bono publico’.584
In 1849, Phear took a similar approach to Justice Best in Blundell v Catterall585
stating that for tidal waters and the shores ‘it would seem that the Crown simply represents
the public: the Crown is in fact its subjects’ trustee’.586 Phear was critical of those
elements of the reasoning of the majority in Blundell v Catterall587 that placed too much
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emphasis on Hale’s metaphor of the King being the owner of the soil as if he were a
manorial lord.588
Woolrych writing in 1850589 acknowledged that there was a difference in opinion
between those who believed the right had originally emanated from an exercise of the
regalia of the Crown (in other words, an exercise of prerogative) and those who believed
it had always been a public right (‘jus publicum vel commune’). Woolrych comes down
on the side of the latter on the basis that there is no evidence it was at any time exclusively
vested in the Crown.590 Accordingly, he stated that the waters of the sea and navigable
rivers were ‘the birthright of all his majesty’s subjects’.591
A shift in opinion on the public right to fish and the interests of the Crown in the
1800s can be observed in successive editions by the American writer Angell. Angell
wrote first on this issue in 1824.592 A text covering similar material was published in
1826593 and was cited by Justice Selway in Gumana v Northern Territory.594 Angell in
1826 emphasised the authority of the American legislature over the public right to fish
since: ‘The legislature, in fact, are the public, and no one can deny the authority of the
public to relinquish what belongs to them, without at the same time denying that it does
belong to them.’595 The 1847 edition, however, omitted this passage, and although not
limiting the power of the legislature, stated that ‘If there are no words in a patent from the
government showing an intention to grant an exclusive fishery, it still remains public.’596
Furthermore, in the 1847 edition, the effect of regulation on the rights of a subject was
expressly limited ‘to the extent of its clearly expressed intention’.597 The preface to the
1847 edition drew attention to American cases between 1824 and 1847, 598 as well as the
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views of English writers Woolrych, Hall and Schultes, which are all cited,599 as is Blundell
v Catterall.600
The influential views of Moore and Moore601 are discussed in Chapter 2. Moore and
Moore were of the view that the Crown did originally own the foreshore, but that the
Crown had disposed of much of the foreshore, and its rights in adjacent tidal fisheries, to
private interests at a very early time. As discussed in Chapter 2, Moore and Moore in
1903 rejected the idea that the public right to fish was established by the Magna Carta
and postulated that it must have had its origin in an exercise of the prerogative of the
Crown in favour of the public, whether real or assumed.602
C. Summary of Cases and Texts to 1914
In summary, little certainty on the fundamental nature of the right is to be found in
the cases cited above or in legal commentaries of this period. A wide variety of opinions
exist from this period on the source of the right and its relationship to the state and the
interests of the Crown. It is arguable that, taken together, they add little additional
certainty to that provided by Lord Mansfield in 1768 that the right is ‘in the king, and is
public’.603 The Birthright/Magna Carta account was strongly favoured in Malcomson v
O’Dea.604 References to ownership by the King such as in Blundell v Catterall,605
however, support the Crown Ownership account. The purpose of the preceding section
was not to reconcile these different views, but to highlight the contested nature of the
jurisprudence in this period.606 As noted in Chapter 1, the confusion and conflict that
ensues from this diversity of opinion remain a subject of comment by English and
Australian courts. Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis suggest how some of these conflicts can
be reconciled to provide a more coherent conceptual base for the public right to fish in
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Australia. Such a reconciliation should not obscure that, at the time, these issues were
contested, without a clear consensus emerging.
Although a degree of uncertainty existed in English law between 1800 and 1914 on
the source of the right, the right’s existence was not in question. The next section deals
with evidence that the right to fish was received into the law of the Australian colonies,
and then the law of Australia. This section also covers the decision of the Privy Council
in Attorney General of British Columbia v Attorney General of Canada in 1914.607
Although this is a judgment on the law of Canada, for the reasons given below it also
provides an authoritative guide to the public right to fish under Australian law.608
D. Early Colonial Evidence of the Right
As noted above, early direct evidence of the public right to fish in Australian cases
is limited. On the foundation of the colony of New South Wales, it was accepted that the
statutory and common laws of England applied to the colony.609 On limited selfgovernance being granted in 1823, the application of the common law was reconfirmed
in New South Wales Act 1823 (4 Geo. IV c.96). Section XXIV of that Act stated that laws
made in New South Wales must:
[N]ot [be] repugnant to this Act, or to any Charter or Letters Patent or Order in Council
which may be issued in pursuance hereof, or to the Laws of England [emphasis in original],
but consistent with such Laws, so far as the Circumstances of the said Colony will admit. 610

Elements of the Crown’s prerogative that had a particularly English historical
character never applied to the colonies in Australasia (including New Zealand), such as
the reservation of royal fish like whales.611 The reference to the laws of England is
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relevant given the different nature of the laws in Scotland. For example, in Scotland,
salmon were reserved for the Crown as royal fish, just as whales were in England.612
As noted above, there is a general paucity of early Australian cases directly related
to the public right to fish, and no significant Australian case prior to 1975 has been
identified by academic commentators.613 Other sources of evidence do exist, however,
that show that colonial officers in Australia and the United Kingdom presumed that the
public right applied. These sources include; early legislation, colonial instructions on
settlement and legal opinions provided in a dispute in colonial Western Australia over
exclusive licences in the mid-1800s.
The care taken by colonial authorities in the preservation of public access to shores
and rivers provides indirect evidence for the assumed application of the public right to
fish. Early New South Wales ordinances balanced the need for practical measures relating
to the management of oyster beds and the preservation of public rights. New South Wales
Ordinances 1828 Clause XXIV provided that, although it was an offence to steal from
another’s oyster bed ‘being the property of another person’, floating fish above the beds
were excepted.614
Furthermore, colonial instructions provided for extensive government reserves above
the intertidal zone. A reasonable implication is that the area below that buffer zone was
subject to public rights, and access was protected from private encroachment through
government grant. Early colonial orders on the disposition of Crown lands in the colony
of New South Wales in 1828 provided that ‘the government will further reserve to itself
all land within 100 feet of the high-water mark on the sea coast, creeks, harbours and
inlets’.615 A later reservation in 1831 modified the earlier regulation by providing that the
Crown could make private grants for ‘commerce and navigation’.616
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The original instructions in 1826 to Colonel William Light in relation to land surveys
for the foundation of the colony of South Australia provided for extensive reserves above
the high watermark on both the coasts and the banks of rivers. In this instance, the
instructions made it explicit that the purpose was for the public interest by dedicating the
reservation for a ‘public road’.617
Finally, a dispute in the 1850s over the executive power of the governor in Western
Australia provides evidence on the views of both the colonial legal profession, and of the
colonial office in London, on the public right to fish. The circumstances of the dispute
are outlined in documents collected in the British Parliamentary Papers.618 In early 1851,
Governor Fitzgerald granted an exclusive licence to fish for pearls within Sharks Bay, a
deeply indented bay off the coast of Western Australia. This lease was then of some
controversy. After the governor issued these licences, the Advocate General in Western
Australia, G F Moore, formally advised Governor Fitzgerald on 9 July 1851 that:
I consider that the right to take shell fish in the open sea or on the sea-shore one of
those ‘jura publica or communia,’619 those public rights which cannot now be granted to an
individual to the exclusion of British subjects … I am not aware that the fact of recent
settlement of this territory would make any difference in the application of the law as
established in England, but I would suggest the propriety of a reference to the Secretary of
State on these two points; whether the Crown can now make a grant in this colony of an
exclusive right of fishing; and 2ndly, whether it would be advisable to exercise such a
power should it be considered to exist.620

G F Moore was clearly of the view that the colony had the power to legislate fishing
licences, but that such regulation could not be warranted given the lack of knowledge as
to the status and extent of the fishery.621 The governor requested further advice from the

617

‘Letter of Instructions by the Colonisation Commissioners for South Australia to Colonel William Light,
Surveyor General for the Colony of South Australia’, 9 March 1836, London. Reprinted in Correspondence
and Papers Relating to the Government and Affairs of the Australian Colonies, 1830–1836, British
Parliamentary Papers, Colonies, Australia 4 (Irish University Press, 1970) 505-07.
618

Correspondence and Papers Relating to Constitutions, Crown Lands and Other Affairs, 1852–53, British
Parliamentary Papers, Colonies, Australia 15 (Irish University Press 1969) 74-124.
619

Moore’s use of the words ‘jura publica or communia’ mirrors that by Chitty, see above n 580, 142.

620

See above n 618, 84.

621

There was a series of correspondence on this issue and the related issue of licences for guano in the
area. Secretary of State, Earl Grey, had previously advised in a letter dated 23 May 1851 to Governor
Fitzgerald that a licence duty could only be imposed by means of a local law, but he would not approve
an ordinance at that point in time. Clearly the colonial authorities considered the powers of the governor

98

colonial authorities in London. Lord Grey, the Secretary of State, on 12 December 1851
responded and stated that:
it was not considered that a licence duty [relating to the exclusive grant] could be
imposed except by means of a local law. That opinion is in accordance with the conclusion
which has been arrived at by the Advocate General of your government.

In further correspondence on 6 January 1852, Lord Grey reiterated his position,
stating that ‘you will at once have withdrawn any exclusive permission to particular
persons to fish for pearls. You will leave the right open to the public [emphasis added]’.622
The records of this dispute demonstrate that both imperial authorities and colonial
legal officials believed that a colonial public right to fish existed and, furthermore, that
the right could not be abridged by means of a prerogative grant by the Crown. The right
was; nonetheless, open to regulation by a competent local jurisdiction.623 Certainly, the
preservation of public access to shores and the banks of rivers at the time was of sufficient
public importance that additional buffers of Crown land were added.624 In 1910, Justice
O’Connor 625 commented on colonial policy relating to public rights and stated that:
It must be remembered also that the Colony was then in its infancy; all ungranted
lands belonged to the Crown, and the responsibility of managing them in the best interests
of a young and growing community rested with the Crown. Having regard to the public
use of the lagoon for fishing, and its possibilities for other public uses in the future, I think
the surrounding circumstances tend strongly to rebut the inference [that policy intended
the lagoon and shore to be covered by the original grant].
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These three strains of evidence — legal advice on the powers of the Governor of
Western Australia, reservations of Crown land along the coast and colonial legislative
practice — all support the proposition that the public right to fish was part of the law of
the Australian colonies. The position taken by the Advocate General in Western Australia
is consistent with the English case law discussed above, and indeed the judgment by
Justice Brennan in 1989 in Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries.626 Regardless of later
controversies over the extension of the common law beyond the low water mark,627 it
would also appear that the public right to fish extended offshore, at least in the opinion of
colonial authorities.
The practice of the colonies (and then later the States of Australia) in not granting
out the foreshore provides a partial explanation as to why there is such a paucity of
Australian case law prior to 1975.628 Since coastal lands and the banks of rivers were
retained primarily in the hands of the Crown, there was much less scope for the conflict
between the rights of private owners (or lessees) and the public right to fish that generated
many of the cases in the United Kingdom in the 1800s and early 1900s.
E. 1914: The Crown as Parens Patriae
The Privy Council in Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for
Canada629 reviewed the public right to fish in considerable detail. The Privy Council
considered laws relating to public rights to fish in the context of Canadian constitutional
arrangements over tidal and non-tidal rivers, the foreshore, tidal waters and the sea.
Although the case involved constitutional questions of a particularly Canadian nature, the
relevance of the decision to Australian law is enhanced by its consideration of these
matters free of the confounding issue of old royal grants in the United Kingdom.630 The
judgement delivered by Lord Chancellor Haldane was cited in later Australian cases
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including the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case,631 Harper v Minister for Sea
Fisheries,632 Commonwealth v Yarmirr633 and Blue Mud Bay Case.634
The issues in Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada
centred on competing rights between the Provinces of Canada and the Canadian
national government (the Dominion of Canada).636 The Supreme Court Act 1906 of
Canada (c 139) provided that constitutional law questions could be referred directly to
the Canadian Supreme Court. The meant that the Privy Council on appeal was obliged to
consider matters of law on a broad basis, rather than on a narrow basis as it might have
done had the case turned on facts that related to a specific fishery.637 A key issue in the
case was the relationship between public rights to fish and the powers of the Colony of
British Columbia over fisheries in both tidal waters and non-tidal waters. The judgment
delivered by Lord Chancellor Haldane, for the Privy Council, also touched on associated
questions such as the authority of R v Keyn638 and historical controversies over the right’s
source and character.
635

The Privy Council in Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for
Canada639 set out a number of the right’s legal attributes, firstly, that an exclusive fishery,
whether in tidal or non-tidal waters, could only be brought about by a grant or
prescription, but not by custom.640 Secondly, in tidal waters (the foreshore, estuaries and
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tidal rivers), no new exclusive or private fishery could be created since the Magna Carta,
and this proposition held for British Columbia as well as England.641 Finally, the Privy
Council concluded that no such private fisheries had been created in tidal areas in British
Columbia as ‘no rights there existing [in British Columbia] could possibly date from
before the Magna Carta’.642 Applied literally, such a determination would mean that
exclusive use, even with evidence showing the active exclusion of others, could never
form the legal basis for an exclusive private fishery in common law, as no royal grant to
them could have possibly occurred.643
The Privy Council noted that the ‘legal character’ of the public right to fish was ‘not
easy to define’.644 The judgment delivered by Lord Haldane referred to De Juris Maris as
support for the existence of a public right to fish645, but rejected Hale’s description of the
King being ‘the owner of this great waste’.646 On controversies over the ultimate source
of the right and its association with the Magna Carta, the Privy Council criticised the
view, held by Moore and Moore, that the Magna Carta had no relevance to the public
right to fish.647 Lord Chancellor Haldane, delivering the judgment for the Privy Council,
however, concluded that these questions ‘of historical and antiquarian interest only’,648
holding that the right, whatever its source, was now protected by the Crown as ‘parens
patriae.649 Consistent with the approach of the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea,650
the Privy Council held the right to fish was a general right held by the public.651
Effectively, the Privy Council sidestepped a definitive assessment of the character of the
right based on its history to focus on the specific effects of the right in that case.

possibility that a grant was created in the past). See also Henry John Wastell Coulson, The Law Relating to
Waters, Sea, Tidal, and Inland (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed, 1924), 368-9.
641

A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153, 170 ‘unquestioned law’.

642

Ibid, 171.

643

See A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153; Yarmirr v Northern Territory (No 2) (1998)
82 FCR 533; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2000) 101 FCR 171; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1,
especially 129 (Murphy J).
644

A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153, 169.

645

Ibid, 168.

646

Ibid.

647

Ibid, 170.

648

Ibid.

649

Ibid, 169.

650

Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155.

651

A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153, 170.

102

The Privy Council rejected the view that the Crown owned the seabed of adjoining
seas in a private or proprietorial sense. The description of the public right by the court
was that it was a ‘paramount title which is prima facie in the public’.652 In the Privy
Council’s opinion, the public’s right to fish originated in the sea, later having been
extended shoreward to the shores, tidal rivers and estuaries. This is consistent with some
older cases cited earlier653 where, regardless of the terminology used to describe the
interests of the Crown, the public right to fish was described as an extension of the public
right to the seas.654 Even when the interests of the Crown to the foreshore were asserted
to their full extent in the 1500s, they were still based on an asserted right of the Crown to
the seas, not the right of the Crown to the lands of England.655 Finally, the Privy Council
explicitly stated that ‘the right of the public to fish in the sea … does not depend on …
any title in the Crown to the subjacent land’.656 The Privy Council did note the ‘conflict
of judicial opinion which arose in R v Keyn’ on the ownership of the seabed out to three
nautical miles.657
Notwithstanding having earlier dismissed controversies over the right as being of
antiquarian interest, Lord Haldane presented the Privy Council’s own account of the
origin of the public right to fish.658 He stated that the right to fish in the seas had been
enjoyed ‘from time immemorial’ and then extended by common practice from the sea to
the foreshore and tidal areas ‘continuous with the ocean’. The Crown, as parens patriae,
protected that right and, over time, it became ‘a legal right enforceable in the courts’.659
This explanation of the source of the right fuses elements of both the Birthright/Magna
Carta account and the Bracton/Civil Law accounts. The Privy Council did not expand on
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how, and more importantly when, the right evolved in such a fashion. The statement by
the Privy Council that fishing had been enjoyed by the public in the oceans from ‘time
immemorial’ is not fully compatible with the Birthright/Magna Carta account. The
Birthright/Magna Carta account provides that the public right emerged out of competition
over the shore, estuaries and tidal rivers, not as an extension landwards of rights of the
public in the ocean.660
F. Commonwealth and State Jurisdictions and the Right
After the decision of the Privy Council 1914, and up to 1975, there were no
Australian cases directly confirming the reception into Australian law of the public right
to fish. There was, however, significant legislative activity taking place. As outlined by
Gullett, during this period significant legislation was enacted regulating the management
and control of fisheries.661 The existence of a public right to fish, however, does not
appear to have been at issue.
In 1969, questions of constitutional significance as to the geographical extent of the
interests of the State and Commonwealth below the low watermark were raised in Bonser
v La Macchia.662 Gullett concluded663 that at the time it was generally assumed that the
territorial limits of the Australian colonies (and their successors, the states of Australia)
extended three nautical miles outward from the low watermark.664 In a series of cases
culminating in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case,665 the territorial limits of the
states were held by the High Court to end at the low watermark.666 This case was
described as ‘momentous’ by the editors of the Australian Law Journal.667
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The Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case668 is the first high-level Australian judicial
authority that supports the right. Justice Jacobs formed part of the majority and Justice
Stephen was in the minority, and yet both concurred on the existence of the public right
to fish. In his judgment, Justice Stephen referred to the rights of the Crown to the
foreshore as being proprietary in nature, but subject to the public right to fish.669 Justice
Jacobs held that the common law did not extend below the low watermark.670 This
conclusion depended in part on R v Keyn,671 a decision also given prominence in Chief
Justice Barwick’s judgment.672 If the common law finished at the low watermark,673 and
the public right to fish is a common law doctrine, then the right should not extend beyond
the low watermark. Justice Jacob resolved this geographic limitation on the public right
by holding that the right to fish beyond the low watermark had been statutorily extended
from the land outwards by the ‘Great Charters’,674 which limited the King’s claims to the
seas. Justice Jacobs’ conclusion in this regard is in direct contrast with the historical
evidence cited earlier in both this chapter and the previous chapter that the public right
was traditionally associated with rights to fish in the sea. A narrow geographical
limitation on the reach of the common law below the low watermark was rejected in
Commonwealth v Yarmirr, 675 which is discussed further below.
G. Key Conclusions to 1975
Firstly, the key legal attributes of the public right to fish appear to have remained
stable over the period 1700 to 1975,676 even though the origin of the right was
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contested.677 As noted in Chapter 1, the emergence of novel competing interests brought
the right back to prominence in Australia in 1987. The rise of these competing rights and
their impact on the public right is considered in Chapters 4 and 5.
Secondly, there is a need for caution when citing sources from this period.
Consistency and coherence in the law is not apparent, not least because of conflicts
between public policies favouring freedom of the seas and the English Crown’s historical
claims to ownership of the seas surrounding the British Isles.
Finally, the English Crown claimed678 both ownership and sovereignty679 of the
marine domain surrounding the British Isles. It did not make such a broad claim to the
marine domain surrounding the Australia colonies.680 There is no evidence that the
prerogative right of the Crown to claim ownership of the marine domain of Australia was
ever exercised.681 Certainly, there is no Australian legal equivalent of the Crown Estate.
Accordingly, the rights of the state to the marine domain in Australia are substantially
different to those in the United Kingdom. If differences in history and context are given
their full due, there is a strong argument for a greater degree of flexibility in the Australian
adaptation of the right than is apparent in cases such as Harper.682
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CHAPTER 4: THE AUSTRALIAN RIGHT
A. Introduction
Chapter 3 outlined the reception into Australian law of the public right to fish up to
1975, including NSW v Commonwealth (‘Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case’).683 In
1989 the High Court considered the relationship between the public right and new forms
of statutory fishing rights in Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (‘Harper’).684 As
outlined below, Harper confirmed that the public right to fish was part of the law of
Australia and outlined key attributes of the right. Harper also confirmed that new forms
of statutory fisheries management had abrogated the public right to fish and replaced it
with statutory rights. The leading judgment of Justice Brennan outlined the legal attributes
of the right in Australian law, drawing heavily on English law precedents, and the Privy
Council case Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.685
The decision in Harper was handed down in two key Australian Indigenous rights
cases, Mabo v Queensland [No 1](‘Mabo [No 1]’)686 in 1988 and Mabo v Queensland
[No 2] (‘Mabo [No 2]’)687 in 1992.688 The introduction of new forms of statutory fisheries
management and the recognition of Indigenous rights were broadly contemporaneous
events in Australian law. The final part of this chapter introduces the effect of the
recognition of Indigenous rights on the public right to fish. Yanner v Eaton (‘Yanner’)689
in 1999 demonstrated a shift in the interpretative stance applied to statutory management
schemes for wildlife following the 1992 recognition of native title in Mabo [No 2].690 The
effect on the public right to fish of statutory management schemes is a central topic of
this thesis. The discussion of Yanner in this chapter also sets up the context for the in-
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depth discussion in Chapter 5 of the three-way interaction between Indigenous rights,
statutory rights to fish and the public right.
B. The Australian Right to Fish
1.
Australian Adaptation?
Under the doctrine of reception, only the relevant elements of a common law right
are received into the law of a colony.691 As noted in Chapter 3, there are substantial
differences in the context in which the public right to fish operates between Australia and
England. Notwithstanding these significant differences, the description of the Australian
right in Harper closely follows English precedents. The leading judgment of Justice
Brennan drew directly on English authorities692 and the Privy Council’s decision in
Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.693 Justice
Brennan in Harper closely followed the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General
for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.694 The one exception in Harper is
a small variation in the language used by Justice Brennan when describing the interaction
of the right with statute law. Justice Brennan referred to the right as being ‘freely
amenable’ to regulation.695 Although the reasons for this variation are not clear from the
judgment, the effect appears to have been to weaken the right.696
Following Harper, the possibility that a significantly adapted right might have been
received into Australian law appears to have been forestalled. As will be argued in
Chapters 6 to 8, there would be advantages for consistency and coherence in Australian
law if there was an explicit recognition that the Australian right has evolved in a different
direction to the English right.
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2.

Australian Fisheries Management in the 1980s
a) Changes in Australian Fisheries Management
Up until the early 1980s, the principal focus of Australian fisheries management was
the prevention of commercial overfishing, typically achieved through a combination of
restrictions on fishing gear and limitations in the number of commercial vessel licences
issued.697 The decision in Harper was broadly contemporaneous with the widespread
adoption from the mid-1980s of new fisheries management techniques.698 In Australia,
these new approaches have been described as ‘rights-based’ or as ‘rights-based
management’.699 One of the characteristics of such schemes is the move from regulating
public access to a resource towards creating private rights of access to that resource.700
Rights-based approaches were intended to resolve perceived defects in older styles
of fisheries management. These defects included; overfishing, excessive vessel numbers
and overcapitalisation. Separate articles by Gordon and Scott (in 1957 and 1958
respectively)701 outlined how, in the absence of private rights, there are increases in
fishing efforts until it is uneconomic for fisheries to continue fishing. Although each
fisher would be acting rationally in his or her best interest, the overall outcome is
economically inefficient. Economic waste will occur even if a fishery does not collapse
from overfishing, in other words, even if the management of fish stocks is effective.
According to this narrative, economic rents are dissipated through overinvestment in
vessels and equipment as new fishers enter the fishery and each fisher seeks to appropriate
for themselves a bigger share of the resource. Although the economic rationale behind
rights-based approaches had been raised in the 1950s, it was not until the 1980s that more
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economically sophisticated mechanisms, such quota-management schemes, saw largescale application (particularly in Iceland and New Zealand).702
In the 1970s a number of Australian states took steps towards implementing rightsbased management schemes for commercial fisheries through the introduction of limitedentry fisheries regimes.703 These limited-entry schemes restricted the entry of new fishers,
limited the size of vessels and specified the fishing equipment that was allowed.
Economic benefits provided by such management measures can, however, prove to be
temporary. For example, even if vessel numbers are strictly limited, existing participants
have an economic incentive to increase their individual share of the catch through
investment in other factors of production, such as better vessels and adoption of new
technology. This still represents a diversion of resources of the community away from
more productive ends. Furthermore, even if a limited-entry fishery is tightly managed, an
increase in potential effort can still be of concern, as small errors in management can
readily lead to overfishing.704
In the 1980s, Australian fishery managers began experimenting705 with management
schemes that created tradeable rights to fish, including giving fishers a right to a specific
share of the expected catch of a fishery.706 In Australia, where a fisher has an interest in
a specified share of a catch, it is typically described as a ‘quota fishery’ or a ‘quota
scheme’ of management. The intended outcome of a fishery quota is to provide economic
incentives that encourage fishers away from economically wasteful activities and
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investment.707 From an economic perspective, transferability is important in achieving
efficiency objectives by allowing rights to be sold to those fishers who can make the best
use of them.708 All other things being equal, the more clear and comprehensive rights are,
the more those rights become economically efficient, as well as valuable to the holder of
those rights. Valuable commercial rights to harvest abalone were the subject of the dispute
in Harper.709
The relevance of these changes is that for statutory rights of this kind to meet their
intended economic and sustainability objectives, they must limit the public right to a
significant extent. Statutory schemes that merely restrict new entrants by limiting the
number and type of commercial vessels are compatible with a public right, albeit a highly
regulated right. It becomes, however, progressively harder to classify fisheries
management schemes as merely regulatory the more comprehensive these schemes
become. In Harper, it was held that the public right to fish abalone in Tasmania had not
merely been regulated but had been abrogated and replaced with private statutory
rights.710
b) Regulation of Abalone Fishing in Tasmania
The dispute in Harper was over government charges on the lucrative abalone fishery.
The Tasmanian commercial fishery had grown to become the largest wild abalone fishery
in the world.711 The fishery, with its minimal incidental take of other species, was
especially suitable for the introduction of a quota scheme. An overall total allowable
commercial catch was determined, with shares (quota units) allocated to fishers, ending
competition between commercial fishers for access to the resource. A total allowable
commercial catch was first set for the fishery in 1985. Initially, catches were divided
equally amongst the then-commercial participants. Informal trading arrangements soon
emerged whereby quotas could be leased out. Formal trading rules allowing quotas to be
transferred permanently were not put in place until 1991.712
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Contemporaneously with the introduction of the commercial quota scheme, there was
a substantial increase in the market price of abalone. The combined effect was an increase
in the profitability of abalone fishing and subsequent increases in the value of commercial
leases for abalone quota. Complaints followed that the result was the enrichment of a
small number of fishers.713 The Tasmanian government attempted to raise additional
revenue from the commercial abalone fishery. From 1987–9 various schemes were
devised to raise revenue while still providing for fluctuations in prices and catch levels.714
C. Harper and the public right to fish
1.
The Decision in Harper
The lead judgment in Harper was delivered by Justice Brennan.715 Justice Brennan
provided a detailed exposition on the public right to fish and its application to Australia
and outlined the key legal attributes of the right. Justice Brennan also commented on
related issues such as the ownership by government of the living resources of the sea and
foreshore.
The principal proposition put to the court by counsel for Harper was that the various
legislative schemes implemented by the Tasmanian government to raise substantial
revenues through licence fees on commercial abalone fishers were unconstitutional.716
Section 90 of the Australian Constitution provides that the Australian states, such as
Tasmania, may not levy excise duties.717 The High Court had previously found that
licence fees levied against a Western Australian fish-processing licence were a duty of
excise, and hence unconstitutional.718 Counsel for the commercial abalone fishers in
Harper argued that catching abalone was the first step in processing and, consequently,
state licence fees to catch abalone were similarly invalid.719 The submissions made by the
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Commonwealth and the States of Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia placed
significant emphasis on the pre-existing ownership of sedentary marine resources by the
Crown by reason of ownership of the soil of the seabed by the defendant.720 For example,
counsel for Tasmania argued that abalone, due to their degree of attachment to the soil,
were owned by the Tasmanian government721 pursuant to the Coastal Waters (State Title)
Act 1980 (Tas).722 If Tasmania had succeeded in this argument then, as it already owned
the abalone, licence fees would be classified as a royalty, not a tax, and accordingly
Section 90 would not apply, regardless of the level of fees.723 The relationship between
the public right to fish and the purported ownership of fish by the state was not raised as
an issue in argument.
Although the court could have settled the question of Crown ownership, it found it
unnecessary to do so.724 Justice Brennan noted that the fishery ‘can be truly said to be
public property whether or not the Crown has radical or freehold title to the resource’.725
Justice Brennan observed that if title was required to support the statutory schemes of
fishery management, then legislative arrangements between the Crown and Tasmania
have already demonstrated ‘the consent of the Crown to the creation of those rights [rights
created under statute]’.726 Justice Brennan focused on the legal characteristics of the
statutory scheme, which had abrogated public rights and replaced them with statutory
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rights, rather than on the resolution of the question of the ultimate source of the rights
involved.
In reviewing the statutory scheme set up by Tasmania, Justice Brennan emphasised
the limited nature of the resource and its susceptibility to commercial overexploitation.727
He concluded that:
The public right of fishing for abalone in State fishing waters is thus abrogated and
private statutory rights to take abalone in limited quantities are conferred on the holders of
commercial and non-commercial abalone licences. The Regulations thus control the
exploitation of a finite resource in order to preserve its existence. They seek to achieve this
end by imposing a general prohibition on exploitation followed by the grant of licences for
the taking of limited quantities of abalone. The only compensation, if compensation it be,
derived by the public for loss of the right of fishing for abalone consists in the amounts
required to be paid by holders to obtain abalone licences under the Regulations.728

Justice Brennan classified these statutory rights as ‘akin to a profit a prendre’, and
characterised the licence fees for those rights as a ‘charge for the acquisition of a right’;
accordingly those charges were to be distinguished from licence fees charged where there
was no underlying resource.729 It was integral to the internal logic of Justice Brennan’s
argument that the public right to fish was abrogated in this manner and not merely
regulated. If the right had been merely regulated, then he would still have had to address
the question of whether licence fees for abalone might constitute a tariff prohibited by the
Constitution.730
a) An ‘Entitlement of a New Kind’
Justice Brennan acknowledged the public right to fish could lead to overexploitation.
He referred731 to the judgment of Lord Chancellor Selborne in Goodman v Mayor of
Saltash,732 which recognised the risk of significant depletion of fish stocks where ‘there
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is a general public right of fishing’.733 Risks of overfishing arising from unrestricted
access had also been raised in Neill v Duke of Devonshire.734 Lord Chancellor Selborne
recognised the risk that fishing under the public right could lead to overexploitation. He
furthermore pointed out that the appellants were engaged in drift fishing, a method he
described as being ‘of recent introduction’ and which was ‘beyond comparison more
destructive to the fish’.735 Effectively, the appellants in that case were engaging in what
would be recognised in contemporary terms as an unregulated commercial fishery.736 By
the 1800s, English fisheries had become subject to increasing regulation,737 although the
need for regulation to protect offshore sea-fish resources from overexploitation was
questioned.738
Harper, therefore, did not break new ground in recognising that the public right
allowed unsustainable fishing, nor in judicial recognition of the need for regulation to
address that defect. What was new was the recognition of the High Court that legislative
action to protect fisheries had gone beyond regulation of the public right to fish. Justice
Brennan held that the new system created new ‘private statutory rights’ which ‘abrogated’
the public right’.739 Chief Justice Mason and Justices Deane and Gaudron further
emphasised the break with the past in the creation of these statutory rights. In their
judgment they stated that:
What was formerly in the public domain is converted into the exclusive and controlled
preserve of those who hold licences ... it is an entitlement of a new kind created as part of
a system of preserving a limited public natural resource in a society which is coming to
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recognise that, in so far as such resources are concerned, to fail to protect may destroy and
to preserve the right of everyone to take what he or she will may eventually deprive that
right of all content ... [U]nder this licensing system the general public is deprived of the
right of unfettered exploitation of the Tasmanian abalone fisheries.740

Although the public rights to fish in Harper were held to be abrogated, none of the
judgments in that case referred to those rights as having been ‘extinguished’, a point
relevant to later discussion.
b) Individual Elements of the Right to Fish
Justice Brennan in Harper provided a detailed description of the attributes of the
public right to fish relying substantially, but not wholly, on the decision of the Privy
Council in Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.741 He
mentioned the following elements as being part of Australian law (listed for
convenience):
•

•
•
•

•

English law was settled, and since the time of the Magna Carta, no public
right of fishing could be taken away in relation to the foreshore, estuaries,
creek and tidal rivers without competent legislation.742
No restriction can be put upon that right of the public by an exercise of the
prerogative in the form of a grant or otherwise.743
The right is public and not private in nature.744
The public right of fishing in tidal waters is not limited by the need to preserve
the capacity of a fishery to sustain itself. ‘The management of a fishery to
prevent its depletion by the public must be provided for, if at all, by statute.’745
The ‘paramount’ public right to fish qualifies the right of the owner of the
soil to enjoy the exclusive right of fishing over it (whether the owner be the
Crown or not).746
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Justice Brennan both confirmed the public right to fish was part of the contemporary
law of Australia, and provided a comprehensive list of the legal attributes of the right.747
His description generally followed the Privy Council in Attorney General for British
Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.748 Justice Brennan, however, added that the
right was ‘freely’ [my emphasis] amenable to abrogation or regulation by a competent
legislature’.749 The addition of the word ‘freely’ was an apparent innovation and is
discussed further below.
2.

Implications of Harper
a) A ‘Freely’ Abrogated Right
As noted above, the only substantial divergence in Justice Brennan’s judgment from
English law750 precedents was in stating that the right, ‘being a public not a proprietary
right, is freely amenable to abrogation or regulation by a competent legislature’.751 In the
two cases cited by Justice Brennan as authority,752 the adverb ‘freely’ was not used in
conjunction with the power to modify the right by legislation.753 It is not clear from the
text in Harper why Justice Brennan added the modifier ‘freely’ to describe the potential
abrogatory effects of legislation. A number of possible explanations are listed below,
however, it might simply have been that Justice Brennan had no particular intent in mind
when he used the adverb ‘freely’.
The first possibility is that ‘freely’ was intended to emphasise the lack of any
constitutional impediment to the Tasmanian legislature abrogating or modifying the
public right to fish as it saw fit. In Attorney General for Canada v Attorney General for
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Quebec (1921)754 the Privy Council noted potential constitutional limits on the regulatory
powers of the Canadian Federal Government in relation to fishing. 755 Nowhere in that
judgment was the adverb ‘freely’ used in conjunction with the regulation of the right. The
use of the word ‘freely’ by Justice Brennan may have been intended to emphasise that,
under Australian law, there was no impediment to a competent legislature abrogating the
public right to fish, rather than intending to diminish the right itself.
A further possibility is that ‘freely’ was intended to indicate that fisheries legislation
should be read free from old common law interpretative rules favouring public rights
against general words in statutes.756 Older rules of statutory construction provided that
common law public rights should only be abrogated by statute where there are ‘express
words or [by] necessary implication’,757 referred to as the principle of legality.758 As noted
in Chapter 1, Spigelman has suggested that, in reality, the rules of construction that once
applied to old common law rights now have little weight, whereas other rights now
classified as fundamental rights have the greater weight in statutory interpretation.759 To
subject fisheries regulation to restrictive interpretative rules on construction would defeat
its purpose.760 Given Justice Brennan’s view on the defects of the public right in relation
to conservation, it is plausible that it was his intention to clarify that Tasmanian fisheries
legislation should be read free of any restrictions based on the principle of legality.
Finally, the word ‘freely’ might have been intended as a signal that the right itself
should now be considered a generally weak right in Australian law, for example, that it
should be given little weight when considering legislation governing grants to the
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seashore.761 It is difficult to reconcile this interpretation with Justice Brennan’s statement
that grants of land to the low watermark were subject to the ‘paramount right to fish vested
in the public’.762 The word ‘paramount’ suggests that Justice Brennan was of the view
that grants of land should continue to be subject to the common law public right to fish,
unless the right was clearly excluded.
In summary, Justice Brennan confirmed the public right to fish as part of the law of
Australia and provided a comprehensive list of its elements. He also emphasised its
susceptibility to statutory abrogation. Why Justice Brennan decided to emphasise that the
right could be freely abrogated cannot be resolved by reference to the text alone, but
certainly, later judgments have given prominence to the word ‘freely’.763
b) Harper and the Origin of the Right
As noted earlier, a majority of the High Court in the Seas and Submerged Land Act
Case764 found the limits of the common law and of the States of Australia ended at the
low watermark, with different views advanced for the source of the right in the seas.765 In
Harper, Justice Brennan held that the fishery was in tidal waters,766 making a decision on
its extension to the seas (below the low watermark) a moot point.767 Given the views of
the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case majority768 that the common law of England
ended at the low watermark, it was a tenable argument769 that no ‘common law’ public
right to fish could exist below the low watermark. Of the majority in the Seas and
Submerged Lands Act Case, only Justice Jacobs directly addressed the inconsistency
between the majority view of the common law and the existence of a public right to fish
beyond the low watermark. He did so by associating the public right to fish beyond the
law water mark with the ‘great charters’, which restrained the prerogatives of the King of
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England to the seas.770 Justice Jacobs appears to have drawn on the Crown Ownership
source of the right for waters above the low watermark and the Birthright/Magna Carta
source for the seas below the low watermark.
Justice Brennan held that there was a public right to fish in the seas as well as in tidal
waters, citing the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General for British Columbia
v Attorney General for Canada.771 Given the prominence attributed by Justice Brennan
to that case, as well as his sceptical position on questions of title and ownership in the
seas (and sea bed), his general approach supports the proposition that there is a one right
applying across the marine domain, favouring — but not definitively so — the
Birthright/Magna Carta and Natural Law/Bracton accounts of the source of the right.
c) State Ownership of Fisheries
The submissions to the Court in Harper by the Commonwealth, Tasmania, Victoria,
Western Australia, South Australia, New South Wales or Queensland (as summarised in
the Commonwealth Law Reports) focused on prior ownership of fisheries by the Crown,
not the public right to fish.772 On the issue of state or federal ownership of fisheries,
Justice Brennan did not use the term ‘ownership’, and instead described the abalone
resource as ‘a limited natural resource which is otherwise available for exploitation by
the public and can be truly said to be public property whether or not the Crown has radical
or freehold title to the resource’.773 Justices Dawson, Toohey and McHugh characterised
abalone as a ‘public natural resource’.774 The brief joint reasons provided by Chief Justice
Mason and Justices Deane and Gaudron referred to abalone as a ‘limited public natural
resource’.775 Although, as noted above, the question of state ownership was raised in
argument, no judge expressed the view that fisheries were owned by the state.
Although Justice Brennan found that the competence of the state to regulate fishing
was not dependent on it having proprietary rights to the subsoil, he acknowledged that
there was ‘some authority’ that the public right to fish might be ‘sustained’ by the state
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having such a right,776 citing Mayor of Carlisle v Graham777 as support. In
Commonwealth v Yarmirr778 Justice Merkel referred to this citation by Justice Brennan
as support for the view that the public right rested upon the Crown’s ownership of the
subsoil.779 In fact, Mayor of Carlisle v Graham780 is qualified evidence for a different
proposition; that public rights are independent of the ownership of the soil, whether by an
individual or the Crown. That conflict in that case was between the public right and a
private fishery claimed in a tidal river which had changed its course. With the change in
course of the river, it now flowed over what had been private land. Chief Baron Kelly
held that the river, now over private land, would be subject to the public right as ‘the
rights of the Crown and of the public [my emphasis] may come into existence and be
exercised in what has thus become a portion of a tidal river or of an arm of the sea’. 781
He further held that ‘if at any time thereafter the ... river again change[s] its course,
leaving the new channel dry, the soil becomes again the exclusive property of the owner,
free from all rights whatsoever in the Crown or in the public [ again my emphasis].782
The judgment does not support a contention that there is one set of rights, that of the
Crown and that it is only as a consequence the public right comes into operation. Instead
the use of ‘and’ and ‘or’ implies two sets of right in operation.
Reading Justice Brennan’s judgment as whole, he placed little weight on Crown
ownership as the foundation for the right. He relied heavily on Attorney General for
British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada783 in his description of the right. The
Privy Council in that case rejected the ownership account. Furthermore, the case he cited
as authority does not support such a proposition. Given the above, Harper should not be
considered support for the Crown Ownership account of the right’s source and its
subsequent legal attributes.
d) Summary of Harper and the Right
The Australian public right to fish, as outlined in Harper, generally retains its English
legal character, notwithstanding the different context in which the right is exercised. The
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key difference is the susceptibility of the right to abrogation by regulation. This
susceptibility is unlikely to be shared by the English right. In England, with the marine
domain subject to both extensive private rights and the Crown Estate, the loss of the
public right could potentially lead to significant loss of public access. It would also be
contrary to current English public policy — as evidenced by legislation — to protect and
extend public access over public and private lands.784
The significance of Harper to native title in the marine domain can be illustrated by
way of a counterfactual speculation; in other words, to consider what might have
happened if the case had not been decided at this point in time. If it were not for Harper,
there would have only been limited judicial recognition of the Australian public right to
fish before native title rights came to be recognised by the High Court.785 But for Harper
is possible that the High Court might have been more amenable to finding that Indigenous
rights in the marine domain had the capacity to exclude the public right.
3.

Indigenous Rights to Fish
a) Harper and Indigenous Rights
Harper is the first, and arguably the only, substantial judicial analysis of the public
right to fish in Australia. The decision in Harper reviewed the impact of regulation on the
right. The balance of this chapter explores the relationship between the right as described
in Harper and Indigenous interests. The judgment in Harper was handed down786
between two key cases on Indigenous rights in Australia: Mabo [No 1]787 and Mabo [No
2].788 Together, these two cases established the recognition of Indigenous rights (by way
of native title) under the common law of Australia, and the protection of those rights by
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) from discriminatory appropriation. The
recognition in Mabo [No 2] of the survival of Indigenous interests under Australian law
has been described as a ‘judicial revolution’.789 Given that the judgment in Harper was
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handed down between Mabo [No 1] and Mabo [No 2], it would be inconceivable that no
thought had been given to consistency across these decisions. As noted above, Justice
Brennan refers in Harper to the distinction between a ‘radical or freehold title to the
resource’ [my emphasis].790 The contrast between a radical and a legal title was central
to Justice Brennan’s judgment handed down in Mabo [No 2].791 It seems unlikely that
Justice Brennan saw a fundamental inconsistency between the public right to fish in
Harper, the interests of the Crown and of Indigenous interests.
The latter part of this chapter will assess the impact of the recognition of native title
in Mabo [No 2] on the High Court’s interpretation of statutory schemes of management
for wildlife and, in particular, the authority of Yanner v Eaton.792 A more detailed account
of the three-way interaction between native title, statutory schemes of management and
the public right to fish will be considered in Chapter 5. A key issue is the degree to which
the statutory abrogation of rights is analogous to the extinguishment of Indigenous rights.
b) Indigenous Rights and Yanner v Eaton
Harper was decided at a time of flux in Australian law, when common law
Indigenous rights to land and resources were in the process of being recognised. The
decision in Mabo [No 2]793 (together with Mabo [No 1]794 and Wik Peoples v
Queensland795) established Indigenous rights in the form of ‘native title’ as part of the
common law of Australia. In Mabo [No 2], Chief Justice Mason and Justices Brennan,
Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh all stated that extinguishment did not occur
automatically on acts of settlement by the Crown, but required specific further acts of
appropriation by the Crown.796 A key aspect of Justice Brennan’s judgment797 was a
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contrast between radical and legal title.798 Radical title was gained automatically by the
Crown on settlement, with legal title only being gained by the Crown (or private persons)
through specific alienation by the Crown.799 The alternative proposition put forward by
Justice Dawson, that ‘colonial lands which remain unalienated were owned by the British
Crown’, was rejected.800 The language used by a number of the Justices of the High Court
spoke directly and emphatically about moral reasons underpinning their decision to
recognise Indigenous rights to land in Australian common law.801 Nonetheless, although
it was now clear that the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) protected native title from
extinguishment from 1975 onwards, native title was still susceptible to extinguishment
by valid acts before 1975.802
After Mabo [No 2], judicial assessments of the interaction between common law
public rights and statutory schemes in the marine domain also had to take into account
potential interactions with Indigenous rights. The rest of this chapter reviews the impact
of the recognition of Indigenous interests after 1992 on the interpretation of statutory
management schemes for wildlife. On their face, these statutory management schemes
appeared to have the potential for both the extinguishment of Indigenous interests and the
abrogation of the public right. The High Court in Yanner v Eaton,803 however, found that
even an assertion of state ownership would not extinguish native title rights, in apparent
contradiction to earlier authority in Walden v Hensler.804 The common law public right to
fisheries is different to that of common law doctrines on wildlife, and it is only with due
caution that analogies should be made between the treatment of wildlife and fisheries. In
this instance, such analogies are reasonable. At issue was the proper interpretation of
natural-resource management legislation in the form of a general prohibition on take
coupled with a licencing or exemption regime. As demonstrated in Chapter 6,
contemporary fisheries legislation is often in this form.
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c) Indigenous Interests and Assertions of Crown ‘Ownership’
In each of the cases of Walden v Hensler805 and Yanner v Eaton,806 Indigenous
defendants had been charged with hunting wildlife without a permit and contrary to the
Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld). That Act prohibited hunting generally, then allowed
it only with a licence. This prohibit–licence approach to regulation has some similarities
with the legislative approach taken in Tasmania in Harper. The Fauna Conservation Act
1974 (Qld), however, went a step further and Section 7(i) specifically vested the
‘property’ of all wild fauna in the Crown. Significantly, this Act was passed prior to 1975,
and accordingly was not at risk from invalidation by the Racial Discrimination Act 1975
(Cth), even if it implemented a discriminatory expropriation of native title interests.
In Walden v Hensler, Walden was unsuccessful in his claim to a defence under the
Queensland Criminal Code of an honest claim of right in property807 based on his belief
in his right to hunt and take wildlife ‘according to Aboriginal law’.808 By contrast, in
Yanner v Eaton, Yanner successfully claimed that his Indigenous common law rights had
survived Section 7(i) of the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld). Although the issues
differed to a degree,809 the same argument was made by Queensland in each case, that
Section 7(i) had extinguished Indigenous rights to hunt and replaced those rights with a
statutory scheme.810 Although the High Court did not formally overrule the earlier
decision, the judgments delivered in Yanner v Eaton show that a substantial shift in
judicial approach to statutory interpretation had taken place after Mabo [No 2].
As noted above, at issue in both of these cases was whether Indigenous rights had
survived an assertion of Crown ‘property’ in wildlife by Section 7(i) of the Fauna
Conservation Act 1974 (Qld). In Walden v Hensler, Justice Brennan (in the majority) was
of the view that property rights of the Crown under Section 7(i) had indeed ‘eliminated
any right that Indigenous people may have had at common law’.811 Justices Gaudron and
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Toohey (in the minority) did not directly accept this view on extinguishment. Their
separate judgments in favour of the defendant, however, each depended on the
effectiveness of Section 7(i) in converting fauna into ‘property’,812 so that the Indigenous
defendant could sustain a defence of an honest claim of right in property. Implicitly, their
judgments accepted that the state had created a form of property under that Act and had
not merely regulated existing rights.813
In Yanner v Eaton, Chief Justice Gleeson and Justices Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne in
their joint majority judgment814 found that there was a sufficient degree of flexibility in
the interpretation of the word ‘property’815 under the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld)
to allow for the continuation of native title rights to hunt and fish. The plurality
characterised ‘property’ as a term that could signify a ‘wide variety of different forms of
interest’.816 The plurality further found that the reference in Section 7(i) to property
should be interpreted as describing the aggregate of state rights over wildlife, and
accordingly, that section did not have the effect of extinguishing Indigenous rights.817
Their judgment referred with approval818 to the judgment of Chief Justice Vinson in the
US Supreme Court Case of Toomer v Witsell.819 In that case, Chief Justice Vinson found
that:
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The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to
preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.820

On the potential effect of the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld), Chief Justice
Gleeson and Justices Gaudron Kirby and Hayne JJ found that native title rights and
interests were a ‘socially constituted fact’ and that Indigenous people had a ‘spiritual and
social connection with the land’.821 This connection was not severed by regulation of
access or by requiring licences such as ‘a permit to be held to hunt or fish’. 822 The
plurality referred to the right as being at risk of being extinguished. Justice Gummow, in
his concurring judgment, also referred to the risk of it being extinguished, but also used
the word ‘abrogate’ or ‘abrogated’.823 He held that ‘legislative regulation … did not
abrogate the native title right. Rather, the regulation was consistent with the continued
existence of that right’.824 Whether the test for ‘extinguishment’ of Indigenous interests
was the same as that for ‘abrogation’ of the public right to fish created significant
confusion825 until apparently settled in the negative by the High Court in Karpany v
Dietman826 and Akiba v Commonwealth.827 This issue is discussed in more detail in
Chapters 5 to 7.
In Yanner v Eaton the majority drew support from Section 211 of the Native Title Act
1993 (Cth). Section 211 of the Native Title Act supports Indigenous rights to hunting and
fishing by providing that certain State and Territory laws did not apply to Indigenous
persons exercising native title rights engaging in hunting and fishing.828 In the event that
certain criteria are met,829 Indigenous persons are not subject to laws expressed in the
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form of a general restriction associated with a system of conditional permissions. Only
prohibitions of universal effect, for example, totally protected wildlife or similar bans
would apply.830 The majority found that the operation of Section 211 necessarily assumed
the continued coexistence of native title where regulatory schemes involve such a
‘conditional prohibition’.831
The decision in Yanner v Eaton revealed a shift in approach to Indigenous rights832
and the interpretative stance to the effect of legislative schemes of management. The
plurality in Yanner v Eaton justified a different outcome to that of Walden v Hensler on
the basis that the issues discussed in Yanner v Eaton were ‘radically different’.833 These
differences are not explained in detail. The only specific difference cited by the plurality
in Yanner v Eaton was the passage of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘NTA’). A
reasonable interpretation of the plurality’s ‘radically different’ comment is that it was a
reference not just to the legal impact of specific provisions of the NTA, but to a shift in
interpretive approach due to a combination of statutory, social and judicial changes of
which the NTA was the culmination.
The Full Federal Court in Akiba v Commonwealth834 also emphasised the influence
of the NTA, and especially Section 211, on the interpretative approach applied in Yanner
v Eaton. On appeal to the High Court in Akiba v Commonwealth,835 the plurality,
however, rejected the emphasis placed by the Full Federal Court on the connection
between Section 211 and Yanner v Eaton. Akiba v Commonwealth confirmed the general
authority of Yanner v Eaton on the legal characterisation of expansively worded
regulatory regimes for natural-resource management.836 The importance of Yanner v
Eaton to the public right to fish lies in the approach taken by the majority to the
interpretation of legislative provisions asserting rights to, and control over, wildlife.
Whereas in that case, the majority held that wildlife legislation should be read down as
being regulatory in nature; in Harper the court found that the legislative scheme was
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sufficiently comprehensive so as to abrogate, and not merely regulate, the public right to
fish.
A comprehensive assessment of the effect of fishery management schemes on the
public right needs to reconcile Yanner v Eaton with Harper and Akiba v Commonwealth.
In Akiba v Commonwealth Chief Justice French and Justice Crennan made the explicit
distinction between the abrogation of the public right and extinguishment of Indigenous
rights.837 There is nothing inherently contradictory in the High Court finding that the
effect of statutory provisions potentially extinguishing Indigenous rights is different to
the abrogatory effect of statutory provisions on public rights to fish. Indigenous rights
are recognised by the common law as a form of private interest in land or waters, or at
least a communal right analogous to such an interest.838 There is a strong presumption in
favour of such rights not being extinguished.839 The public right to fish does not give rise
to private rights. In Harper, Justice Brennan contrasted public rights with proprietary
rights when noting that the public right was ‘freely amenable to abrogation or
regulation’.840 Elements of the public right, such as the rule in relation to private grants
to the low watermark, are more properly compared to other public rights rather than
private rights. In some ways, this public nature makes the right fragile, in other ways,
such as the potential for it to revive after abrogation, the right’s public nature makes it
more potentially robust.
Notwithstanding differences between public and private rights, a degree of confusion
between the abrogation of a public right and the extinguishment of Indigenous rights is
understandable. Each of those rights will be affected where there is a ‘necessary
implication’ to do so in legislation.841 In a 2010 article, Goldsworthy suggests an approach
that, if applied, could provide a clearer guide to interpretation of management schemes
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for natural resources.842 Goldsworthy suggests that there are two potential meanings for
‘necessary implication’. The first is whether the implication is necessary for the provision
to have effect. The second is whether the author had a ‘certain communicative intention’
that is ‘in the circumstances obvious’.843 The first of these meanings focuses on the
effectiveness of the specific legislative scheme being reviewed, the second on broader
considerations as to what is ‘obvious’. It is possible for the same legislative words in
fisheries legislation to give rise to a necessary implication that the public right to fish has
been abrogated, whereas for broader considerations such as the potential for interaction
with Indigenous rights, the words might not contain sufficient intent to extinguish
Indigenous interests.
Nonetheless, this distinction is a fine one.844 A regulatory scheme for fisheries
management expressed in general terms would need to be ‘just right’ to have the effect
of abrogating the public right to fish (and creating exclusive private rights) but, on the
other hand, not appear to intend to extinguish Indigenous rights to fish. The High Court
was faced with this issue in the Blue Mud Bay Case.845 Although the Blue Mud Bay
Case846 has not recently been cited in more recent fisheries cases before the High Court,
neither has it been overruled.847 For the reasons given in Chapter 5, the interpretative
stance taken by the majority in the Blue Mud Bay Case848 is unsatisfactory. Some of the
problems that arise in applying the case to current fisheries legislation will be discussed
in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 it is concluded that The Blue Mud Bay Case is of limited utility
in the interpretation of fisheries legislation and to the relationship between that legislation
and the public right.
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4.
Conclusions
The decision in Harper is the first substantial analysis of the public right to fish by
an Australian court. Harper confirmed the reception of the right from English law and
the key characteristics or attributes of the right. A novel feature of Harper was the explicit
recognition of public policy considerations behind new legislative approaches to fisheries
management, and the abrogation of common law rights. The case, although confirming
the public right to fish, also emphasised its susceptibility to abrogation by statute.
Yanner v Eaton presented what superficially appeared to be a different approach to
the effects of wildlife legislation and fisheries legislation. Conditional prohibitions of the
kind common in fisheries legislation were found not to have an extinguishing effect on
Indigenous rights in that case. The reconciliation of Harper with Yanner v Eaton is
complicated by the fact that Harper was decided in the absence of consideration of
Indigenous interests. The three-way interaction between Indigenous rights, statutory
rights to fish and the public right is the subject of Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5: THE ABROGATED RIGHT
A. The Right and The Blue Mud Bay Case
The Blue Mud Bay Case849 in 2008 was the last in a series of cases over fishing rights
in the tidal zone850 of the Northern Territory (collectively the ‘NT Fishing Cases’851). The
significance of the Blue Mud Bay Case to this thesis is that, but for this case, Australian
law in relation to the public right to fish appeared to have been relatively settled. The
general legal characteristics of the Australian public right to fish having been outlined in
Harper,852 the appropriate stance to take to the interpretation of wildlife legislation set
out in Yanner v Eaton853 and the interaction between Indigenous rights and the public
right outlined in Commonwealth v Yarmirr.854 Based on these cases, comprehensive
regulation could abrogate the right and replace it with a statutory right. Natural-resource
management legislation of the prohibit–licence variety, however, could generally be
interpreted as regulatory in nature, and not intended to wholly abrogate or extinguish
other rights.855 Furthermore, due to the common law right, exclusive Indigenous claims
to the marine zone based on common law native title would not be recognised under
Australian law.856
In the Blue Mud Bay Case, however, the plurality decided that provisions of the
Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) which were expressed in a prohibit–licence form abrogated the
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public right across the Northern Territory by ‘necessary implication’.857 This left the
public only such rights as could be sourced in the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT).858 On its face,
this prohibit–licence legislative scheme did not appear to be different in kind from the
legislative scheme found to be only regulatory in effect in Yanner v Eaton.859
Furthermore, the approach of the plurality emphasised the susceptibility of the right to
abrogation. As a result of that abrogation, the plurality held that ‘[n]o question arises of
any intersection between a common law right to fish and rights given by the grants under
the Land Rights Act’.860
The key question explored in this chapter is the degree to which the approach of the
plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case represents a reliable guide to the effect of fisheries
legislation on the public right to fish in other jurisdictions.861 This chapter proposes that
the plurality adopted a ‘narrow and shallow’ approach to adjudication. Their approach —
whether intended or not — limits the utility of the plurality’s reasoning as a general guide
to the interpretation of fisheries legislation. The limited authority of the Blue Mud Bay
Case as a guide to statutory interpretation of fishing legislation can be demonstrated in
more recent High Court fishing cases. In neither Akiba v Commonwealth 862 or in Karpany
v Dietman863 was the Blue Mud Bay Case cited in the judgments, or in oral argument
before the court. Nonetheless, the Blue Mud Bay Case has not been formally overruled or
distinguished as relevant only to the special circumstances applicable to that dispute in
the Northern Territory. The plurality’s approach increased uncertainty over the effect of
fisheries legislation on the public right. These matters are explored further in Chapters 6–
8.
This chapter concludes with a discussion on the different accounts of the source of
the public right raised in judgments in the NT Fishing Cases.864 Of particular interest is
the degree to which the public right to fish has been associated with prerogatives of the
Crown, and by implication with the Crown Ownership account of the source of the right.
As highlighted in earlier chapters, from a legal historical perspective the Crown
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Ownership account is the weakest of the three sources for the right, the other two being
the Birthright/Magna Carta and Bracton/Natural Law accounts. A close association
between the public right to fish and prerogatives of the Crown carries the legal implication
that the right is subject to the general legal rules governing the prerogative.865
B. The Tidal Zone in the Northern Territory
1.
Introduction
The preceding chapter dealt with the recognition of Indigenous rights under the
common law of Australia, and their reinforcement by the passage of the Native Title Act
1993 (Cth) (the ‘NTA’). The degree of recognition of Indigenous rights is limited by the
recognition of common law rights to fish and navigate.866 These common law rights
preclude the recognition of exclusive Indigenous interests in the marine domain.867 A
successful claim for an exclusive Indigenous fishery would need further support, such as
that provided in the Northern Territory under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (the ‘LRA’). The LRA was not based on common law native
title, having been created in a period when it was thought that such rights to land were
incapable of recognition under the common law of Australia. 868 Under the LRA, titles to
land and waters were granted in ‘fee simple’869 to Land Trusts, those trusts being
administered by Land Councils, Indigenous corporate bodies established under the
LRA.870 Along the coast the geographical boundaries of LRA title extend out to the low
watermark 871 including the foreshore when exposed by tides, waters between the high
and low watermarks, tidal rivers, and estuaries (for the purposes of this chapter ‘the tidal
zone’).872 As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, such an extensive geographic extension of private
property in the form of fee simple title down to the low watermark is exceptional in
Australian law. Whether the LRA title provided a sufficient statutory basis for exclusive
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Indigenous rights in the tidal zone would, however, depend on the interaction of the LRA
with both fisheries legislation in the Northern Territory and with the public right to fish.
2.
The LRA and the Tidal Zone
The proportion of the Northern Territory coast subject to LRA title has been variously
estimated as between 80 per cent873 and 88 per cent.874 For the most part, this title covers
areas that were administered as Aboriginal reserves prior to the commencement of the
LRA. Justice Woodward outlined a history of those Aboriginal reserves in 1974 in his
Second Report of the Aboriginal Lands Commission.875 Justice Woodward described this
history as ‘a complicated history of proclamations, revocations, fresh proclamations,
resumptions in part for other purposes and so on’.876 There had been a longstanding
dispute in the Northern Territory over whether commercial fishers had a right of access
to tidal waters and foreshores along the coastline of Aboriginal reserves.877 Justice
Woodward noted the existence of a dispute over ‘estuaries and tidal flats’, and concluded
that these areas ‘have generally been regarded as being part of reserves and therefore out
of bounds to commercial fishermen’.878 He recommended that ‘Aboriginal land ... should
include both offshore islands and waters within two kilometres of the low tide zone’.879
Justice Woodward intended that fisheries laws of general application should continue to
apply to this area.880
The legislative scheme recommended by Justice Woodward was not implemented in
the LRA. Legislative endeavours to implement Justice Woodward’s recommendations
commenced under the Whitlam Labor Government — which commissioned his report —
but the LRA was finalised under the Fraser Liberal–National Coalition Government in
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1976. The final version of the LRA provided for the grant of fee simple titles, but only
down to the low watermark. Below the low watermark, the LRA provided for future
declarations of exclusive zones of access out to two nautical miles, but under
complementary Northern Territory legislation (‘sea closures’).881 Each of these separate
statutory regimes had the potential to limit the public right to fish, but in different ways.
Under the LRA, fee simple title was granted to the tidal zone, but the LRA did not
explicitly address public access to the tidal zone. Sea closures from the low watermark
outwards to two nautical miles could exclude public access, but without an accompanying
grant of title. The Full Federal Court in Gumana v Northern Territory noted the LRA was
the result of a ‘legislative compromise’.882
A lack of clarity on public access to areas below the high watermark set the scene for
further conflict, in particular, between the public right to fish in the tidal zone and the
LRA’s statutory regime of control over LRA title areas. Section 70 of the LRA restricted
non-Aboriginal access to Aboriginal land. Depending on the definition of ‘land’, when
the tide was out, the surface of the tidal zone might be considered land. When the tide
was in, the same area would be considered water. In other words, public rights of access
would ebb and flow with the tide over LRA land.883 By reason of the public rights to fish
and navigate, non-Aboriginal fishers could range far inland along tidal rivers,
undermining one of Justice Woodward’s original objectives, which was to provide for the
‘privacy’ of Indigenous communities.884 Although the proposition that rights can move
in and out with the tide has some historical885 and legal support,886 it seems implausible
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that obscure English legal history had influenced the legislation’s preparation.
Furthermore, an anomaly would be introduced if the public right was retained over the
tidal zone and then a sea closure was granted outward from the low watermark. There
could potentially be exclusive Aboriginal access to LRA land above the high watermark,
an exclusive zone of Aboriginal access seaward below the low watermark, and public
right of access over the tidal zone, retained over LRA title. Accordingly, there would be a
public right of access sandwiched between the high watermark on one side, and a twonautical-mile sea closure from below the low watermark on the other.
3.
Access to the Northern Territory Tidal Zone
Access to the tidal zone in the Northern Territory was not in question in
Commonwealth v Yarmirr887 due to the circumstances of the case and the litigative
choices made by the participants and courts in earlier proceedings. At first instance,
Justice Olney held that the claim before him excluded coverage of LRA title in the tidal
zone.888 As a result of the exclusion of the tidal zone, the three-way interaction between
fisheries legislation, public rights and Indigenous rights under the LRA was not at issue,
only the two-way competition between native title rights under the NTA and the public
right to fish. On appeal, the Federal Court declined to add the impact of LRA title to the
matters at issue.889 The result was that the question of the effect of the LRA on the public
right was not before the High Court on appeal.
Given that access to the tidal zone was unresolved, the Arnhem Land Aboriginal
Land Trust commenced litigation in Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust v Director of
Fisheries.890 This litigation addressed the three-way interaction between the LRA, the
Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and the public right to fish. The Land Trust disputed the claim
by the Northern Territory that the combined effect of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and the
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public right was to ensure access to the tidal zone above LRA title.891 At first instance,
Justice Mansfield concluded that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) regulated, but did not
wholly abrogate, the public right to fish.892 He also held that the public right to fish
continued in effect over the LRA title, however, he excluded estuaries and inland tidal
waters from the geographic extent of the public right to fish on the basis of an ‘implied
prohibition under the LRA’.893 This exclusion, unsupported by authority,894 represented
an innovative compromise that allowed public access to the tidal zone along the coast
while allowing for the privacy intended by Justice Woodward to prevail over public
access in rivers and estuaries.895 On appeal, the Full Federal Court decided on technical
grounds to quash Justice Mansfield’s judgment.896 Justice Sackville did state that ‘without
expressing a final view’, the public right to fish prevailed over LRA title.897
4.
The Blue Mud Bay Case
With an inconclusive result following the decision of the Full Federal Court in 2001,
full consideration of public access to the tidal zone in the Northern Territory was left to
The Blue Mud Bay Case.898 A fresh case commenced before Justice Selway in Gumana v
Northern Territory.899 Hearings before Justice Selway were held concurrently under both
the LRA and the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) to avoid some of the technical problems that
troubled earlier litigation. This ensured that the three-way interaction between Indigenous
rights, fisheries regulation and the public right to fish in the Northern Territory could be
fully addressed. Justice Selway held that, on authority of the Full Federal Court in
Commonwealth v Yarmirr, the public right to fish applied to the tidal zone and allowed
commercial and recreational access to the tidal areas granted under the LRA.900 Justice
Selway stated, however, that if not bound by authority he would have characterised the
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public right as merely ‘the common law principle that a person can do that which is not
prohibited’.901
On appeal in Gumana v Northern Territory,902 the Full Federal Court focused on the
interpretation of provisions of the LRA. The Court did comment on the public right to
fish, 903 but declared its final conclusions were based on the ‘text and context’904 of the
LRA rather than on its views on the public right.905 The Court held that both the public
right to fish and the operation of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) were excluded from the
tidal zone by operation of the LRA.906 The Court held that not only did the public right to
fish not apply to LRA titles, but also that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) ‘had no
application’907 to areas under LRA title, in part based on limits on the Northern Territory’s
power to create rights affecting LRA title. 908
As noted above, the High Court plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case adopted a
different order of questions to consider than that adopted by the Full Federal Court. The
plurality held that the relevant preliminary question was whether or not the Fisheries Act
1988 (NT) had abrogated the public right.909 Having concluded that the public right had
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been abrogated across the Northern Territory,910 only then did the plurality consider the
LRA and its interaction with fisheries legislation.
C. The Blue Mud Bay Dispute
1.
Context and the Interests at Stake
Prior to considering the Blue Mud Bay Case in further detail, it is useful to first review
the economic, political and resource management context of the dispute. This section
assesses possible reasons why the plurality might have been attracted to the adoption of
an approach that has been described as a ‘narrow holding’911 in which competition over
rights was ‘not fully resolved’912 and in which the Court ‘refrained from spelling out in
comprehensive terms what legal entitlements the traditional owners hold over the
intertidal zone’.913 The plurality was largely silent on the policy and economic issues
involved in this case.914 The analysis below, therefore, explores the issues through the
submissions made by the parties in oral argument. In addition, this review of the issues
clarifies some misconceptions in academic commentary on the case as to the value of
competing commercial rights in the Northern Territory.915
The proportion of the Northern Territory coast subject to LRA title has been estimated
at between 80 per cent916 and 88 per cent917. Although the area involved is extensive,
some sources have overestimated the size of the economic interests directly affected,
especially of the commercial fisheries involved.918 These fisheries were described as ‘rich
natural resources’919 and the commercial fishing industry’s assets have been described as
‘immense’.920 The value of all fisheries in the Northern Territory appears to have been
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conflated with the value of the fisheries of the tidal zone.921 Public claims of the fishing
industry may have helped create an exaggerated impression of the scale of the interests
involved.922 In reality, although the inshore area covered by LRA title is extensive, the
commercial fisheries affected are low-value fisheries. In 2008, the principal fisheries
impacted were a commercial barramundi fishery and a commercial mud crab fishery. In
2010, the total annual lease value of all commercial fisheries under LRA title was
estimated to be ‘well under $3 million per year’.923 The more economically lucrative
fisheries in waters off the Northern Territory tend to be offshore.924
Recreational fishing is an important social activity in the Northern Territory
community925 and of significant importance to the Northern Territory economy.926
However, generating fee income from recreational fisheries is problematic. If the
Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) was excluded from the intertidal zone, Indigenous organisations
would have legal control of access to the tidal zone,927 but would also need to manage
access and activities without recourse to the machinery of state created under the
provisions of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT).928 An audit of Land Councils in 2008 showed
that in 2005–6 it cost the Northern Land Council $49 to process a permit for access under
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the LRA.929 This is just the cost of processing applications. If the Full Federal Court’s
orders restricting the application of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) had remained in place,
then in order to enforce access restrictions, Land Councils would have had to rely on
common law trespass or look to the provisions of the LRA to set up a separate system for
enforcement and management.930 Licensing, management and enforcement can be
expensive activities.
One profit-maximising strategy would be to optimise net income by imposing high
fees while reducing costs by substantially restricting access. A high-fee, limited-access
strategy may be economically viable for Indigenous ventures targeting high-end game
fishing,931 but would likely exclude many recreational fishers.932 It is significant that the
immediate response of the Northern Land Council to success in the Full Federal Court in
2007 was to set up a unilateral scheme providing for the automatic free issue of permits
to recreational fishers and to assure recreational fishers of future access through
negotiation with the Northern Territory government.933 The Northern Land Council
ensured that management responsibilities remained with the Northern Territory
government while claiming fees and other assistance from the Northern Territory in return
for non-Indigenous access, which was consistent with a pragmatic assessment of the risks
and benefits. 934 As of late 2017, this strategy has showed some success,935 but after nearly
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10 years on from the decision by the High Court with no long-term arrangements in place,
the prospect for further conflict remains.936
Arguments by the parties before the High Court in The Blue Mud Bay Case are best
understood against this backdrop of complex issues relating to the costs, benefits and
practicality of future arrangements. Noting these issues, it is unsurprising that all parties
were of the view that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) should apply to the tidal zone.937 While
the parties agreed that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) covered the tidal zone, they disagreed
on the degree to which the public right to fish survived regulation under the Fisheries Act
1988 (NT). Counsel for the Northern Territory, the Commonwealth and commercial
fishing interests asserted that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) had the effect of regulating
rights to fish, but did not wholly abrogate the public right to fish.938 Counsel for the
Indigenous parties argued that the statutory scheme had wholly abrogated the public right
to fish of commercial fishers, but did not argue that the public right to fish by recreational
fishers had been abrogated.939 The principal arguments advanced on behalf of Indigenous
interests focused on the exclusion of non-Indigenous access under Section 70 of the LRA,
and on whether commercial licences under the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) could authorise
access to the tidal zone.940 In essence, the parties accepted that the public right to fish
extended over LRA to some degree; disagreed on the extent to which the public right to
fish had been abrogated by the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT); and differed markedly on the
effects of the LRA and the interaction of that Act with licences under the Fisheries Act
1988 (NT).
In relation to the effect of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and LRA on fisheries
management, Mr Walker QC stated:
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They are aquatic resources, they are subject to the legislative stewardship of the
Territory and licences can be granted for the taking of it. If it is the grazier [earlier using
the analogy of a grazier that had private land] who gets the licence that is all he or she
needs, but if it is anybody else then of course there has to be an arrangement. The Fisheries
Act does not purport to alter private property, why should it be seen as altering Aboriginal
land. 941

From a natural-resource management perspective it is advantageous that fishery
management schemes are as comprehensive as possible, covering all users. This becomes
a difficult task when fish stocks straddle jurisdictional boundaries.942 In the absence of
tight integration with the Northern Territory’s statutory schemes for the management of
fisheries, practical problems for sustainable management would likely emerge from the
exclusion of the operation of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) from the tidal zone. The
emphasis placed by Counsel on ‘legislative stewardship’ is consistent with the purposive
approach to the interpretation of fisheries and natural-resource management legislation
taken in Harper943 and Yanner v Eaton.944
In summary, if the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) had been excluded from the tidal zone,
the Land Trust’s rights to the tidal zone would have been clear and well defined, but
problematic from the perspective of management effectiveness and of questionable value
from an economic perspective. The Northern Territory would have been left without clear
legislative authority to manage fisheries along much of the Northern Territory coast. Any
legislative attempt to resolve ensuing problems of access, management and sustainability
would have undoubtedly faced significant political risk and uncertainty.
2.
A Strained Construction?
In The Blue Mud Bay Case, the plurality945 took a different approach to that taken by
the Federal Court at the first instance, the Full Federal Court on appeal or indeed of
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counsel in oral argument before the High Court. The plurality’s first step towards
resolving the three-way interaction between Indigenous rights, statutory schemes of
management and the public right was to assess whether or not the Fisheries Act 1988
(NT) had comprehensively abrogated the public right to fish in the Northern Territory.
This approach made the effect of fisheries legislation on the public right fundamental to
their judgment.946 In essence, the plurality’s judicial approach was novel in its treatment
of the public right, not in its treatment of Indigenous rights under the LRA. It was only
after concluding that the right had been abrogated that the plurality considered the LRA.
The result was that the effect of the public right on LRA title was not at issue in the
plurality’s judgment. This sidestepped the need to resolve a more controversial question,
that being priorities between the public right and Indigenous rights under the LRA. This
was an issue that the legislature had left open notwithstanding Justice Woodward’s clear
recommendations on access to the tidal zone.947
The plurality held that by ‘necessary implication, the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) (and
in particular ss 10 and 11) abrogated any public right to fish in tidal waters in the Northern
Territory’.948 Having decided that the public right had been abrogated, they held that it
was unnecessary to decide the question of whether or not LRA title excluded the right.
The plurality’s findings led to an — apparently unintended949 — impact on the Fisheries
Act 1988 (NT), which was the loss of access by non-Aboriginal fisheries to most of the
tidal zone of the Northern Territory. Legislation intended to support the ability of the
Northern Territory to develop and manage fisheries led to a significant reduction of the
area in which the vast majority of recreational and commercial fishers could fish, at least
without permission from LRA title holders.
In assessing the effect of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) on public rights, the plurality
stated that, ‘[t]he statutory abrogation of a public right may appear not only from express
words but by necessary implication from the text and structure of the statute’.950 The
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plurality’s apparent characterisation of arguments by Counsel for the Northern Territory
and commercial fishers that explicit words were required to abrogate the right cannot be
reconciled with the record of oral argument before the Court. Counsel for those parties
only argued that there needed to be a clear statutory intent to abrogate a public right,951
an orthodox view of authorities relating to public rights such as in Potter v Minahan.952
A finding of a necessary implication would have been sufficient to satisfy a test of clear
intent. At issue was whether a finding of necessary implication was required in the first
place.
On its face, Section 10 of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) appears to have been an
unexceptional example of a conditional prohibition in natural-resource management
legislation of the type referred to in Yanner v Eaton.953 The Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) is
less comprehensive than the statutory provisions referred to in Yanner v Eaton.954 In that
case, the requirement to hold a licence to hunt wildlife was not subject to exemptions for
personal use; there was a legislative history of removing exemptions for Indigenous
hunting and there was a provision vesting property in wildlife in the Crown. 955 The Blue
Mud Bay Case plurality did not explain why the relevant provisions of the Fisheries Act
1988 (NT) were not a conditional prohibition that was regulatory in nature, especially
considering earlier Federal Court decisions had supported such an interpretation of the
Act.956
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Section 10 of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) states that:
(1)
Subject to this Act or to an instrument of a legislative or administrative
character made under it, a person shall not:
(a)
licence ...

take any fish … unless the person does so under and in accordance with a

(2)
Nothing in this section shall apply to the taking of fish … by a person for
957
subsistence or personal use only (and not for the purposes of sale), within such limits (if
any) relating to numbers, quantity, size, weight, methods, types and amount of fishing gear,
and periods of time (including closed and open seasons), as may be prescribed for any such
fish.

The plurality’s construction of Section 10 of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) is valid
only if its interpretation of ‘nothing in this section’ in Section 10(2) is viewed as nonliteral. Otherwise the limitation ‘nothing’ would also apply to the abrogatory effect of
Section 10(1). Only a very limited meaning of ‘nothing’ supports the plurality’s
interpretation that Section 10(1) applied to create a general prohibition that is only
relieved by statutory exemption under Section 10(2). Indeed, Gullett cited Section 10(2)
of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) as evidence of a positive intent by the Northern Territory
to preserve the public right to fish.958
Furthermore, although the plurality initially characterised the Fisheries Act 1988
(NT) as a form of comprehensive statutory regulation,959 it later emphasised the
limitations of regulation under the Act. On questions of access, the plurality concluded
that ‘the Fisheries Act does not deal with where persons may fish. Rather, the Fisheries
Act provides for where persons may not [emphasis in the original] fish’.960 On this basis,
it held that licences under the Act did not provide a right of access to the tidal zone under
LRA title.961 According to the plurality, therefore, the effects of the Fisheries Act 1988
(NT) were so comprehensive that they abrogated the public right to fish, but were limited
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in relation to the rights of licensees under the Act. The result, as noted above, was that,
‘by necessary implication’, legislation intended to further the legislative authority of the
Northern Territory led to a reduction in the area over which rights under that Act could
be exercised without the approval of the holders of LRA title.
Goldsworthy has suggested that there are two kinds of ‘necessary implication’. The
first is an implication that is necessary for a statutory provision to have its intended effect,
and the second is where there is a ‘certain communicative intention’ that is ‘in the
circumstances obvious’.962 The necessary implication in this case appears unlikely to have
been of the first kind. Such a finding would be directly contrary to Yanner v Eaton,963 that
a regulatory scheme does not require abrogation or extinguishment of prior rights to have
effect. Indeed, the plurality did not refer to Yanner v Eaton at all. The necessary
implication here appears to be of the second kind, a conclusion based on obvious intent
as drawn by the plurality from the words of the statute.
The plurality, however, did not explain why it found there was such a necessary
implication, although it did note the susceptibility of the public right to abrogation. 964 In
the reasons given for their interpretation of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT), the plurality
compared the Act to regulation of prerogatives of the Crown citing965 Justice McHugh in
Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal of New South Wales; Ex Parte Defence Housing
Authority.966 The plurality also cited Attorney General v De Keysers Royal Hotel Ltd (‘De
Keyser’s Case’)967 amongst others as authority for the proposition that the Fisheries Act
1988 (NT) abrogated the public right to fish in the Northern Territory.968 The importance
of De Keyser’s Case,969 to the reasoning of the plurality is emphasised by its repeated
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reference in oral argument by Justice Gummow.970 De Keyser’s Case is more typically
cited as an authority for the proposition that prerogative powers cannot coexist with
legislation.971 In this case, the issue was the impact of legislation on a public right. It is
not clear whether the plurality was proposing a new ‘necessary implication’ rule based
on De Keyser’s Case,972 a specific rule relevant to this legislative scheme only, or a rule
relevant because of a loose association of the public right to fish with the prerogative.
Possibly a mixture of all the above. As the High Court noted in the same year, the canons
of statutory interpretation ‘jostle for acceptance’.973 Chapter 7 considers the wider
implications of the association of the public right to fish with the prerogative and the rule
in De Keyser’s Case. For the purposes of this chapter, it is relevant only that there was a
degree of association in the plurality’s judgment between prerogatives of the Crown and
the public right to fish, and that this association appears to have influenced the weight
given to the public right by the plurality.
The plurality did not address the question of whether the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT)
might also extinguish common law native title rights by ‘necessary implication’974 (in
particular, extinguishment prior to 1975975). The possibility of extinguishment was drawn
to the Court’s attention by Counsel for the Northern Territory.976 Such a question is
natural given that the test for extinguishment has been expressed in terms broadly similar
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to the test claimed for abrogation of the public right.977 Prior to the decisions of the High
Court in Akiba v Commonwealth978 and Karpany v Dietman,979 a comprehensive
regulatory scheme for fisheries management would have needed to be ‘just right’ to
wholly abrogate the public right and to avoid the potential to extinguish common law
native title rights.980 In 2012, the Supreme Court in South Australia held that state
fisheries legislation had the effect of extinguishing native title.981 Although reversed on
appeal in the High Court in Karpany v Dietman,982 the South Australian Supreme Court’s
decision showed the difficulty of consistently applying a test that is, on its surface, similar
for both abrogation of the public right and extinguishment of Indigenous rights.
In summary, the problematic elements in the plurality’s reasons include:
interpretation of the literal words of Section 10(2) so as to make them subject to Section
10(1); no engagement with previous authority on the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT);983 a novel
application to the public right of a rule of statutory construction relating to the prerogative
(De Keyser’s Case); a questionable characterisation of the arguments of counsel on
statutory interpretation; and a failure to reference Yanner v Eaton984 as a key authority on
the interpretation of natural-resource management schemes. The implication found by the
plurality escaped the observation of prior courts in the NT Fishing Cases series.985 Taken
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together, these elements suggest the plurality did indeed apply a ‘strained construction’986
to the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT).
3.
A Narrow and Shallow Approach
In applying a strained construction to the provisions of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT),
the plurality adopted what can be characterised as a narrow and shallow approach in their
judgment.987 A narrow and shallow approach is attractive to the judiciary where there is
a desire to decide in a certain way, but without courting unnecessary controversy nor
making a wider change in the law than necessary. 988 This does not mean that a wider
construction might not be adopted by later courts, but rather that the original court
refrained from propounding a broader legal principle than necessary. The High Court had
before it a complex and politically sensitive dispute989 of broad public interest. It was a
dispute the legislature had left unresolved in the LRA. Native title and Indigenous rights
have been a controversial issue in Australian political and legal circles.990 Pierce, in Inside
the Mason Court Revolution, describes the negative reaction in Australian judicial circles
to perceived judicial activism in the High Court under Chief Justice Mason, not least in
relation to native title and Indigenous rights.991 Former Chief Justice French, writing extra
curially — although not directly criticising past courts — publicly disavowed judicial
activism as a basis of High Court jurisprudence.992 The Blue Mud Bay Case decision
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State Law Review 1081.
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involved an issue of Indigenous rights that touched directly on the recreational activities
of a significant percentage of the non-Indigenous population.993 Public access to the
foreshore is included in the NTA, although those provisions are of questionable effect.994
In 1998 the Liberal–National conservative government passed amendments to the NTA
that purportedly confirmed that native title rights were subject to fisheries laws.995 In
those amendments, the tidal zone between high and low waters was designated as being
subject to the ‘offshore’ NTA rights regime, a regime significantly less favourable to
Indigenous rights than the ‘on-shore’ regime.996 By contrast to the NTA, the
Commonwealth legislature — whether intentionally or not — left open the question of
the interaction between the public right and the LRA.
In the Blue Mud Bay Case, the plurality’s discussion of the legislation is shallow in
that it does not refer to the policy considerations found relevant in interpreting naturalresource management legislation in Harper997 and Yanner v Eaton.998 The High Court has
emphasised the need to consider context999 and to determine legislative effect.1000 There
was, however, no in-depth analysis by the plurality of the legislative history of the
Fisheries Act 1988 (NT).1001 That the approach applied was narrow is further indicated

gives the appearance of working it out from first principles but really coming up with something entirely
novel … the process of getting it [the result he wanted] is a process of disguise — not subterfuge but
concealment.’ See generally, Larry Alexander, Legal Rules and Legal Reasoning (Collected Essays in Law)
(Dartmouth Publishing, 2000).
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by the final orders of the Court. After noting that the declarations made by the Full Federal
Court were ‘framed too widely’, the final orders were that:
Sections 10 and 11 of the Fisheries Act (NT) do not confer on the Director of Fisheries
(NT) a power to grant a licence under that Act which licence would, without more,
authorise or permit the holder to enter and take fish or aquatic life from [LRA title over the
tidal zone]1002

These do not make a declaration on the status of the public right to fish. Indeed, they
do not mention the public right to fish at all. The words ‘without more’ almost invite
future argument as to what that ‘more’ might be. By way of example, the decision might
be less relevant to authorisations for state-managed fisheries with more narrowly defined
limits, such as gulfs or bays, compared to the wide-ranging licences across the whole of
the Northern Territory coast referred to by the plurality.1003 The judgment of the plurality
shows signs of a narrow and shallow approach to adjudication.1004
4.
Question Order and Path Dependence
In addition to reasons given above, the judicial methodology adopted by the plurality
to the order of questions resolved in this three-way dispute over fishing rights provides
further evidence of a narrow and shallow approach to adjudication. The reason why the
first question considered by the plurality was the abrogatory effect of the Fish Resources
Act 1988 (NT) was not made explicit, although the plurality drew attention to the
importance of their choice of question order.1005 This lack of explanation opens up
additional opportunities for alternative approaches to the resolution of conflicts between
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multiple rights in the marine domain without an explicit overruling of that case.1006 This
point can be illustrated in the history of the NT Fishing Cases1007 themselves.
The NT Fishing Cases1008 demonstrate the possibility of different outcomes
depending on the choice of the order in which questions are considered. For example, in
Gumana v Northern Territory (2005),1009 Justice Selway deferred to an earlier decision
of the Full Federal Court in Commonwealth v Yarmirr1010 and resolved that the
substantive question to be addressed was whether the public right to fish prevailed over
otherwise exclusive Indigenous rights under the LRA.1011 In other words, the assessment
was first made between the public right and the LRA. Explicit, but not fully developed, in
his argument was that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) regulated, but did not wholly abrogate,
the public right to fish.1012
On appeal, the Full Federal Court in Gumana v Northern Territory1013 applied a
different order of questions. Drawing on the history of the LRA, the Court first held that
it was the LRA that excluded the public right, then decided that the Fisheries Act 1988
(NT) did not apply over LRA title.1014 The Court’s conclusion that the Fisheries Act 1988
(NT) did not apply to LRA title turned on its interpretation of the LRA and the limits on
the legislative powers of the Northern Territory legislature, and not on the construction
of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT). The Full Court, although it also doubted the weight that
should be afforded the public right to fish, emphasised that its construction of the LRA
did not turn on the prerogative approach to the characterisation of the public right to fish
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preferred by Justice Selway.1015 The order of the questions it posed had the effect of
making that assessment unnecessary.1016
Whereas the Federal Court, on appeal, focused first on the effect of the LRA in The
Blue Mud Bay Case; as noted above the plurality resolved the questions by first looking
at whether the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) abrogated the public right to fish. There was then
no need to undertake a pairwise assessment of priorities between the public right to fish
and the LRA. Differences in outcome in these cases can be partly, or largely, attributed to
the order in which the questions were asked. Arguably, the plurality in The Blue Mud Bay
Case did not overrule the Federal Court’s interpretation of the effect of the LRA on the
public right,1017 but rather, by making a different methodological choice, it came to a
different conclusion.
The plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case did not explain the order it chose to address
questions of priorities between different rights. Nor did they indicate what, if any, policy
considerations might have influenced them in their choice. Without explicit guidance on
the methodological choices made, future High Courts do not need to explicitly overrule
The Blue Mud Bay Case to exercise wide discretion over the adjudication of rights in the
marine domain. It is significant that neither the Blue Mud Bay Case nor De Keyser’s Case
were cited in the judgments of the High Court in Akiba v Commonwealth1018 or Karpany
v Dietman.1019 Instead, Yanner v Eaton,1020 with its purposive approach to the
construction of natural-resource management legislation, was cited. This difference in
approach to statutory interpretation of natural-resource management legislation is
discussed in the ensuing section.
5.
Is the Blue Mud Bay Case a Useful Guide?
As noted above, the plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case appears to have adopted a
strained construction to the provision of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and a narrow and
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shallow approach in its reasoning. Given this, the authority of the case on the question of
the abrogation of the public right may be especially susceptible to limitation through
standard judicial techniques of non-citation, re-interpretation or distinguishing. Indeed,
as Sunstein points out,1021 one of the attractions of a narrow and shallow approach is that
it defers to a more broadly applicable finding at a later date. Furthermore, The Blue Mud
Bay Case involved special contextual factors, including the unique legislative history of
the LRA and the limited jurisdictional competence of the Northern Territory.
The question is then the precedential authority that should be placed by other
jurisdictions on the Blue Mud Bay Case plurality’s construction of the Fisheries Act 1988
(NT) as abrogating the public right by necessary implication. As noted by Pearce and
Geddes, ‘binding precedent has a different significance in this area [statutory
interpretation] of the law than in other areas’.1022 They summarised the law as:
The result flowing from this difference [between statute law and common law] is that
if a court is seeking the meaning of a particular legislation, it cannot be bound by the
interpretation placed on like words in other legislation by another court. Since the latter
court was only saying what the words before it meant, its decision cannot be conclusive as
to the meaning of another similar provision1023

By way of a recent example in Sea Shepherd v Western Australia,1024 at issue was
the construction of the Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (WA). Analogies had been
made in argument to South Australian fisheries legislation and the decision of the South
Australian Supreme Court in Dietman v Karpany.1025 Justice Edelman noted the limited
value in such analogies, stating that ‘nothing was said [in the High Court in Karpany v
Dietman1026] concerning any analogy with the Western Australian legislation. An
observation which is unsurprising given the forceful expression from the High Court
bench of the risks of drawing analogies from other legislation in Karpany v Dietman.1027
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The question then is not whether the finding by the plurality of a ‘necessary
implication’ in the Blue Mud Bay Case is binding in other jurisdictions, but the degree to
which its approach to interpretation is influential. The later treatment of the case is the
best guide to the degree of influence that it should be accorded. In 2013 the High Court
delivered two judgments1028 on the impact of fisheries legislation on native title rights
that suggest that relatively low weight should be accorded to the interpretative approach
of the plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case.
In Akiba v Commonwealth,1029 the High Court decided on the appropriate test to
apply in assessing the extinguishing effect of a fisheries management scheme on native
title rights. The plurality held that ‘the central point made in Yanner … is that a statutory
prohibition on taking resources … without a licence does not conclusively establish
extinguishment of native title rights and interests’.1030 Chief Justice French and Justice
Crennan stated that, since the rights of Indigenous fishers in the Torres Strait were
‘common law property rights’, extinguishment will occur only where ‘no other
construction is reasonably open’.1031
In Akiba v Commonwealth,1032 the court made it clear that the test for extinguishment
of native title rights should not be compared to the test for abrogation of common law
public rights in Harper.1033 There was, however, no explicit guidance provided on the test
of when the public right might be abrogated. Nonetheless, the high prominence in Akiba
v Commonwealth1034 of Yanner v Eaton provides support for the proposition that,
generally, natural-resource management legislation in the form of a general prohibition
coupled with a licencing regime should be interpreted as a form of conditional
prohibition. As noted earlier, in Yanner v Eaton, natural-resource management schemes
in general were classified as being in the form of conditional prohibition, not just a form
of conditional prohibition with respect to questions relating to native title rights.1035
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An emphasis on Yanner v Eaton was also a feature in the decision of the High Court
in Karpany v Dietman.1036 In that case, the High Court overturned a decision of the South
Australian Supreme Court1037 that past Fisheries Acts had extinguished native title based
on fishing rights in South Australia.1038 The High Court cited Yanner v Eaton as authority
for the proposition that legislation of this kind was in the form of a ‘conditional
prohibition’, 1039 and ‘regulated, but was not inconsistent with, the continued enjoyment
of native title rights’.1040 The High Court did not restrict its comments to native title
interests, stating that the Fisheries Act 1971 (SA) ‘read as a whole … regulated rather
than prohibited fishing’, pointing to provisions of the Act that provided for statutory
mechanisms whereby fishing would be permitted.1041 The Court concluded that ‘the [Act]
did not generally prohibit non-commercial fishing’, not merely Indigenous fishing.1042 It
is difficult to reconcile the approach reached by the Court in this case with the plurality’s
finding of abrogation by necessary implication in the Blue Mud Bay Case.
The authority of the Blue Mud Bay Case as a general guide to the interpretation of
fisheries legislation is weakened by its non-citation in the two fishing-related cases before
the High Court in 2013 discussed above. Nonetheless, the Blue Mud Bay Case has not
been overruled, and the implications of the plurality approach to statutory interpretation
in that case is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7.
6.
The Prerogative and the Public Right
A separate, but related, question to when legislation will give rise to abrogation by
necessary implication, is the question of the weight to be given to the ‘principle of
legality’ and the degree to which legislation should be read with an assumption that the
legislature did not intend to abrogate public rights. Associations between the right and
prerogatives of the Crown suggest that a low weight should be given to the right. As noted
in Chapter 1, questions about the origin and source of the public right to fish are, in effect,
questions about the weight to be afforded to the right and the legal effects of the right.
The three accounts of the right’s source identified in this thesis are the Bracton/Natural
Law account, the Birthright/Magna Carta account and the Crown Ownership account. Of
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these three, the Crown Ownership account provides the weakest support for the right. As
a right derived from a presumed past grant by the Crown by exercise of prerogative
powers, it might be subject to the same tests and disabilities as a prerogative power.
There is support for the Crown Ownership account in the Blue Mud Bay Case. The
plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case implicitly associated the public right to fish with
prerogatives of the Crown through its reference to De Keyser’s Case.1043 It did not,
however, associate the public right to fish with prerogatives of the Crown to the degree
that Justice Selway did in Gumana v Northern Territory 1044 Justice Selway was of the
view that the public right to fish was not really a right, but a limitation on the exercise of
the prerogative of the Crown to make grants in the tidal zone and seas, stating that:
those public rights are best understood as restrictions on the Crown’s prerogative
powers, rather than restrictions on statutory grants. The relevant prerogative powers have
had no application in Australia since 1842 ... What is effectively left of these public law
rights (if anything) are not enforceable common law ‘rights’, but rather the common law
principle that a person can do that which is not prohibited.1045

Not only did Justice Selway not recognise the multiple legal bases for the public right
to fish as outlined in Chapters 1–3, he also did not cite any English authority for this
proposition. Justice Selway acknowledged1046 that his views on the public right to fish
were different to those of Justice Brennan in Harper.1047 It should be noted that Justice
Selway’s association of the public right to fish with the prerogative is subtly different to
the association made by Moore and Moore.1048 As outlined in Chapter 2,1049 Moore and
Moore associated the public right to fish with the prerogative because they presumed the
right’s origin was in a past exercise of the powers of the Crown over its estate in the seas.
In other words, the public right was carved out of the interests of the Crown. Justice
Selway’s view was that the right — at least in Australia — was not an interest carved out
of the estate of the Crown, but a mere limitation of the prerogative powers of the Crown.
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The Full Federal Court’s view in Gumana v Northern Territory1050 on the relationship
between the public right to fish and prerogatives of the Crown is less clear. As noted
above, the Federal Court’s principal focus was on the ‘text, structure and context of the
Land Rights Act’.1051 The Court did discuss both the public right to fish and prerogatives
of the Crown, but decided that it was not necessary to come to a conclusion, stating
that:1052
Equally, because of the view we take of the text, structure and context of the Land
Rights Act, it is unnecessary for us to enter upon the debate fanned by Selway J as to
whether the public rights to fish and to navigate are, strictly, common law rights or ‘are
best understood as restrictions on the Crown’s prerogative’: Gumana 141 FCR 457 at [69].
It is unsurprising that in different ages the rights have been ascribed differing provenances:
see Bonyhady T, The Law of the Countryside (1987) Ch 8. What needs to be said about the
public rights is what has been emphasised on a number of occasions. As was said by Barrett
J in Georgeski v Owners Corporation SP49833 (2004) 62 NSWLR 534 (at [84]):
… it is not possible to make, with any degree of confidence, a complete and exhaustive
statement of the common law rights of the public in relation to tidal waters and the foreshore.
The matter is a ‘difficult question’ no less today than when so described by Lord Wright in
1935 [in Williams-Ellis v Cobb [1935] 1 KB 310 at 320].

See also Bonyhady (1987) p240 on the right to fish (“the legal basis of this right is
unclear and there are also significant limitations on the manner in which the right may be
exercised”).

The Federal Court stated that legislation was subject to public rights, unless those
rights failed to have ‘contemporary accuracy and utility’.1053 Furthermore, it stated that
the application of older common law rules of interpretation of this kind also depends on
the context in which they were being applied.1054 This approach to the public right to fish
would appear to be inconsistent with Justice Brennan’s statement in Harper where he
referred to the ‘paramount’ nature of the public right to fish.1055 The Federal Court
interpreted that statement as applying only to the interaction between the right and
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prerogative grants.1056 It is not clear in this context, however, what prerogative grants the
Federal Court believed Justice Brennan had in mind. As Justice Selway noted above,1057
prerogative rights to grant estates in the seas lapsed with self-government sometime in
the mid-to-late 1800s. Furthermore, earlier in its judgment, the Federal Court discounted
the need to resolve the relationship between the prerogative and the public right to fish.1058
This leaves the position of the Federal Court on the prerogative somewhat uncertain.1059
Stripped of the attempt to reconcile its position with Harper by reference to the
prerogative, the Full Federal Court’s approach — emphasising the context for the exercise
of the public rights — has the advantage of resolving some of the conceptual difficulties
arising from the application of English legal precedents to Australia. In Australia, all
private interests in the tidal zone have been created1060 or are sustained1061 by statute.
Unlike England, there is no question of a transfer, or carve out, of rights derived from a
pre-existing Crown Estate with both public and private characteristics. Following the Full
Federal Court’s logic, the public right to fish need not be classified as either intrinsically
weak or intrinsically strong. The strength of any presumptions in favour of the right would
instead depend on the specific statutory context in which the right was being considered.
It would be fully consistent with such a view that presumptions in favour of the public
right to fish might be weak against rights created by fee simple private grants, 1062 but
there might be a stronger presumption in the right’s favour when regulatory schemes of
the Crown for natural-resource management are involved. More speculatively, in
Chapters 7 and 8, it is argued that where land or waters have been vested in a body for a
public purpose that is not directly related to fishing, then the context and purpose of that
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legislation should be reviewed carefully to assess whether it wholly or partially abrogates
the right.
The Federal Court’s emphasis on context largely resolved a glaring incongruity in
Australian law: the extensive impact of a weak public right on the recognition of
Indigenous rights.1063 Justice Selway in the first instance stated that ‘these public law
rights (if anything) are not enforceable common law “rights”, but rather the common law
principle that a person can do that which is not prohibited’.1064 This formulation suggested
that the public right to fish is a very weak right, if a right at all. The public right to fish,
however, has had a significant impact on Indigenous rights, by preventing recognition of
exclusive Indigenous interests in Australia’s marine domain.1065 Adoption of the Full
Federal Court’s approach resolves this incongruity, as it context that is decisive rather
than whether the public right is characterised — in other circumstances — as
‘skeletal’,1066 ‘fundamental’1067 or even as ‘lacking contemporary significance’.1068
As noted earlier, the order of questions adopted by the Federal Court led it to focus
on the interpretation of the LRA. The general views expressed by the Federal Court on
common law presumptions and the public right to fish were not explicitly rejected in The
Blue Mud Bay Case, as the plurality decided on different grounds. Accordingly, it can be
argued that the views of the Federal Court on the public right to fish retain considerable
authoritative weight. Unfortunately, the clarity of the Federal Court’s position is
undermined by its own reference to prerogative grants of the Crown, as if they were still
operative in the marine domain. It is, therefore, an open question whether the Federal
Court did or did not find an association between the public right and the prerogative and
whether that association was relevant to the weight to be afforded to the right.
Some general guidance on the strength of association between the public right and
the prerogative can be gained from guidance from two significant decisions handed down
after Chief Justice French joined the High Court bench. Judgments in ICM Agriculture
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Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1.
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Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 68 (Gleeson CJ and Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
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Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth1069 and Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales1070
touched broadly on prerogatives of the Crown, state power, legal history and resource
management. These two cases involved a wide-ranging review of the history of the
relevant legislation.1071 This approach contrasts with the very limited review taken by the
plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case. In Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales1072
the Court undertook an extensive review of prerogatives of the Crown relating to mining
and minerals, without reference to De Keyser’s Case,1073 as would have been expected if
the Blue Mud Bay Case established a broadly applicable rule to statutory interpretation
based on De Keyser’s Case. In ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth ,1074 the
nature of common law rights to water and the effect of regulation were discussed by the
court, with a significant emphasis on water resources as limited natural resources.1075 De
Keyser’s Case1076 was referred to by Justice Heydon, but only as a case on compensation
for takings by the Crown,1077 not as a general rule of interpretation.
The treatment of De Keyser’s Case by the High Court in these two cases
demonstrates scant support for it as a general or overarching rule of interpretation. In this
regard, the treatment by it in the Blue Mud Bay Case is the outlier, and only a modest
weight should be afforded to the indirect association between the prerogative and the
public right. This issue is of more than antiquarian import. Different views on the source
of the right are associated with different conclusions as to the weight to be afforded it. In
addition, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, different views on the source of the right
would lead to differences in outcome should abrogatory legislation be lifted, leaving open
the question of whether the public right to fish can revive.
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D. Conclusion
In concluding, it is useful to consider Coper’s distinction between criticism of a
decision and criticism of the reasons given in that decision.1078 In the Blue Mud Bay Case,
the decision of the Court substantially restored what Justice Woodward considered the
status quo prior to the LRA, that being a closure of access to commercial fishers.1079 In
relation to recreational fishers, the effect was to create a right to privacy over the tidal
zone, as had originally been recommended by Justice Woodward.1080 The High Court’s
confirmation of the Northern Territory’s role in, and powers over, natural-resource
management was called for by all parties. The Blue Mud Bay Case is not problematic due
to the orders made by the court, but due to the approach taken by the plurality in their
judgment.
The effect of the Blue Mud Bay Case in other jurisdictions depends on the
characterisation of that decision by the courts in question. If the case is characterised as a
special case relating to Indigenous rights with a unique legislative provenance, then its
impact on the interpretation of fisheries legislation is limited.1081 If the case is
characterised as one relating to the interpretation of natural-resource management
legislation generally, it undermines the general authority of Yanner v Eaton, effectively
limiting the relevance of that case to consideration of the interaction between legislation
and Indigenous interests.1082 Based on the analysis of cases before the High Court
between 2008 and 2017, it seems likely the Blue Mud Bay Case has been relegated to
judicial obscurity through non-citation, but it has not been overruled. The consequences
for the interpretation of fisheries legislation is covered in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6: THE RIGHT AND FISHERIES
LEGISLATION
A. Chapter 6: Introduction
The previous two chapters reviewed the judicial treatment of the public right to fish
in Australia following the recognition of Indigenous rights to fish and the implementation
of rights-based management. Following the analysis presented in those two chapters, this
chapter undertakes a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction assessment of the likelihood of the right
being wholly abrogated by fisheries legislative schemes introduced since 1988.
The relevance of an enquiry into whether the right has been wholly abrogated in a
jurisdiction was demonstrated in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1083 Public access to the marine
domain rests in part on the underlying public right to fish, the abrogation of which
changes the relationship of the rights of the public to the marine domain. In addition to
waters held under fee simple title, the marine domain is also the subject of a range of
leases, statutory vesting in government authorities and management regimes for nonfishing purposes (such as ports). More recently, the marine domain has seen extensive
marine parks and reserves declared, with further reserves planned.1084 The abrogation of
the public right to fish changes the legal context underpinning the interpretation of
potentially conflicting legal regimes.
This chapter is focused on whether or not fisheries legislation wholly abrogates the
public right to fish. Chapter 7 focuses on the legal consequences of partial abrogation in
those areas of Australia’s marine domain where the public right to fish has only been
abrogated in part. A partial abrogation, for example, could be limited by time, place,
purpose or species.1085
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(2008) 236 CLR 24. See n 53 above on the use of the term ‘wholly abrogated’. Although the plurality
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B. Key Issues
1.
Rights-based Management
As noted in Chapters 1 and 4, from the 1950s to the early 1980s, the principal concern
of Australian governments1086 was the expansion of commercial fisheries; the prevention
of overfishing was a secondary concern.1087 By the 1980s, failures in fisheries
management had led to overfishing and poor economic outcomes. Between 1988 and
2007, all Australian governments managing marine fisheries introduced new and
substantially reformed legislative schemes for fisheries management.1088 A key objective
of these schemes was to improve economic outcomes, particularly from commercial
fisheries.1089 Typically, this objective was achieved through the creation of defined rights
of access under statutory plans of management.1090 Statutory fishing rights in this form
necessarily partially abrogate the common law public right to fish, and in the case of the
Northern Territory, wholly abrogated the right in the intertidal zone.
As noted earlier, in Harper in 1989 the High Court considered the legal effects of a
statutory scheme introduced to implement rights-based management.1091 As noted in
Chapter 4, this case was fundamental to the recognition of the public right to fish in
Australia. The dispute in Harper1092 was over the introduction in Tasmania of a quota
management scheme for wild abalone. As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, the more
comprehensive a statutory scheme is, the harder it becomes to classify as merely
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The Australian States were early adopters of fisheries regulation as to size limits, limitations on nets
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regulatory in nature.1093 In Harper,1094 the Court recognised that the public right to fish
abalone in Tasmania had not merely been regulated but had been abrogated and replaced
with new statutory rights for both recreational and commercial fishers. As noted in
Chapters 4 and 5, the general authority of Harper on the effect of fisheries legislation on
the public right to fish has been confirmed, even though an extension of the reasoning in
the case to the extinguishment of Indigenous rights has been rejected by the High
Court.1095
2.
Property in Wild Fish
In addition to the introduction of comprehensive schemes of management, some
States of Australia have also sought to emphasise their rights over fisheries by asserting
their ownership of wild fish in the water, a novel legal concept.1096 Harper1097 sheds light
on the likely motive for such assertions.1098 Legislative assertions of ownership are likely
related to questions of the constitutional ability of States to levy fees.1099 If fish are owned
by the state, fees levied on fishing activities can be classified as royalties instead of fees
of excise (which Section 90 of the Australian Constitution prohibits the States from
imposing), making them free of doubt.
In Harper, Justice Brennan cast doubt on claims of property in the abalone fishery
by the state of Tasmania, 1100 but he did not express a final opinion on this point.1101
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Justices Dawson, McHugh and Toohey, although generally agreeing with Justice
Brennan, did hold that access fees of this nature could constitute a duty of excise in some
circumstances, and therefore were at risk of being constitutionally invalid.1102 In an
apparent attempt to resolve any uncertainty in its favour, Tasmania asserted ownership of
living marine resources under Section 9(1) of the Living Marine Resources Management
Act 1995 (Tas). In parliamentary debate, the Tasmanian Minister for Fisheries was
questioned as to whether or not certainty over the validity of fees was the purpose of the
relevant provision. The response from the Minister, although somewhat equivocal,
suggests that the question of ownership was indeed a relevant factor.1103
3.
Regulate/Abrogate/Extinguish: A Recap of Yanner v Eaton
Two aspects of Harper1104 have the potential to limit the general application of the
High Court’s approach to the public right to fish to legislation. The most important of
these is the limited extent of the scheme involved. The statutory scheme in the case of
Harper was comprehensive in nature but limited to wild abalone. Public rights of access
to fish for other species had not been abrogated. The second aspect is that the case did not
directly consider the interaction of Indigenous rights and the public right to fish, and that
the relevant fisheries legislation was interpreted in the absence of direct consideration of
Indigenous interests. The recognition of native title rights in 1992 prompted a
reconsideration by the High Court in Yanner v Eaton on the appropriate stance to take
when interpreting legislative schemes of natural resource management.1105 The relevance
of Yanner v Eaton to the interpretation of fisheries legislation lies in the sceptical eye cast
by the majority on the effects of legislative provisions that asserted complete control over
wildlife in the form of a general prohibition coupled with an exemption and licensing
regime.1106 The general applicability of that case to the interpretation of fisheries
legislation might appear to have been undermined by the Blue Mud Bay Case.1107 As
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outlined in Chapter 6, however, the approach taken in Yanner v Eaton1108 found support
in Akiba v Commonwealth1109 and Karpany v Dietman.1110
In Yanner v Eaton,1111 the High Court considered the meaning of assertions of Crown
‘property’ in Section 7(1) of the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld). Chief Justice
Gleeson and Justices Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne found that the word ‘property’ allowed
for the continuation of common law native title rights to hunt and fish. They characterised
property as a term that could signify a ‘wide variety of different forms of interest’.1112
They then held that the reference to property in the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld)
should be interpreted as a way of describing the aggregate of State rights over wildlife,
and that, accordingly, the vesting of ‘property’ under Section 7(1) did not have an
extinguishing effect on Indigenous rights.1113 As noted in Chapter 4, the plurality
judgment cited Chief Justice Vinson from the American case of Toomer v Witsell: ‘The
whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in
legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important resource.’1114 Legislative words merely claiming
the ownership of fish in general terms could be classified as just such ‘legal shorthand’,
with fishing fees at risk of being classified as a constitutionally prohibited excise. The
Victorian Fisheries Act 1996 (Vic) appears to have been drafted specifically to exclude
such an interpretation to the greatest extent possible.1115
C. Australian Fisheries Legislation after 1988
1.
A Continuum of Legislative Approaches
Reconciling different approaches by the High Court to natural-resource management
legislation of the ‘prohibit, regulate and exempt’ variety is problematic. The authority of
the Blue Mud Bay Case,1116 on the extent of abrogation in the legislative schemes of the
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Northern Territory has not been not overruled. Accordingly, expansively words in
legislative schemes cannot be safely be assumed as merely being legislative shorthand for
full powers of management.1117 Nonetheless, later cases do not appear to follow the same
approach.1118 The result is that there are three possible outcomes arising out of legislative
schemes governing fishing that have been implemented since 1988. The public right to
fish may have been wholly abrogated by fisheries legislation; the public right to fish
commercially might have been wholly abrogated, but recreational rights regulated; or
lastly, both commercial and recreational rights might have been preserved in a highly
regulated form.
To assess the extent of abrogation it is necessary to identify what factors are relevant
in assessing whether fisheries legislation — in the broad form of a prohibition, coupled
with exemptions — wholly abrogates the public right to fish. Even though the law is not
clear on this point, at the very least, the identification of such factors can assist drafters
who wish to clarify whether or not their proposed regulatory scheme rests on the
regulation of the public right to fish, or rests on the abrogation and replacement of the
public right.1119 Three factors can be identified based on the text of Australian fisheries
legislation. Firstly, whether legislation expresses a clear general prohibition on fishing
coupled with regulations that grant fishers rights of a statutory nature. Secondly, whether
there are assertions of state ownership that support the conclusion that the right has been
wholly replaced with statutory rights. Finally, whether there are supplemental
characteristics of the legislation that might clarify the intended effects of the legislative
scheme.
Based on these three factors, the legislative schemes of the Australian States and the
Commonwealth 1120 can be arranged on a continuum of the degree to which they are likely
to either wholly abrogate public rights or regulate, but preserve, public rights. Victorian
legislation is at the notional left end of the continuum, as it couples a general prohibition
on fishing with assertions of state ownership and implements a comprehensive licensing
regime for both recreational and commercial fishing. New South Wales legislation is at
the right end of the continuum and is more explicitly regulatory in nature, preserving the
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public right to fish — at least for recreational fishers. Commonwealth and other State
legislative schemes can be placed between those two ends of the spectrum. Reading from
left to right and from most abrogatory to least abrogatory, the schemes are; Victorian,
Tasmanian, South Australian, Western Australian, Commonwealth, Queensland1121 and
then New South Wales.
The point of arranging them on such a continuum is that even if the general approach
of the courts to interpretation shifts, the relative positions of the States are likely to remain
the same. In other words, based on the discussion below, if as per Karpany v Dietman,1122
South Australian legislation does not wholly abrogate the public right to fish then, all
other things being equal, Western Australian legislation is unlikely to do so. However,
Tasmanian legislation might abrogate the right as it is more similar to Victorian
legislation and worded similarly to Northern Territory legislation.
The discussion below of the legislative schemes of the Australian States is prefaced
by comment on Commonwealth fisheries legislation, whose structure has been influenced
by the Commonwealth’s focus on commercial fisheries management. As noted above,
this analysis focuses on legislative text rather than contextual elements, which are
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
a) Commonwealth Fisheries Legislation
The objectives of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) demonstrate the
Commonwealth’s concern for ‘efficient and cost-effective’1123 management while
‘maximising the net economic returns to the Australian community from the management
of Australian fisheries’1124 and having regard for ‘principles of ecologically sustainable
development’.1125 The Act does not contain an assertion of the ownership of wild fish by
the Commonwealth,1126 nor a general prohibition on fishing without a licence.
Commercial fishing without a licence is, however, an offence under Section 95 of the
Act. Given Section 95, the public’s right to fish commercially is, on balance, likely to
have been wholly abrogated by the provisions of the Act. Supporting this conclusion,
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171

under Section 17, the Australian Fisheries Management Agency has a positive obligation
to implement plans of management for commercial fisheries unless it makes a specific
determination that one is not needed. Based on its overall structure, the Act so
substantially regulates commercial fishing that it is likely that public rights to fish
commercially have been abrogated and replaced with a statutory scheme, rather than the
public right having been merely regulated. Such a conclusion is consistent with the
objectives of the Act.
The Act is principally concerned with the management of commercial fisheries.1127
The limited coverage in the Act of recreational fishing reflects the Commonwealth’s
focus on commercial fisheries. Most recreational fishing in Australia takes place close to
shore,1128 and recreational fishing activities are generally managed by the States and the
Northern Territory. Recreational fisheries beyond State waters are typically managed by
the States by means of statutory arrangements agreed with the Commonwealth.1129 There
is limited coverage of recreational fisheries in the provisions of the Fisheries
Management Act 1991 (Cth). The Act lacks a prohibition on recreational fishing (without
a licence) equivalent to that for commercial fishing in Section 95. Section 10(3)(a) of the
Act stipulates that management plans apply to recreational fishing only if recreational
activities are expressly included. Further reinforcing the separate treatment of recreational
fishing, 2004 amendments to the Act1130 clarified that recreational charter-boat fishing1131
was to be classified as a form of recreational fishing, not commercial fishing. Given the
above, the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) is very unlikely to have wholly
abrogated all recreational public rights to fish. Even if there is a statutory management
plan in place that licences recreational fishers for a specific fishery their rights to access
other fisheries would not have been abrogated. That the Act was not intended to create a
fully comprehensive statutory regime for all fishing activities is supported by the lack of
reference in the Act to the management of Indigenous fishing.1132 Accordingly, the public
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right to fish recreationally in Commonwealth waters continues, including public rights of
access. The effect of partial abrogation of the right is considered further in Chapter 7.
b) Victorian Fisheries Legislation
The Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) combines a declaration of the ownership of wild fish
with broadly worded prohibitions on fishing without a licence (or exemption). The
combined effect is highly likely to have wholly abrogated public rights to fish, replacing
them with statutory rights under that Act. To find to the contrary, the Blue Mud Bay
Case1133 must be distinguished, overruled or ignored.
The Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) has the most emphatic statement of Crown ownership
in Australian legislation. Section 10(1) states that ‘[t]he Crown in right of Victoria owns
all wild fish and other fauna and flora found in Victorian waters’.1134 The term ‘found’ is
an undefined term in the Act, and exactly when a fish might be found and become
property of the Victorian State is unclear. Gullett has suggested that the reference to fish
‘found’ in Victorian waters in Section 10(1) of the Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) implies that
the designation of property would only apply to fish ‘located by humans in Victorian
waters’.1135 This would avoid the apparent absurdity of ownership changing as fish move
in and out of Victorian waters in an ‘unfound’ state. Although it is not possible to say
exactly when a fish might be ‘found’ or ‘located’ there can be little doubt of the legislative
intent to assert ownership of wild fish before they are captured, especially given the
Explanatory Memorandum to the original bill also emphasised prior Crown
ownership.1136
Section 10(2) further states that property in fish only ‘passes’ (presumably from the
Crown) to fishers when they are taken lawfully under the Act. Section 150 provides for
royalties to be levied on fishers. For a fee to be classified as a ‘royalty’, there must first
be State ownership. Indeed, if the Act’s provisions on ownership were intended to
definitively avoid fees being classified as excise duties, they would likely be ineffective
in achieving this purpose unless they abrogated the public right to fish.
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That the intention exists to wholly abrogate the public right to fish is further
supported by the comprehensively worded licensing provisions in the Act. Section 36 (1)
implements a comprehensive licensing regime for commercial fishing. A recreational
licence is required for all marine fisheries under Section 44(1).1137 Both Sections 44 and
36 are in the form of a prohibition on recreational fishing, with subsequent authorisation
by licence or permit. That the Act was intended to create a truly comprehensive legislative
regime is further suggested by the lack of general exemption in the Act for Indigenous
fishers, coupled with a very limited statutory provision for permits to be issued under
Section 49(2)(h) for a ‘specified Indigenous cultural ceremony’.1138 Indeed, given the
assertion of State ownership of marine resources, it is possible that but for a combination
of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the Native Title Act (1993) (Cth),
Indigenous rights to Victorian fisheries might have been thought extinguished by the
Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic).1139 The overall effect of the provisions of the Act is to create a
comprehensive statutory regime, and a likely abrogation of public right to fish across
Victorian waters.1140
If the public right to fish has been wholly abrogated across Victoria, then on the
authority of The Blue Mud Bay Case,1141 any vesting of waters in private individuals
would consequently be interpreted free of common law assumptions in relation to the
public right to fish and access for this purpose.1142 Where land or waters are vested in a
public authority, access to those waters for fishing might depend on the goodwill of that
authority or, alternatively, specific permission for access might be required. In some
circumstances, a fishing licence might be sufficient authorisation of access. Such an
implication is more likely to be found in detailed management arrangements for fisheries
in a specific area, analogous to the undefined something ‘more’ referred to by the majority
in the order granted in The Blue Mud Bay Case.1143 A fishing licence might be capable of
providing such authority under the terms of a management plan, however, Section 50A
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of the Act emphasises that a licence does not of itself authorise access to ‘water authority
property’.
c) Tasmanian Fisheries Legislation
Tasmanian legislation includes a declaration of ownership of living marine resources,
but there are less comprehensive licensing provisions than there are in Victoria’s
legislation. Section 9(1) of the Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 (Tas)
states that ‘[a]ll living marine resources ... are owned by the State’. The Act, however, is
less emphatic in its assertion of ownership than the Victorian Act. For example, the
Tasmanian Act does not have an equivalent provision to the statement that wild fish are
owned by the ‘Crown in right of Victoria’,1144 and there is no equivalent provision to
Section 10(2) of the Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) which sets out the circumstances in which
property in fish will pass to fishers.
The provisions of the Tasmanian Act on the prohibition of fishing activity are almost
identical to those found in Section 10 of Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and interpreted in the
Blue Mud Bay Case1145 as wholly abrogating the public right to fish. There is a general
prohibition on take without a fishing licence in Section 60(1) of the Living Marine
Resources Management Act 1995 (Tas). This prohibition is relieved by a wide exemption
for recreational fishers in Section 60(2)(a)1146 and for Aboriginal fishers at Section
60(2)(c). Given the similarity of Section 60 of the Act to Section 10 of the Fisheries Act
1988 (NT), if the approach of the plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case was strictly applied,
the Tasmanian Act would wholly abrogate the public right to fish (for both commercial
and recreational fishers). Based solely on the authority of the plurality judgment in the
Blue Mud Bay Case, Tasmanian legislation would wholly abrogate the right. As discussed
in Chapter 5, however, the general applicability of that case is doubtful. Furthermore,
accepted principles of statutory interpretation do not require that a court follow the
interpretation of words in a different statute in a different jurisdiction. The High Court
has held that identical words may be interpreted differently in different States, given that
context and legislative history varies.1147
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If the public right has been abrogated, recreational fishers’ rights will depend either
on the general exemption in Section 60(a) of the Living Marine Resources Management
Act 1995 (Tas) or on the provisions of a statutory management plan issued for a specific
fishery. The general arrangements under the Act for recreational fishing do not appear to
be as comprehensive in nature as in Victoria. Given the treatment of South Australian
fisheries legislation by the High Court in Karpany v Dietman,1148 it seems that, on
balance, the arrangements would not be interpreted as wholly abrogating recreational
rights. Although given the similarities between Section 60 of the Living Marine
Resources Management Act 1995 (Tas) and the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT), this cannot be
free from doubt.
For commercial fisheries, Section 32 of the Living Marine Resources Management
Act 1995 (Tas) provides a somewhat limited (and circular) definition of management
plans under the Act, stating that ‘[a] management plan consists of rules relating to a
specified fishery’. The authority of a fishing licence is described using restrictive
language in Section 63: ‘[a] fishing licence authorises the holder of the licence to carry
out fishing in accordance with the licence.’ On the other hand, Part 3 and Part 4 of the
Act contain extensive provisions on management plans and quota rights. In addition, as
noted above, there is a general assertion of State ownership. Given these considerations,
even without a high degree of authority being accorded to the Blue Mud Bay Case,1149 the
provisions of the Act relating to commercial fishing under a management plan would
likely abrogate public rights to fish commercially and replace them with a statutory
scheme. Whether there is some residual public right for commercial fishers who are not
covered by a plan is unclear.
In summary, compared to Victoria, the provisions of the Act are less emphatic on
ownership and a recreational licence is only required for some fisheries. It is likely that,
but for the Blue Mud Bay Case,1150 Tasmanian legislation would have been interpreted as
merely regulatory in nature with respect to recreational fishing activities. Yanner v
Eaton1151 would be authority for reading down the assertion of ownership to mean a
general statement of the interests of the State in fisheries management. Nonetheless, with
both a claim on ownership and given the similarity of Section 60 of the Act to Section 10
of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT), it is arguable that public rights to fish in Tasmania have
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been wholly abrogated. Given differences in wording from the Victorian legislation,
whether wild fish are ‘owned’ by the State of Tasmania in a fashion analogous to private
ownership depends on the degree to which the authority of Yanner v Eaton1152 is
persuasive on this point.
d) South Australian Fisheries Legislation
In South Australia, the Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA) includes an assertion
of the ownership of wild fish in broadly similar terms to that of Victoria.1153 The Act
contains a general prohibition on commercial fishing except by license,1154 but does not
include an equivalent general prohibition on recreational fishing. Due to the lack of
comprehensive recreational licensing provisions in the Act, the complete abrogation of
public rights is less likely than in Victoria. In Karpany v Dietman, the State of South
Australia conceded that the Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA) did not extinguish
native title rights.1155 In this regard at least, the assertion of ownership of wild fish does
not appear to have been interpreted literally. Given the general interpretative stance to
South Australian fisheries legislation adopted by the High Court in Karpany v
Dietman,1156 the Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA) is unlikely to have wholly
abrogated all public rights to fish in that jurisdiction.
e) Western Australian Fisheries Legislation
In Western Australia a general prohibition on commercial fishing is created by
regulations issued under the Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (WA) 1157 and not
directly by the Act itself. Recreational fishing is highly regulated, but licenses are not
required for recreational fishing activities. It is likely that the public right continues in
Western Australia, unless excluded by specific management plans enacted under the Act.
The objects of the Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (WA) in Section 3(1) are
‘to share and conserve ... the State’s fish and other aquatic resources ... for the benefit of
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present and future generations’. The Act, however, does not include a specific assertion
of property by the State in wild fish. For commercial fisheries, Part 6 of the Act sets up a
system of management plans and authorisations. The Act itself does not explicitly require
that all commercial fishers hold a commercial licence; Regulation 121 of the Fish
Resource Management Regulations 1995 (WA) does. Regulation 121(1) provides that all
persons who engage in commercial fishing must hold a licence under the Act.1158
Furthermore, it is an offence under Regulation 121(2) for any fisher to sell fish without
such a licence. By way of contrast, for recreational fishers, Regulation 123(1) provides
only that a licence must be held for those activities listed in Regulation 124. The activities
listed in Regulation 124 are quite extensive. From 2010, all boat-based recreational
fishing activities came under a new licensing regime created under Regulation 124(B-D).
Recreational fishing from a beach with a line, however, is not listed under Regulation 124
and, consequently, a licence is not required. Although there is no general exemption in
the Act for Aboriginal fishers, Section 6 of the Act provides that Aboriginal fishers do
not need to hold a recreational licence when fishing for non-commercial purposes.
Read together, the Western Australian Act and Regulations would appear to create a
regime for commercial fishers partially abrogating the public right to fish and selectively
replacing those rights with statutory schemes. The public right to fish commercially has
likely been closely regulated rather than abrogated given the lack of a general prohibition
on commercial fishing in the Act itself, and its relegation to regulations to the Act.
Furthermore, in Western Australia there has been extensive use of broadly worded
exemption provisions under the Act to create commercial fisheries outside the general
legislative framework of the Act.1159 The use of an exemption from a prohibition as a
management tool implies that some underlying right remains, which relief from a
prohibition allows a fisher to take advantage of. The South Australian Supreme Court has
commented on the Western Australian practice of extensive use of exemption provisions,
and a distinction between Western Australian and South Australian practice in this regard
was made.1160
Section 66 of the Act (on commercial management plans) is expressed in positive
terms, authorising a person to undertake a specific activity, not merely relieving them of
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a prohibition on an activity. A new Section 73(A) was added in 19971161 to clarify that
managed-fisheries authorisations were subject to marine reservation provisions for
conservation under the Conservation and Land Management Act 1984 (WA). That this
amendment was deemed necessary suggests that its drafters were of the view that
authorisations under Part 6 of the Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (WA) might be
capable of being interpreted as a positive statutory right, including a right of access to
waters. Section 66(2) states that an ‘authorisation may authorise a person ... to engage in
fishing or any fishing activity of a specified class in a managed fishery or an interim
managed fishery’. Unless a plan is drafted very broadly to cover ‘any fishing activity’, it
is likely that it would have only a partial abrogatory effect relating to that particular
activity, similarly to abalone regulation in Harper.1162
In relation to recreational fishing in Western Australia, the Act and Regulations
create an extensive, but not fully comprehensive, recreational fishing regime. As noted
above, the right of Western Australian recreational fishers to fish commercially is
abrogated by a restriction on sale in Regulation 121. This regulation, however, does not
affect their right to fish recreationally, nor does it require them to hold a licence. It is a
matter of interpretation and judgement when the regulation of the public right to fish
becomes an abrogation of the right and replacement of the right by a new scheme.1163 If
all recreational fishing activities were required to be licensed under the Regulations to the
Western Australian Act, they might have been wholly abrogated and replaced by statutory
rights. It would appear, however, that the recreational activities for which a licence is
unnecessary are still sufficiently extensive that the public right to fish has not yet been
wholly abrogated. This conclusion is all the more likely given that the Act lacks
provisions on ownership comparable to those in either Tasmania or Victoria.
In summary, for commercial fishers, the lack of a direct prohibition on commercial
fishing without a license in the Act, the absence of an assertion of State ownership, and
the wide use of exemptions make it likely that the public right to fish of commercial
fishers has not been wholly abrogated by the Act alone. A detailed management plan
under the Act could do so. For recreational fishers there is no mandatory requirement to
be licenced. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that the effect of the Act is to wholly
abrogate their public right to fish.
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f) New South Wales Fisheries Legislation
The objectives of the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) do not include an
express declaration of ownership or property in wild fish. Section 3(1) merely includes
an objective to ‘share the fishery resources of the state’. In addition, there is no general
prohibition of access in the provisions of the Act. There is, instead, a broad power under
the Act to define a fishery under Section 6 of the Act and then to declare ‘fishery
management strategies’ for it under Part 1A of the Act (Section 7(A)-(D)). Notes in the
Act make it clear that the authors intended to preserve the public right. At Section 3 the
notes state that:
At common law, the public has a right to fish in the sea, the arms of the sea and in the
tidal reaches of all rivers and estuaries. The public has no common law right to fish in nontidal waters — the right to fish in those waters belongs to the owner of the soil under those
waters. However, the public may fish in non-tidal waters if the soil under those waters is
Crown land. In the case of non-tidal waters in rivers and creeks, section 38 declares that
the public has a right to fish despite the private ownership of the bed of the river or creek.
However, the right to fish in tidal or non-tidal waters is subject to any restriction imposed
by this Act.

Under Section 102(1) of that Act, all commercial fishing activities must be licenced.
There are some differences in the wording of that section from the statutory provisions
considered in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1164 If only the authority of that case was relevant,
however, Section 102(1) could be interpreted so as to wholly abrogate commercial
fishers’ public right to fish. Applying that case to New South Wales legislation would,
however, lead to an anomaly in that Act between the status of commercial rights in the
marine domain and of commercial rights to fish in inland waters. Section 38(1) creates an
independent statutory right to fish inland waters (non-tidal rivers and creeks) for both
commercial and recreational fishers. This statutory right applies even if the bed of the
river is in private hands. Creating a positive right to fish for commercial fishers in this
manner that does not appear to be consistent with an intent to wholly abrogate the public
rights of commercial fishers in the marine domain. That this anomaly would be created
strongly suggests that it was not the original intent of the Act to fully abrogate the rights
of commercial fishers. Given the weak authority of the Blue Mud Bay Case,1165 Section
38(1) can likely be interpreted as supporting the general provisions of the Act, rather than
abrogating the public right to fish of commercial fishers. A fishery management strategy
provided for in Part 1A of the Act might still substantially abrogate the right of
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commercial fishers, short of wholly abrogating it.1166 Nonetheless, taking into account the
overall structure of the Act and the notes to the Act, it is likely that regulation, rather than
complete abrogation, was intended by the general provisions of the Act.
In relation to recreational fishing, Division 5 of the New South Wales Act creates a
comprehensive system of recreational fees. There are, however, significant differences
between the provisions relating to fees on recreational fishers and licence requirements
on commercial fishers.1167 For commercial fishers, under Section 102, the relevant
offence is the take of fish without a commercial licence. Under the Act, recreational
fishing activities in New South Wales are not expressed as being conditional on the
holding of a licence. For recreational fishers, it is the non-payment of a fee under Section
34(J) that is the offence. To clarify, this means that it is not the activity engaged in by
recreational fee evaders that is unlawful, but the non-payment of the fee. This difference
in legislative approach strongly supports the inference that recreational fishing rights
depend on the underlying public right to fish, rather than arising out of the statutory
provisions of the Act. Again, that it was the intent of the drafters of the Act to preserve
the public right to fish is supported by the note to Section 3 of the Act. That note both
summarises the common law public right to fish and supports the inference that the
purpose of Section 38(1) was to extend the rights of all fishers through creating a statutory
right to fish in inland waters. The Act does not expressly preserve Indigenous rights, but
limited guidance can be drawn from this omission, as it is unlikely that Indigenous rights
would be extinguished by the provisions of the Act in any event.1168
Further supporting the inference that the public right to fish has not been wholly
abrogated, the Act introduces the concept of ‘public water land’. Under Section 4(1),
where land is vested in the Crown for a public purpose, the Act classifies it as ‘public
water’. Limited exemptions for the exclusive possession of public water land are provided
for in Part 6 of Division 3 of the Act. The limited nature of these exemptions indicates
that the drafters’ intent was to favour public access. This right of access can be contrasted
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with the more restrictive approach over access to ‘water authority property’ under Section
50A of the Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic).
In conclusion, it is almost certain that the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW)
does not trigger the complete abrogation of the public right to fish for recreational fishers.
Broad provisions in the Act provide the power to implement comprehensive management
schemes for recreational fisheries, but given the overall structure of the Act, it seems
likely that these provisions regulate, rather than wholly abrogate, the public right to fish.
It is likely the Act does not trigger the complete abrogation of the public right to fish for
commercial fishers. Section 102 abrogates the general public’s right to fish for
commercial gain, but whether it also abrogates commercial fishers’ public rights, and
replaces them with a statutory right, likely depends on the wording of particular
management schemes. A conclusion that the public right to fish commercially has not
been wholly abrogated would have the advantage of bringing commercial and recreational
rights in line with the provisions of Section 38(1) on access to non-tidal waters.
g) Queensland Fisheries Legislation
In Queensland the Fisheries Act 1994 (Qld) refers to the ‘community’s fish
resources’ in Section 3(1), but the Act does not include a declaration of ownership in wild
fish. There is no general prohibition on commercial fishing in the Act itself, however the
Fisheries Act 1994 (Qld), Fisheries Regulation 2008 (Qld) and individual declared
management plans1169 work together to limit fishing for commercial purposes to those
holding licences under the Act. For example, the Fisheries Act 1994 (Qld) includes wide
provisions for the declaration of ‘regulated fish’ under Section 78 and for setting out
‘prescribed waters’ under Section 79A. Regulation 627 supplements these provisions by
limiting the use of boats for commercial fishing activities to licensed commercial fishers.
A piecemeal approach to regulation as taken in Queensland makes a summary of the
overall impact of the Act difficult.1170 That it is piecemeal1171 suggests that, although the
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regulatory scheme in Queensland may have abrogated recreational fishers’ public rights
to fish commercially, it has not done so comprehensively for commercial fishers who
might still exercise that right subject to regulation. As in Western Australia, specific
management plans might replace commercial fishers’ public rights with a statutory right
in some cases. Although the Act provides for the management of recreational fisheries,
including the creation of fishery management plans under Section 32, there is no general
prohibition on recreational fishing, and in practice a recreational licence is only required
in limited circumstances.1172 Accordingly, the right of the public to fish recreationally is
unlikely to have been wholly abrogated.
h) Summary of Legislative Abrogation
Based on the factors identified above, Victoria and New South Wales fisheries
legislation represent opposite ends of a continuum of legislative approaches, with the
most abrogatory being in Victoria and the least abrogatory regime in New South Wales.
Tasmanian legislation is broadly similar to that in Victoria, if less comprehensive in
nature. South Australian and Western Australian legislation fall somewhere in the middle
of the continuum. Queensland’s piecemeal Act and Regulations are less restrictive than
Western Australia but lack the clarity of intent that exists in New South Wales legislation
maintaining public rights and public access. Notwithstanding that lack of clarity, taken as
a whole, Queensland legislative arrangements fall well short of being a sufficiently
comprehensive scheme that would justify the conclusion that the public right had been
wholly abrogated across the jurisdiction.
2.
Abrogation and Access
The public right to fish is a longstanding legal presumption that supports public
access to the sea, foreshore and tidal rivers for the purpose of fishing. The right has
contributed to the non-recognition of, and hence the rejection of, exclusive Indigenous
rights to the marine domain in Australia.1173 In reality, private grants of exclusive (fee
simple) estates below the high watermark are rare in Australia, so the practical influence
of private grants on the public right to fish is limited.1174 Fee simple title to the tidal zone
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under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (the ‘LRA’), is an
exception to the usual practice.
Given that private ownership down to the low watermark is rare in Australia, there is
little interaction between private titles equivalent to a fee simple title and the public right
to fish.1175 As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, the application of old English rules relating to
fee simple grants of land over the marine domain in Australia seems to lack both a solid
legal foundation and a compelling public need. In particular, there is no competing Crown
interest in lands and waters analogous to the Crown Estate in England. In addition, there
are no competing private rights to the extent there is in England with private rights
equivalent to fee simple estates covering 50 per cent of the foreshore. 1176 In Australia
extensive private rights to the low water mark have rarely been granted. Furthermore,
even in England, the contemporary relevance and utility of the public right to fish has
been questioned.1177 The need for a strong public presumption against private rights in
order to generally protect public access to the Australian coast is weak.1178 Access under
the public right to fish to areas in the marine domain that are vested in a government
agency is an issue of more widespread application. As noted by Justice Selway in Gumana
v Northern Territory,1179 there has been extensive vesting of waters for ports and harbours
in public authorities in Australia.1180 For example, the Rottnest Island Authority Act 1987
(WA) covers the waters around Rottnest Island as well as the land, with control and
management vesting in the authority under Section 11(2).
Old common law assumptions in favour of the preservation of public rights should
be applied with caution and the weight given to those assumptions will depend on the
context in which they are being considered.1181 Based on the Full Federal Court’s ‘text,
structure and context’ approach to statutory interpretation in Gumana v Northern
Territory1182 it would appear reasonable that the public right to fish is accorded more
weight where land or waters are vested in a public body for a public purpose which does
not require exclusive use of the marine domain. By contrast, where there are competing
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private interests where a degree of exclusivity would otherwise be expected, the
presumption in favour of the public right to fish should be more readily excluded. 1183
The Full Federal Court’s approach to interpretation seems logical, but as noted
earlier, the authority of its view on this point is clouded given the successful appeal to the
High Court in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1184 The High Court plurality, however, did not
directly contradict the Federal Court on this point, and a single Federal Court judge at
first instance might properly consider the Full Federal Court’s argument on this point as
persuasive.1185 A partial reconciliation would be possible if a distinction was made
between approaches to fisheries legislation and non-fisheries legislation. As noted in
Chapter 5, Goldsworthy has proposed two meanings to ‘necessary implication’. The first
is as an implication that is necessary for a statutory provision to have its intended
effect.1186 To read fisheries legislation as being subject to a strong common law
presumption in favour of the public right to fish would undermine the effectiveness of
even the most carefully worded fisheries legislation. For non-fisheries legislation, it
makes sense for the primary intent of that legislation to be more closely scrutinised by
the courts on whether abrogation is truly necessary for such legislation to have its
intended effect. For non-fisheries legislation, the second of Goldsworthy’s proposed tests
for a ‘necessary implication’ would still apply, being an implication where there is a
‘certain communicative intention’ that is ‘in the circumstances obvious’.1187 Although it
is possible the public right to fish might be directly dealt with in non-fisheries legislation,
it appears to be rarely, if ever, specifically referred to in non-fisheries legislation.1188
Regardless of the appropriate test, where the public right to fish has been wholly
abrogated, a legal presumption in favour of access by fishers will be lost. For example,
the old English common law rule that applied to private grants of harbours or oyster leases
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was that those grants were subject to public rights of fishery and navigation, at least to
the extent that those activities were consistent with the purpose of the grant.1189 If the
right has been wholly abrogated, then the public right to fish no longer forms part of the
context in which other legislation covering the marine domain is being considered.
Indeed, where the public right to fish has been wholly abrogated by fishing legislation,
then fishing access to such areas vested in public authorities would appear to require
either specific legislative authority1190 or the consent of the agency in which that area has
been vested. Where access requires both a fisheries licence and the consent of another
body, there is the potential for multiple layers of management and conflict over
management. Although integrated coastal management — whereby overlapping and
competing interests are managed within a common framework — has been highlighted
as advantageous for some time, it has not been implemented to any great extent in
Australia, although small-scale attempts have been made.1191
The practical problem is that the marine domain is subject to a range of coexisting
and competing rights. What guidance can be gained from common law interpretative
principles for legislation? Where there is a potential conflict between different legislative
schemes, which rights will prevail? In all of this, what weight should be given to the
public right to fish? In 2011, the leading Australian text on statutory interpretation listed
the public right to fish as a standard presumption in interpretation. 1192 The 2014 edition
did not.1193 If that change signals that the right is now especially susceptible to statutory
abrogation by implication, then the balance of interests in the marine domain shifts, with
the potential for unintended consequences as a result.
In the marine domain, a consistent set of assumptions on the public right can provide
a degree of consistency in approach to the interpretation of text and context, assisting in
achieving a higher degree of clarity and coherence in the law. 1194 Shared assumptions
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provide a common starting point for resolution of conflicts. The history of the NT Fishing
Cases1195 show the difficulty that courts have resolving ‘text and context’ where the
legislature, deliberately or not, does not explicitly address potential conflicts between
legislative schemes and the common law. Where the right is wholly abrogated, the effect
of overlapping legislation may lead to shifts in the interests of other rights holders, such
as the holders of LRA title in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1196 It is true that the High Court in
Commonwealth v Yarmirr declined to give the public right to fish the status of a ‘skeletal
principle’.1197 This statement should be judged, however, in the context of the argument
put forward that a ‘skeletal principle’ would extinguish common law native title.1198 This
does not prejudge whether the right has a role as a basic organising principle for access
and use of the marine domain. In this capacity, the plurality recognised the ‘fundamental
inconsistency’ between the public right and the native title rights asserted in that case.1199
The case does not, therefore, preclude recognition of the public right as having
fundamental qualities. To avoid inappropriate analogies to issues of extinguishment in
Indigenous rights cases, the right is better described as an organising principle rather than
a fundamental or skeletal mechanism.
As noted above, a primary objective of rights-based fishery legislation is to clarify
rights to take fish, particularly statutory rights held by commercial fishers. If regulating
the right to take fish has the incidental effect of removing common law rights of access
to the marine domain, this works against the achievement of the clarity that is being
sought, because rights are replaced with an uncertain access regime. Fisheries managers
in some jurisdictions may already have the power to address access in statutory
management plans for fisheries. As noted above, it is likely in Western Australia that the
current Act in force may already include such a power. Given the potential effect of
abrogation on access to areas vested for public purposes, there might be an advantage in
fishing legislation clarifying access arrangements like in New South Wales. Alternatively,
management plans should be worded carefully to avoid the conclusion that they were
intended to wholly abrogate the right. Jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approaches may

problem with this approach is that it can encourage circular reasoning, as whether the activity is indeed
prohibited is the crux of the matter. If, on the other hand, it is merely a weak reformulation of the common
law presumption in favour of the public right to fish, then it is not soundly based in legal history or
doctrine.
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resolve conflict over access to fisheries through detailed and highly specific management
plans, but such approaches are unlikely to generally clarify the underlying basis of access
to the marine domain. In any event, recreational fishing management arrangements are
typically less detailed than those governing commercial fishing activities. Accordingly,
in many cases recreational fishers whose rights have been abrogated might be left with a
weak statutory exemption supporting their access.1200 In relation to access by recreational
fishers, the approach adopted in New South Wales of declaring areas of the marine
domain ‘public water land’ has merit.1201
D. Conclusions
A key objective for the introduction of the new fisheries legislative schemes adopted
since 1988 was to improve management outcomes through ‘the explicit allocation of
access to fish resources between stakeholders’.1202
When expansive legislative language on ownership is mixed with legislation for
rights-based management, there is a risk of unanticipated consequences from both the loss
of rights of access and from the reversal of common law assumptions on the ownership
of wild fish; in particular, the loss of a consistent, albeit possibly weak, principle
underlying consistent approaches to the interpretation of legislation over the marine
domain. The result renders more difficult the task of assessing priorities to access and use
under overlapping statutory regimes in the marine domain. If legislation is intended to
wholly abrogate public rights and replace them with a statutory scheme, then it is
desirable that access issues are directly addressed, including access to waters and lands
vested in bodies for public purposes. The value of legislative assertions of ownership to
wild fish is questionable. Their value as a defence by the states of Australia against claims
that some fishing licence fees might otherwise be constitutionally invalid has yet to be
tested. There has been no evidence of any other purpose for such assertions.
As noted in Chapter 1, Australia’s fishers, researchers and managers have identified
the establishment of clear allocated rights to fisheries as Australia’s second-highest
priority for reform. Uncertainty works against the advancement of that objective.1203 A
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more consistent and coherent approach that can be applied to the public right is outlined
in Chapter 7.

189

CHAPTER 7: A USEFUL RIGHT
A. Introduction
1.
Connection to Previous Chapters and the Concluding Chapter
This chapter completes the substantive discussion on abrogation introduced in
Chapter 5 and continued in Chapter 6. Chapter 6 focused on whether Australian fisheries
legislation had wholly abrogated the public right to fish. This thesis concludes that the
right was wholly abrogated by fisheries legislation in the Northern Territory,1204 and has
likely been wholly abrogated by legislation in Victoria and possibly Tasmania. The right
has not been wholly abrogated by Commonwealth fisheries legislation or in Queensland,
New South Wales, Western Australian or South Australia. Whereas Chapter 6 focused on
the effect on the right of fisheries legislation, this chapter discusses the potential effects
of abrogation on statutory schemes and develops a general guide to abrogation which is
intended to reduce uncertainty surrounding the right.
The conclusion to this chapter considers the contemporary utility of the right, a
discussion that is furthered in the final chapter of this thesis.
B. Incidental Impacts of Abrogation
1.
Public Vesting of the Marine Domain
The public right to fish underpins public access to the marine domain.1205 Given that
substantial parts of the marine domain have been vested in public bodies,1206 a question
then arises about the interaction of the public right and legislation vesting the marine
domain to a public body. The public purpose of such a vesting might be clear, such as the
vesting of a port or special-purpose reserve,1207 and not necessarily related to the
management of fishing activities. In such cases, common law presumptions in favour of
the public right should continue to apply, unless they are expressly excluded by
legislation. Given that Australian law has preserved the common law rule that the public
right to fish is ‘paramount’ over fee simple estates in the marine domain,1208 there seems
to be no reason why a lesser estate vested in a government body would not be subject to
the right — unless the right has been expressly excluded or the right has been excluded
by necessary implication. The public right to fish is abrogated only to the extent that
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abrogation is consistent with a purposive test applied to the interpretation of vesting
legislation.
Where there are extensive legislative vesting and control schemes in non-fisheries
legislation, fishing activities can become subject to another level of regulation while at
the same time remaining subject to fisheries legislation. Coexistence between overlapping
legislation appears to be the norm in Australian jurisdictions. For example, Queensland
fishing activities within the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park also remain subject to
Queensland fisheries legislation.1209 By way of a further example, the waters around
Rottnest Island in Western Australia have been vested as an ‘A’ Class Reserve in the
Rottnest Island Authority.1210 That Authority nonetheless states that it defers to
‘Department of Fisheries rules and regulations’.1211 As noted in Chapter 6, both Western
Australian and Queensland fisheries legislation operates to regulate, but does not wholly
abrogate, the public right to fish.
If a court finds that a generally worded vesting provision wholly or substantially
abrogate the right, this could change the legal context for the application of fisheries
legislation. Potentially abrogatory legislation might put in place a comprehensive scheme
of regulation over the use of the marine domain but still not provide a positive right of
access.1212 Where there is no right of other access and the public right has been wholly
abrogated, it would be the responsibility of the body in which the marine domain has been
vested to resolve access issues. The result could be potentially burdensome to the body in
which the marine domain is vested. The body may be reluctant, unqualified or lack the
resources to take on the obligations of managing access. As noted in Chapter 5, on the
handing down of the decision in the Blue Mud Bay Case,1213 the Indigenous title-holders
did not seek to manage fishing activities through their control over access. Instead, they
sought to have the Territory government assume obligations for the management of
access to the intertidal zone.1214
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2.
Proprietary Rights
The potential impact of the abrogation of the right on proprietary estates in the marine
domain is a complex question. Even if, as in the Northern Territory, the public right to
fish has been lost, the separate common law principle that no property can be held in wild
fish appears unaffected1215 and general fisheries legislation still applies.1216 Although
fisheries law applies over private estates, the effect of those laws might be different
depending on whether they apply to proprietary interests or to the public right.
That fisheries laws may have a different effect on private estates in the marine domain
is consistent with old English precedent. Moore and Moore1217 demonstrate that the
holders of ancient fisheries in the marine domain were initially considered exempt from
general fisheries regulations.1218 Such an exemption would be consistent with the
proposition that proprietary rights are unaffected by general words in legislation. The
conclusion that fisheries legislation in Australia may have a different effect on public
rights than it has on proprietary rights finds support in Akiba v Commonwealth, where
Chief Justice French and Justice Crennan held that the ‘necessary implication’ test was
of greater strength when proprietary, or usufructuary, rights were involved.1219
The issues that arise are illustrated below by an example based on the extensive fee
simple title to the marine domain in the Northern Territory under the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (LRA). This example demonstrates how
fisheries regulation can have a different effect on an area where the public right has been
wholly abrogated as compared to an area where it has only been regulated. In particular,
there may be a legal obligation to pay compensation to a LRA title holder compensation
arising out of changes in fishing regulations. There might be also be case that any failure
to pay compensation would breach the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).1220 It is
acknowledged that legal liability for compensation arising from changes to regulatory
schemes is a complex and contested legal issue and not free of uncertainty.1221
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Nonetheless, three elements would appear to be relevant; that a proprietorial interest is
involved, that this interest is substantially or wholly affected by regulation, and the state
has acquired an interest directly or for the benefit of another party. 1222 On the first point,
a LRA title-holder — free of the public right to fish — could grant out an exclusive
‘fishery’ to a commercial fisher. If this were an old English case, there would be no doubt
that a right of fishery of this kind is a form of incorporeal property. 1223 In the absence of
the public right, this characterisation of the rights of the title-holder as proprietorial in
nature gives rise to the possibility compensation might be required upon a change of
regulatory arrangements over the marine domain.
Before considering the degree to which the other two elements required for
compensation have been met, it is first appropriate to distinguish between the economic
advantages arising out of a regulatory fishing scheme and those arising from locational
advantages associated with the ownership of a property. The first set of advantages is
unlikely to be proprietary in nature,1224 and the second is more likely to be proprietary.
As earlier chapters have outlined, in a common-pool fishery free from regulation,
economic rents are likely to be dissipated. It can be argued that the economic rents1225
that accrue from the regulatory intervention by the Northern Territory under the Fisheries
Act 1988 (NT) depend on, and are inherently subject to, changes in that statutory
regime.1226 An economic advantage of a different type, however, accrues to exclusive
title-holders, whether economic rents in a fishery are achieved overall or not. This is
because some fishing sites are better than others and give rise to localised rents — in other
words, it is convenient for fishers to fish in that location, and they would be prepared to
pay for that access even if no true economic rents were generated from the fishery overall.
These local advantages constitute part of the regular value of proprietorial right of control
of land and waters, albeit they may have a low economic value in an open-access
fishery.1227 A title owner free of the public right to fish can grant out a ‘fishery’ to a
commercial fisher. That fisher would still need a license issued by the Northern Territory
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government to carry out fishing activities.1228 As noted above, if this were an old English
case, there would appear to be little doubt that a right of fishery of this kind is a form of
property, albeit still subject to fisheries laws.1229
Once the test for a proprietorial interest has been satisfied two questions remain;
whether the interest has been affected and whether the state has acquired an interest that
is directly or indirectly for the benefit of another party. For the purposes of this example,
let us then say that after a LRA title-holder granted a fishery to a commercial fisher, the
Northern Territory government restricted commercial fishing for barramundi within LRA
title areas,1230 removing the prospect of gaining economic value from commercial
fisheries. Further, let us assume that the Northern Territory government did so primarily
to benefit another sector, recreational fishers. The LRA title-holder’s proprietorial rights
would appear substantially diminished, with that value transferred by the Northern
Territory government to other beneficiaries. Barramundi could still be caught
commercially, but no longer over LRA title. There would appear to be a plausible case for
compensation for the loss of such local advantages, which are proprietorial in nature, and
possibly, but much less likely, for compensation for the loss of an opportunity to gain a
portion of the economic rent generated by the regulatory regime itself.1231 In Harper,
Justice Brennan stated that a right to fish may be invalid if ‘created in diminution of
proprietary rights of the owner of the seabed and without the owner’s consent’.1232 If this
is the case, by analogy, a diminution of a proprietary interest, being the right to fish
commercially over LRA title, would plausibly attract compensation.
This is not to suggest that every form of regulation, for example, general
environmental regulation, would give rise to a compensable interest or claim. As
acknowledged above, compensation is a complex and contested area of the law. By
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contrast, where the public right exists, a title-holder might be able to exercise joint control
over access, but cannot be said to have the same interest in the fisheries themselves.1233
Those fishing would be able to do so in pursuance of their regulated public right.1234 To
further demonstrate this point, let us consider a slightly different set of facts, where
fishing activities were not actually taking place on a title-holder’s land, but access across
that land was necessary to access a fishery, for which the title-holder was charging fees.
The title-holder could not be said to have a legal interest in the fishery, even though the
title-holder was generating fees out of the fishery. Here, it is less likely that a court would
find that the title-holder had a proprietorial right in a fishery, as the fisher would still be
fishing pursuant to a pre-existing public right, even though the fisher was paying access
fees to the title-holder.
This example highlights the potential for shifts in legal relationships when the public
right is wholly absent. Where the public right has been wholly abrogated, proprietorial
interests may emerge that would require fisheries-management actions to consider the
proprietorial interests of title-holders. In some cases, plausible claims to legal
compensation might arise. The discussion above provides insight into novel legal issues
that can emerge when the right is wholly abrogated.
3.
Indigenous Interests
Assessment of the extent of abrogation of the public right to fish is relevant to
Indigenous interests in the marine domain1235 in two ways. Firstly, in the absence of the
public right, general statutory rules of interpretation apply to any conflict between the
NTA and fisheries legislation. The NTA has been interpreted as intended to be protective
of Indigenous rights,1236 but it also contains extensive statutory provisions purporting to
protect the integrity of statutory fishery-management regimes.1237 The resolution of these
elements is problematic. As discussed by Bartlett,1238 so far, no significant issues seem to
have arisen out of the difference between a regulated public right and a statutory right to
fish. This may be in part because, although the High Court in Commonwealth v
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Yarmirr1239 recognised Indigenous rights to fish, it also established that they were nonexclusive.1240
Where the public right to fish has been wholly abrogated, however, one of the
principal rationales for non-exclusivity becomes significantly weaker. Although the
public right to navigate remains, this is a narrower right. It does not protect the public use
of fisheries and protects access only under limited circumstances, such as when traversing
an area. Justice Merkel argued in favour of the potential recognition of exclusive rights
in his dissenting opinion in the Full Federal Court in Commonwealth v Yarmirr.1241 His
argument — which is well-founded in historical terms – highlighted precedents for the
recognition of exclusive fisheries that existed in Ireland before the English settlement of
Ireland was legally recognised. He highlighted 19th and early 20th century Irish cases
involving private fishing rights. In Akiba v Commonwealth, Chief Justice French and
Justice Crennan found that Indigenous rights to fisheries were of a proprietorial or
usufructuary character,1242 making Justice Merkel’s analogy to old Irish rights even more
apt.1243 That these rights perhaps only became capable of recognition as exclusive once
they had been abrogated by later legislation is a significant hurdle, but overcoming it is
not impossible. The High Court in Commonwealth v Yarmirr held that Indigenous rights
could be recognised beyond territorial limits at settlement.1244 As the discussion in this
thesis on Yanner v Eaton1245 in Chapter 4 demonstrates, the approach of the High Court
to the interpretation of Queensland wildlife legislation shifted after the passage of the
NTA. 1246 Accordingly, it is at least possible that exclusive Indigenous fishery rights could
be recognised where there is no competing public right to fish.
Although in theory an exclusive Indigenous right might exist, currently in no
Australian marine jurisdiction has there been both a broad finding of Indigenous rights to
fish equivalent to those found in Akiba v Commonwealth1247 and a finding that there is no

1239

(2001) 208 CLR 1.

1240

Ibid.

1241

(2000) 101 FCR 171, 302-315 (Merkel J).

1242

(2013) 250 CLR 209.

1243

There is likely still a requirement that the rights be evidenced by some form of historical grant or
licence, but this does not need to be an ancient grant. See, eg, Malcomson v O'Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155
1244

(2001) 208 CLR 1.

1245

(1999) 201 CLR 351.

1246

Chapter 4 C 3.

1247

(2013) 250 CLR 209.

196

competing public right, as in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1248 Furthermore, since Karpany v
Dietman1249 it is now much less likely that the right has been wholly abrogated outside
the Northern Territory, with the possible exception of Victoria. In an event, if the
composite nature of the public right is acknowledged, then exclusive Indigenous rights
are less likely to arise. This is not because recognition of the different elements of the
public right changes priorities between those rights and Indigenous rights, but because a
regulatory regime would need to abrogate all elements of the right in order to make way
for exclusive Indigenous rights.
C. Termination of an Abrogatory Event
This section addresses the question of what happens when an abrogating event passes
or is terminated. To answer this question requires a return to the question raised in the
first part of this thesis. What is the fundamental character of the public right to fish?
Depending on the answer to this question, the character of the right will lead to its
automatic revival on the removal of an abrogatory event or, alternatively, having been
extinguished by abrogation, the right would not revive.1250
Recent Australian cases suggest three possibilities. Firstly, the public right may be
‘public’ only in the limited sense attributed to it by Justice Selway, being that that which
is not prohibited is permitted.1251 Secondly, the public right may be so closely related to
the prerogatives of the Crown that, just as prerogatives can be extinguished by regulatory
regimes,1252 so the public right to fish can be extinguished. Finally, the public right revives
once an abrogating event has passed. This interpretation rests on the broad enquiry on the
history of the right with its multiple sources and elements described in Chapters 2-4.
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The first possibility noted above — that only a very limited form of public right exists
in Australia — was raised by Justice Selway in Gumana v Northern Territory.1253 Justice
Selway argued that the right in England is more appropriately characterised as a
restriction on the prerogatives of the Crown. He further concluded that the Crown, having
never asserted those rights on settlement, permanently lost the ability to do so other than
by legislation once responsible government came into place in the Australian colonies.
According to Justice Selway, all that remained was a common law rule of statutory
interpretation that one can generally do what is not prohibited.1254 Justice Selway’s
approach has a significant advantage in the simplicity of its expression. On application,
it is less clear what the impact of Justice Selway’s approach would be. If it is a strong rule
of construction, then in requiring clear and plain words to prohibit it we necessarily return
to the issue of what constitutes a ‘necessary implication’ where statutory provisions are
not explicit.
Justice Selway focused on the relationship of the right to the loss of certain
prerogatives on the advent of responsible government. Effectively, his account attributed
the whole of the right’s legal character to the prerogative account of the source of the
right. This discounts the Bracton/Natural Law sources and Birthright/Magna Carta
sources of the right. The latter has significant judicial support in key cases underpinning
the legal development of the public right to fish, such as Malcolmson v O’Dea.1255 Justice
Selway constructs a coherent account, but it lacks consistency with past treatment of the
right.
The second possibility is that the right is permanently extinguished by abrogation.
This possibility finds support in the emphasis placed by the plurality in the Blue Mud Bay
Case1256 on De Keysers Case,1257 associating the public right to fish with the prerogatives
of the Crown.1258 A legal consequence of associating that the right with prerogatives is
that, like prerogatives, the right would not revive once the statutory scheme that has
abrogated it passes.1259 The lack of any reference to De Keysers Case by the High Court
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in Karpany v Dietman1260 and Akiba v Commonwealth1261 suggests that while the Blue
Mud Bay Case1262 was not formally overruled, it is a judicial dead end in the context of
public rights to fish.1263 Nonetheless, an association of the right with prerogatives of the
Crown is supported by Moore and Moore1264 and by Hale’s analogy between the rights
of the king in the sea and the rights of a lord to the wastes of his manor.1265
As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, however, the public right to fish has multiple sources,
with only one of them dependant on an assumed past exercise by the Crown of its
prerogative. The prerogative account has its source in a period in English law where there
were vigorous attempts by the Tudor and Stuart monarchs to expand its powers. 1266 The
assumption that the right was solely a creature of the prerogative is inconsistent with the
full breadth of its legal history. The public right was not permanently extinguished over
ancient estates; rather, vigilance was required by the holders of English estates in the
marine domain to ensure that their exclusive nature was preserved, and that their estate
was not reattached to those estates of both public rights and the Crown.1267
On a practical level, extinguishment would lead to highly unusual consequences.
There would be areas of the marine domain to which the public right extends and some
to which it does not, provided an abrogatory event has occurred in the past. Effectively,
a quilt of legal patchwork would exist over the marine domain, with the public right in
some places and not others. For example, a lease of an area of the intertidal zone, even
when expired, might lead to a gap in the public’s right to cross the area. This would make
effective management of the marine domain even more complex given the potential for
conflicts between multiple uses, multiple users and multiple jurisdictions.
That abrogation does not necessarily extinguish under Australian law is suggested by
the consistent use by Australian courts of the term abrogation rather than extinguishment
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in relation to the right. 1268 Australian courts have not explained this preferred word
choice, which suggests two main possibilities: judicial reticence to avoid implying
extinguishment, or courts overlooking explanation by coincidence and without
consideration of the alternative possibility of extinguishment. The first possibility appears
to be a more reasonable assumption. It is conceded, however, that this does not mean that
the courts have adopted the revival approach preferred below — merely that the
implication of extinguishment associated with the prerogative account has not been
resolved.
The preferred construction of the right in this thesis, as developed in Chapters 2–4,
is that there are three sources of the right; the Natural law/Bracton foundation for the
right, the Birthright/Magna Carta foundation, and the assumption of a past exercise of
power by the Crown (by grant or otherwise) in favour of the public. The characterisation
of the right that is most consistent across the ancient sources, as well as key formative
legal cases in the 1800s1269 and 1900s,1270 is that the right is a unique public right of great
antiquity, the justification for which has changed from time to time, but which is not
solely a creature of the prerogative. Because the right is not solely a creature of the
prerogative, it need not be subject to the same legal disadvantage as prerogatives relating
to extinguishment.
It is true that the public right to fish has been described as being amenable to statutory
abrogation and regulation.1271 This does not necessarily imply an inherent fragility in all
legal aspects of the right, including extinguishment. In Mayor of Carlisle v Graham, it
was held that where a navigable river changed its course to cover formerly dry private
land, the river remained subject to public rights of fishery and navigation.1272 The Crown,
however, gained no permanent proprietary interest in the soil as a result of the shift in the
river’s course. The Court found that if the river resumed its original course, the private
landowner would own the (now dry again) soil. This case demonstrates the flexibility of
common law public rights to fish. Rights that are not proprietary in nature are also not
subject to the legal limitations of proprietary interests. It is true that Mayor of Carlisle v
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Graham1273 was cited by Justice Brennan in Harper,1274 as qualified support for the
proposition that the public right to fish might be ‘sustained’ by a right to the subsoil. In
fact, Mayor of Carlisle v Graham1275 is merely authority for the proposition that both the
public right and the rights of the Crown applied to the changed course of the river, not
that right depended on the Crown’s interest. Chief Baron Kelly stated that ‘the rights of
the Crown and of the public may come into existence and be exercised in what has thus
become a portion of a tidal river or of an arm of the sea.’1276
It is true that there is a paucity of direct English authority on revival of the right after
abrogation. This may be for several reasons such as; that public rights were formerly
given greater deference by the courts, the special legal status of the Crown Estate, the
lack of comprehensive regimes of fisheries management (compared to those of today)
and, finally, a lack of anyone having a clear interest in challenging public rights after an
abrogatory event has passed. Justice Selway commented in Gumana v Northern Territory
that the public right to fish in Australia had been largely ignored and was ‘resuscitated’1277
by Harper1278 and in Commonwealth v Yarmirr.1279 As argued earlier, this is likely
because those two cases addressed novel issues in Australian law, respectively rightsbased fisheries and Indigenous rights to fish. Two conclusions can be drawn on revival
after statutory abrogation has passed. Firstly, it is a novel question and there is little
guidance from authority. Secondly, a broad reading of the right’s legal history supports
revival, and only a narrow reading of legal history supports extinguishment.
The question then arises of what the impact of revival would be. As noted above, one
of the advantages of revival is the avoidance of a potential patchwork application of the
right in the marine domain with the associated complications in determining the effect on
competing interests and interpreting overlapping legislation. Of course, if proprietary
interests incompatible with the right had been created, then it is likely that, short of
specific legislative words, the rights acquired would continue to apply. For example, a
change to fisheries legislation in the Northern Territory is unlikely to change any
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proprietorial rights gained by LRA titleholders.1280 By way of a further example, the
discussion in Chapter 6 raised the possibility that in New South Wales, the public rights
to fish commercially had been abrogated and replaced by a statutory scheme. If so, a
consequence of the loss of the public right would be the loss to commercial fishers of the
benefit of provisions extending the public right to fish to private inland waters. If the
public right to fish were restored to commercial fishers, this restoration would potentially
represent a reduction in rights held by those holding title to those waters. Absent clear
words to the contrary, the effect of restoration of the public right might not restore
commercial fishers’ right to access private inland waters in New South Wales.
D. Purposive Test and Partial Abrogation
1.
Issues
Following on from the discussion in Chapter 5, the plurality’s approach in the Blue
Mud Bay Case does not provide a generally applicable guide to the interaction between
the right and legislation. The authority of that case has diminished since the decisions of
the High Court in Akiba v Commonwealth1281 and Karpany v Dietman.1282 These more
recent judgments share much in common with the approach to interpretation applied by
the Full Federal Court in Gumana v Northern Territory and that court’s purposive
approach to statutory interpretation and ‘text and context’.1283 A purposive approach to
interpretation is relevant to both the specific question of whether there is a ‘necessary
implication’ of abrogation of a public right as well as the general interpretative stance that
is applied to legislation.
In recent cases, factors found relevant to either abrogation or extinguishment by
necessary implication have included; the comprehensiveness of a legislative scheme,1284
whether the public right has been replaced by statutory rights 1285 and whether the rights
have a proprietary character.1286 Given that recent cases have been focused on Indigenous
rights, it is possible that a relevant factor to the degree of abrogation is whether competing
and potentially inconsistent rights have been created under a statutory scheme of special
significance for Indigenous people. When interpreting legislation, a strength of a
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necessary implication’ test depends on contextual factors such as the strengths of the
competing rights involved.1287 It would appear from Akiba v Commonwealth that the
necessary implication test is weaker when applied to public rights to fish than rights of an
usufructuary or proprietorial nature.1288 There appears to be no generally applicable rule
guiding the assessment of abrogation, other than that the right is ‘freely amenable to
abrogation or regulation’.1289 In Gumana v Northern Territory the Full Federal Court
concluded that LRA fee simple title excluded the public right to fish and created a regime
of exclusive access. The Court, however, declined to provide a more general opinion on
circumstances that would lead to the public right to fish being abrogated. It was not even
prepared to express an opinion on whether the highest level of private interest in land —
a fee simple title — would generally exclude the public right to fish.1290
Litigation over the marine domain in the Northern Territory, and in particular in the
NT Fishing Cases,1291 demonstrates that a purposive approach is not in itself enough to
generate a coherent and consistent test to assess the effects of regulatory abrogation. This
is unsurprising. Two problems arise in the application of the purposive approach to the
marine domain. Firstly, which purposes are relevant. Secondly, which purposes are to be
given priority. The marine domain is a zone of interacting interests, some of them
conflicting and some of them compatible. Those interests are governed by overlapping
legislative schemes. Each scheme has its own legislative history and set of purposes.
There is not only jurisdictional competition between different agencies,1292 but also
arrangements for shared jurisdiction and management.1293 A test that is useful for
considering the interpretation of words contained within a single legislation scheme is
less useful for resolving conflicts between multiple schemes of legislation and the public
right.
The NT Fishing Cases,1294 discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, provide examples of
specific factors that have influenced the courts in their assessment of the degree of
abrogation of the right. Those cases do not display a systematic approach to the question
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of abrogation. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, different outcomes can flow from a simple
constructional choice over which legislative scheme is considered first by a court, and yet
the reason for such choices is not necessarily clear. For example, the plurality in the Blue
Mud Bay Case did not explain why it was necessary to first address the issue of the
interaction between the public right and fisheries legislation, and only then to address
interaction with Indigenous rights under the LRA.1295
A guide to abrogation can contribute to consistency in two ways. Firstly, by the
recognition that there are not one but two potential approaches to the question of
abrogation by ‘necessary implication’. This recognition allows for explicit consideration
of which approach is appropriate, as discussed below. Secondly, through setting out a
preferred order in which potential conflicts should be resolved between the right and
multiple legislative schemes. In theory, the need for a guide would be limited if there
were explicit, clear and comprehensive legislative rules on priority. Given the diversity
of potential interactions in the marine domain, however, an attempt to provide a
comprehensive legislative approach to priorities, and to keep such provisions up to date,
is likely to fail. The NT Fishing Cases1296 demonstrate how difficult it was to apply
legislated rules of priority over areas of the marine domain covered by LRA titles. The
plurality in The Blue Mud Bay Case avoided the whole question of legislative priorities
that was established by the LRA by finding, as a preliminary point, that public rights to
fish had been wholly abrogated under the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT).1297 Where there are
no clear rules of legislative priority, conflicts will ultimately come to the courts for
determination. The approach proposed below supplements a purposive approach to
interpretation with a more specific guide, allowing for a greater degree of consistency to
the statutory interpretation of legislation governing the marine domain.
2.
Proposed guide
The guide to abrogation proposed in this chapter draws on Goldsworthy’s
observation that there are two potential meanings to ‘necessary implication’.1298 The first
is an implication that is ‘necessary for a statutory provision to have its intended effect’.1299
The second is an implication where there is a ‘certain communicative intention’ that is
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‘in the circumstances obvious’.1300 It is proposed that legislative schemes that must
necessarily abrogate the right in order to be effective should be considered before the
effects of other legislative schemes are considered. The next step would be to assess the
impact on the right of statutory schemes where abrogation might not be necessary to
achieve the intended effect of the scheme, but it is in the circumstances obvious. It is
acknowledged that a binary categorisation in this manner will not suit all legislation, and
that there is an intermediate category of legislation whose purpose is partly directed
towards the regulation of fishing, such as environmental legislation. The tests, how they
can be applied, and the impact of this guide are considered in more detail below.
An intended purpose of fishery legislation is to remedy the defects of the public right
in relation to fisheries management and preservation, defects long acknowledged.1301
Accordingly, fisheries legislation falls into the category listed above, a scheme that
necessarily abrogates the right. That a weak presumption of the ‘intended effect’ kind
should be applied in favour of the right in relation to Australian fisheries legislation is
supported by Australian fisheries-management policies supporting rights-based
management. Since 1988, changes have seen the adoption of comprehensive statutorybased systems of management, including new forms of statutory fishing rights.1302 To
interpret such legislation as being subject to a strong presumption in favour of public
rights to fish would undermine one of its primary objectives. The primary purpose of
fisheries legislation is to regulate and, accordingly, the public right to fish needs to be
abrogated to some extent. In relation to the question of whether right has been wholly
abrogated by implication, then the second meaning of implication applies, that it needs to
be obvious.
To convert the principles above into a test for when the right has been wholly
abrogated, the following decision-making rule should apply. The first test is whether such
a result is necessary for legislation to have its full effect. If the answer is yes, then the
right has been wholly abrogated. If the answer to this question is no, then the second of
Goldsworthy’s meanings for necessary implication is relevant, and the test is whether, in
the circumstances, such a necessary implication is obvious. In Chapter 6, I argue that the
Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) has this effect. In Victoria, it was not necessary for the right to
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be wholly abrogated for fisheries-management purposes, but it was necessary for royalties
to be applied under that Act.1303
It is acknowledged that the guidance provided by the scheme outlined above is
general in nature, but it provides more guidance and certainty than the application of a
generic purposive approach to interpretation. The Blue Mud Bay Case1304 demonstrates
how emphatic language intended to settle the authority of the Northern Territory to
manage fisheries had apparently unintended1305 effects on the public right by also
abrogating rights of access. A significant advantage of the guide as proposed would be to
assist the drafters of legislation through clarifying the likely legal effects of differences
in the wording of legislative arrangements. Drafters of fisheries legislation would become
more sensitive to the possible impact of their scheme on elements of the right, such as
access. Drafters of non-fisheries legislation could work from a more certain base when
considering appropriate provisions to ensure that their non-fisheries objectives are met,
while not causing unintended consequences following from the abrogation of the public
right. A consistent interpretative stance in this manner will provide greater certainty on
the effects of laws governing the marine domain. Experts have named certainty over
resource rights a high priority if the Australian community is to maximise benefits from
the marine domain.1306 As noted in Chapter 5, the loss of the public right to fish in the
Northern Territory does not appear to have provided practical certainty for Indigenous
interests on the use of or access to the marine domain 10 years after the decision in the
Blue Mud Bay Case.1307
As noted above, a purposive approach to the interpretation of a legislative scheme
will not of itself provide guidance to determining priorities among conflicting legal
schemes. Little effective guidance can be found in general common law rules of
interpretation, which have no clear priority of application and which themselves ‘jostle
for acceptance’.1308 Without explicit guidance on how schemes interact, merely looking
to the separate ‘purpose’ of each legislative scheme will not provide guidance on their
interaction. Furthermore, although Australia has one common law applied across its
States and Territories, precedential guidance from one jurisdiction is of limited utility to
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another, given that it is a generally accepted rule of Australian statutory interpretation that
courts are not bound by ‘like words in other legislation by another court’.1309 Even when
priorities between legislative schemes have been determined by one jurisdiction, the High
Court might find that the legislative context is substantially different in another, leading
to a different outcome.1310
It is argued above that fisheries legislation needs to surmount only a low bar to
abrogation by necessary implication, but that it does not necessarily follow that it will be
obvious that the right is wholly abrogated. There are three further grounds that support
this argument. Firstly, in Yanner v Eaton,1311 expansive general words on ownership and
regulation in natural-resource management legislation should generally be read as
expressing the full capacity of the Crown to regulate and control, rather than an intent to
wholly abrogate. That case, and the more recent case of Karpany v Dietman,1312 are
focused on the effect of natural-resource management legislation on Indigenous rights.
As discussed in earlier chapters, however, their characterisation of the effect of naturalresource management legislation as regulatory is expressed as general in nature and is not
limited to interaction with Indigenous rights. Secondly, where the replacement legislation
scheme is not comprehensive, too readily concluding that the right has been wholly
abrogated creates potential lacunae and inconsistencies in the law, as discussed in Chapter
6. Effective management does not require complete abrogation. As noted in Chapter 6,
expansive wording in Victoria’s Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) appears to be unrelated to
management and designed to protect revenue and avoid a risk that charges for access to
the marine domain would be classified as constitutionally prohibited. Concluding that
fisheries legislation does not wholly abrogate the right does not require a high
presumption against abrogation, merely the application of a standard purposive ‘text and
context’ approach to the interpretation of the legislative scheme as a whole.
These first two points about abrogation are partly consistent with the reasoning of
the High Court plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1313 The plurality’s application of a
low bar to wholly abrogate the public right in general can be supported, while the

1309

Pearce and Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (2014), see above n 47, 9.

1310

Arguably a basis for distinguishing the approach taken by the plurality to Northern Territory fisheries
legislation in the Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24 from the approach applied by the High Court to
South Australian fisheries legislation in Karpany v Dietman (2013) 252 CLR 507.
1311

(1999) 201 CLR 351.

1312

(2013) 252 CLR 507.

1313

(2008) 236 CLR 24.

207

precedential authority of their conclusion that the Northern Territory statutory scheme
was so comprehensive as to wholly abrogate the right can be doubted.
A third consideration in the assessment of abrogation is that not all cases make it
clear what is being abrogated, implicitly assuming that the public right to fish is a single
right. As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, what is referred to as ‘the public right to fish’ is a
composite right. It includes, for example, both a specific presumption against the loss of
access over waters granted out by the Crown and a more general proposition that the
public’s right cannot be abridged except by a competent legislature. Given there are
separate elements to the right, the public right to fish may be abrogated in some, but not
all, elements. In other words, all the elements of the public right to fish do not necessarily
stand or fall together. Accordingly, any test for abrogation should be applied not just to
the right in general, but also to each of its elements. That the right can be partially
abrogated in this manner is demonstrated by Harper, where the relevant regulations only
abrogated the public right to take abalone.1314 There is no suggestion in that case,
notwithstanding abrogation, that a person engaged in fishing for abalone had their general
right to access the marine domain impaired.
The guide outlined above can be restated as a set of decision-making rules as follows:
Public rights to fish apply to the marine domain, except where expressly excluded
or where included by necessary implication.
As the public right to fish is a composite right with separate elements, abrogation
or extinguishment of some elements does not of itself imply that all elements of the
public right have been wholly abrogated.
If legislation expressly wholly abrogates or extinguishes the right, there are no
longer interpretative assumptions in favour of the public based on the common law
right. Interpretation of the interaction between the abrogating legislation and any
other (potentially) conflicting statutory regimes in the marine domain will be free
of common law assumptions based on the public right.
Where legislation does not expressly abrogate or extinguish the right, the question
is whether or not legislation abrogates the right by implication. The first step in
addressing this question is to assess whether regulation of, and any consequent
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abrogation of, the public right is a necessary purpose to which that legislation is
directed.
If the answer to this question on necessary purpose is yes, then the impact of that
legislation on the right should be considered first before the effect of other
regulatory schemes. As fisheries legislation necessarily regulates the right, its effect
should generally be considered first. The test is whether abrogation is necessary to
the purpose of that legislation.
If the answer to this question on necessary purpose is no, then the common law
presumption protecting the public right applies and any ‘necessary implication’
should be carefully assessed against the purposes of the legislation. Here the stricter
criterion that the implication must be ‘obvious’ should be applied. Accordingly,
abrogation should only be assumed to the extent that the other purposes of such
legislation require abrogation or extinguishment.
E. Applying this Guide to Abrogation
1.
Application to Fisheries Legislation
Fisheries legislation must necessarily abrogate public rights to fish if it is to be
effective in remedying the long-attested defects of the right that are inherent in its openaccess nature. If the strict application of a ‘necessary implication’ presumption was
applied, drafting fishing legislation would become cumbersome, especially where the
legislation was intended to clearly express an authority to regulate without also wholly
abrogating the right. The general assumption that a central purpose of fisheries legislation
is the regulation of the public right to fish is consistent with a purposive approach to
interpretation and the general approach to Australian statutory interpretation. That
fisheries legislation is exempt from a rigorous application of a ‘necessary implication’
test is a reasonable conclusion from both the Blue Mud Bay Case and more recent
cases.1315
The guide to abrogation proposed above asserts that the abrogatory effects of
fisheries legislation on the right should be considered before the potential impact of other
legislation on the right is considered. That the effects of fisheries legislation should be
considered first should not be interpreted as a claim for the authority of fisheries
legislation as privileged over other legislative regimes. It is merely a pragmatic
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recognition that when considering potential conflicts between the right and legislation, it
is logical to first consider the extent to which the right may have been necessarily
abrogated by legislation whose central purpose requires a degree of abrogation. It is
conceded that it may not always be apparent from the title of legislation that one of its
primary purposes is the management and regulation of fishing activities. Historically, this
was a trivial task when the distinction was clear from the title of legislation, for example
the Fisheries Resource Management Act 1994 (WA) and the Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic).
There is, however, an increasing trend towards fisheries management being
perceived as part of a broader domain of ecosystem and environmental management.
Broad environmental objectives are now common in fisheries legislation, along with more
traditional ones of the preservation of fish stocks and the optimisation of fisheries. This
trend is observed from the title of the Tasmanian Living Marine Resources Management
Act 1995 (Tas) and the title in Western Australia of the Aquatic Resource Management
Act 2016 (WA). Should this trend continue, scrutiny will continue to be required to
ascertain the purpose of legislation and distinguish between legislation intended to
manage fisheries and non-fisheries legislation. For example, if the title and objectives of
legislation are expressed in general terms, such as in Tasmania’s Living Marine Resources
Management Act 1995 (Tas), the question exists of whether or not a prime focus of that
legislation is the regulation of fisheries, or whether it has a broader range of objectives of
which interaction with fisheries is merely a subset.
2.
Application to Non-Fisheries Legislation
Where non-fishing legislation affects the public right to fish, the second principle of
obviousness apples. Abrogation should only be found where it is obvious and to the extent
that abrogation is required. Arguably, this is not a separate test, but a traditional way of
expressing a relevant contextual factor for statutory interpretation. One advantage of the
proposed guide is that drafters of proposed legislation in the marine domain, whose intent
is directed towards resolving non-fisheries issues, can assume that the words they use will
not change the balance of rights and interests in the marine domain, except to the extent
required to achieve the purposes intended. Given the overlapping jurisdictional and
statutory regimes in the marine domain, for drafters to consider and explicitly address
every potential impact on both the right and the interaction of the right with other statutory
regimes would be a difficult, if not practically impossible, task.
As contextual factors vary depending on the character of the rights involved, so will
the interpretation of the effects of any legislative scheme. Relevant factors might include;
an assessment of the balance of objects of the relevant Act: specific sections of the Act,
subsidiary legislation, administrative acts, and the nature of any interests created under
that legislation. For example, is the legislation a form of managing the use of the marine
domain (including fishing methods) or merely a restriction on access to parts of the
marine domain consistent with the primary purpose of that legislative scheme, for
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example, a port? Circumstances affecting the purpose (and context) of legislation are
likely to vary so widely that a specific rule in relation to abrogation by non-fisheries
legislation is impracticable. In some cases, the purpose of non-fisheries legislation will
be obvious, for example, a defence control order preventing access to marine areas during
military exercises involving the live firing of weapons. These orders would wholly
abrogate both the exercise of the public right to fish and navigate but are of such a
transient nature that it seems more accurate to speak of a temporary suspension of public
access rather than an abrogation.
There is a possible intermediate category of legislation where the management of
fishing activities is a substantial objective, but it is secondary to another broader goal.
Where non-fishing legislation implements a scheme of management for fisheries
activities broadly comparable to fishing legislation, then a similar rule to fisheries
legislation should be applied, that being that any assumption in favour of the public right
to fish should be applied with caution. An example of such an intermediate case of ‘mixed
purpose’ legislation is environmental legislation; this category of legislation is considered
below.
3.
Intermediate Cases: Environmental Legislation
The binary approach to the test for abrogation by implication, as proposed above, is
more difficult to apply to legislation that has some, but not all the characteristics of
fisheries legislation. Marine environmental legislation is such a potential intermediate
case, as it operates in the marine domain, but is not centrally concerned with the regulation
of fishing activities. As noted in Chapter 1 the principal purpose of fisheries management
is to the regulation of fishing to balance exploitation and protection. Nonetheless, to
achieve their environmental goals regulatory regimes created by environmental
legislation might also need to be interpreted free or largely free of a presumption in favour
of the public right to be effective. To decide which interpretative test for abrogation
should apply — necessary for effectiveness or in the circumstances obvious — would
require enquiry into the detail of the scheme and the legislation under which it is
established. For example, the Commonwealth’s statutory and regulatory process for
marine reserves provides for the declaration of those reserves and the general purposes
for which those areas are reserved but leaves management arrangements to be resolved
later.1316 The purposes for which the reserve has been created can be achieved through
other statutory mechanisms, including changes to fisheries legislation. This structure
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suggests that Commonwealth marine reserves are intended to operate with, rather than
replace, Commonwealth fisheries legislation, and by implication the public rights that
legislation regulates.
In assessing the extent to which an environmental scheme necessarily abrogates the
right, some general guidance can be found in the highly regarded International Union for
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)’s classification system for marine reserves. 1317 The
Commonwealth has used this system to guide its development of one of the world’s
largest system of marine reserves. Under the IUCN’s classification, there are seven levels
of protection ranging from the most restrictive, Category Ia and Category Ib, to the least
restrictive, Category 6. Category Ia Reserves are clearly intended to substantially, if not
wholly, abrogate the public right to fish. The IUCN provides in this category that ‘human
visitation, use and impacts are strictly controlled and limited to ensure protection of the
conservation values’.1318 For an Ia reserve, management regimes require significant
restrictions on fishing activities in the reserve, as well as rights of access.1319 An Ia reserve
would appear to be so obviously incompatible with the public right to fish that a necessary
intention to wholly abrogate, rather than regulate, would appear to be met. Other IUCN
categories allow for other uses, although these uses are clearly intended to be supported
by the regulation of incompatible activities. For example, commercial fishing is allowed
for limited purposes in Category VI reserves. Given a range of activities are allowed,
there seems to be no necessary reason why the public right would need to be wholly
abrogated. Too ready an assumption of the abrogation of the public right to fish under
environmental legislation may undermine the effectiveness of the management of
fisheries under fisheries legislative regimes.1320 A loss of the public right to fish could
also impact the balance of interests and rights in the marine domain in unanticipated ways.
By way of a more specific example, as noted in Chapter 6, the regulation of commercial
fishing in New South Wales may have undermined the intention in that legislation to
create statutory rights of access to inland waters.1321
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Given the above, it would seem appropriate to assume that environmental legislation
of a general nature should be interpreted as being subject to the rules set out in the Guide
above for non-fisheries legislation. Where restrictions are severe, as in reserves meeting
the IUCN category Ia description above, then abrogation would be obvious, and for such
reserves there would arguably be complete abrogation. On the other hand, if a
comprehensive and extensive management scheme of fishing activities is implemented
under environmental legislation, there is no reason not to apply the same decision rules
applied to fisheries legislation under the guide proposed above. Accordingly, the
abrogation of the public right to fish is necessary to achieve the objectives of such a
statutory scheme, and only a weak presumption is appropriate in favour of the public right
to fish. In practice, as noted above, Australian jurisdictions tend to layer schemes on top
of each other rather than replace schemes with each other, with fisheries continuing to be
principally managed by fisheries agencies. Given this practice, a pragmatic approach is
to consider each legislative scheme as one layer of management rather than focusing on
abrogation. The extent of abrogation principally becomes an issue if a statutory regime
wholly abrogates the right, making any further consideration of assumptions in favour of
the right unnecessary.
F. Conclusion: Organising Conflict?
Notwithstanding any, or all, of the arguments above, there is no doubt that the public
right to fish is a common law–based public right, the relevance of which depends on the
degree to which courts will uphold the right. Its limitation as an organising principle for
sound resource management has long been recognised.1322 As noted in Chapter 1, its
contemporary significance has been doubted in both Australia and England. There
appears little Australian judicial support for the right being characterised as a
‘fundamental’ public right worthy of a high level of protection.1323
The public right to fish should not, however, be considered in isolation from the fact
that the marine domain in Australia is a highly regulated environment and subject to
overlapping jurisdictions and legislative schemes. Reconciling these without an explicit
guide or framework is problematic. A purposive approach to the interpretation of
legislation does not in itself provide a sufficient framework to guide consistent judicial
interpretation, as was demonstrated in the variety of judicial approaches applied in the NT
Fishing Cases.1324 As a common starting point for the reconciliation of potentially

1322

Goodman v Mayor of Saltash (1882) 7 AC 633.

1323

Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1; Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457;
Gumana v Northern Territory (2007) 158 FCR 349.
1324

Listed above in n 41.
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conflicting legislative regimes, the public right to fish can assist in improving consistency
and coherence in the interpretation of existing schemes and in the drafting of new ones.
The public right to fish, therefore, acts as a useful default organising principle for
access to, and use of, living marine resources. Essential elements of the right remain
relevant, even if they require some restatement to reflect the right’s contemporary context;
the public can take fish from the marine domain to the extent they are not restricted by
legislation; public access is assumed to exist across the marine domain and there is a
presumption supporting the public right in the marine domain. The strength of that
presumption, however, will depend in substantial part on the central purposes of
legislation covering the marine domain.
This chapter and preceding chapters have adopted the stance of attempting to
reconcile conflicting views on the right so far as it is possible. This restatement does not
address whether more radical changes to the right might be justified, for example, whether
the lack of a legal equivalent of the Crown Estate in Australia warrants a more extensive
revision of the laws of Australia over the marine domain. Chapter 8 looks forward and
considers the potential for more extensive changes to the right. It also considers the
relevance of the history of the right to other areas of the law and legal theory.
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Chapter 8: THE ONCE AND FUTURE RIGHT?
A. Introduction
This chapter sets out a summary of the history of the right and proposes a restatement
of the right in Australian law. The history of the right and its later development in
Australian law has been a primary focus of this thesis. The lens this thesis applies to that
development is the influence of the right over access to and the use of the marine domain.
The rich legal history of the right provides fertile ground for its citation as support for a
variety of arguments. This chapter also notes the potential relevance of its findings about
the development of the right to other areas of the law. It is argued, however, that the legal
character of the right as a public right in the marine domain means caution needs to be
exercised in drawing conclusions based on its history in other areas of the law, such as
private rights and the nature of Crown ownership.
B. History of the Right: Origins and Legal Reasoning
The legal history of the public right to fish is long, complex and contested. The right
is ‘obscure’,1325 with a legal character ‘not easy to define’1326 and has origins ‘lost in the
darkness of the past’.1327 The contested history of the right leads to the observation that it
is ‘more controversial than one may have expected’.1328 As Justice Barrett stated in
Georgeski v Owners Corporation SP49833:1329
[i]t is not possible to make, with any degree of confidence, a complete and exhaustive
statement of the common law rights of the public in relation to tidal waters and the
foreshore. The matter is a ‘difficult question’ no less today than when so described by Lord
Wright in 1935 [referring here to Williams-Ellis v Cobb1330].

Chapters 2 and 3 surveyed the origins of the English common law public right to fish
and grouped the principal sources of the right into three main accounts, the
Bracton/Natural Law, Birthright/Magna Carta and Crown Ownership accounts. It is a
central proposition of those chapters, and of this thesis, that each of these accounts is
solidly grounded in legal history. From this proposition, it follows that arguments based
on a single origin of the right are susceptible to rebuttal by plausible counterarguments
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Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 25 (DF Jackson QC, SJ Gageler) (during argument); A-G
British Columbia v A-G of Canada [1914] AC 153, 169.
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A-G British Columbia v A-G of Canada [1914] AC 153, 169.
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Ibid.
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R v East Sussex County Council [2015] UKSC 7, [27] (Neuberger and Hodge LL).
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[2004] NSWSC 1096, [84].
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[1935] 1 KB 310, 320 (Wright L).
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based on a different origin of the right. It is argued in Chapter 5 that the legal reasoning
of the plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case1331 was over-reliant on the analogy to
prerogatives of the Crown, and by extension, the Crown Ownership account of the right.
It is acknowledged that new evidence on the history of the right could emerge that
challenges the conclusion of this thesis that the right has multiple sources. New evidence
is, however, much more likely to add to the broad base of existing knowledge than fully
displace one or more of the three accounts of the origin of the right outlined. By way of
example, Chapter 3 of this thesis introduced evidence drawn from Australian colonial
history1332 to fill in gaps in the Australian history of the right. This evidence supports the
view that the Birthright/Magna Carta account was dominant when the right was received
into Australian law. This evidence adds weight to arguments based on the
Birthright/Magna Carta approach, but this evidence does not fully displace arguments
based on the other accounts of the right.1333
Two further conclusions about the right can be drawn from this review of the history
of the right. The first conclusion that can be drawn from Chapters 2 and 3 is that certainty
about the legal attributes of the right will not be achieved out of its legal history alone.
Legal history forms part of legal argument and judicial reasoning. 1334 As part of judicial
reasoning, legal history can inform a court on the proper construction of legislation. As
part of the process of legal reasoning, however, legal history is not subject to evidence
before the court.1335 There are no prescribed limit on what elements of legal history judges
can take into account. It is, of course, prudent for advocates to provide, and for a court to
receive, submissions on legal history, as is accepted Australian practice.1336
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(2008) 236 CLR 24, 50-67 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ).
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In particular, the dispute in the 1800s over licences to Western Australian pearling grounds. See above,
Chapter 3 D.
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Such as the association of the right with the prerogative in the Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24.
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Selway, ‘Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of Australia’, above n 63,
131. Indeed the High Court has attracted criticism for ‘dumping a huge amount of history in judgements
[and] by being less explicit about the policy choices being made … with some practitioners concerned that
its heavy focus on history is chewing up litigant's time and money’ cited in Alex Boxsell, Samantha Bowers
and Hanna Low, ‘High Court Ramps Up Pressure’, The Australian Financial Review, 15 August 2011, 52-53
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See treatment of historical sources in Alqudsi v The Queen (2016) 258 CLR 320, 213 (French CJ), 244
(Kiefel Bell and Keane JJ), 254 (Gageler J).
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216

Significant complications will arise for the achievement of consistency in judicial
reasoning where there are longstanding disagreements as to the history of the law. Even
if the authorities consulted by a court could be limited to those written by ‘serious
historians’,1337 such authorities would not provide consistent guidance where serious
historians themselves disagree on the fundamentals of legal history. Chapter 3 outlines
significant differences of opinion on the public right in the 1800s and early 1900s. These
differences include disagreement on the origin of the right and its relationship to the
interests of the Crown in the marine domain. High-level judicial decisions citing the
history of the public right have not settled these debates. As noted in Chapter 3, the House
of Lords decision in Malcomson v O’Dea,1338 — despite being ‘binding authority’1339 —
did not prevent doubts being raised over Magna Carta accounts of the right.1340 This
disputed legal history of the public right to fish presents a court with a wide range of
‘constructional choices’1341 when interpreting the effects of statutes on the public right.
The second conclusion that can be drawn from the review of the history of the right
in this thesis is that it retains the potential for further evolution.1342 With both multiple
origins and unresolved legal disputes over its fundamental legal characteristics, a simple
account that is capable of one orthodox interpretation has failed to emerge. Chapter 3
notes the divergence in American and English law from cases in the 1800s and
onwards.1343 The potential for evolution has so far not lead to significant changes in the
Australian right, such as it being transformed into an American-style public trust.
Although there is a lack of full certainty and the potential for evolution, some legal
characteristics of the right appear to be particularly well grounded and unlikely to change.
The special public and non-proprietary nature of the right has been consistently
emphasised in Australian and English law. Its public nature does means that consistency
in the legal application of the right to fish is unlikely to be found in legal history alone,

1337

See Selway, ‘Use of History’ above n 63, 134. Quoting Dixon J in Australian Communist Party v
Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 196. This observation sets aside the difficulty of deciding which historians
might be considered ‘serious’.
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(1863) 11 ER 1155.
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Neill v The Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App Cas 135, 177-8 (Blackburn L)
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See discussion on constructional choices in Hepburn, ‘Statutory Construction and Native Title
Extinguishment: Expanding Constructional Choices’, above n 4.
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See Bonyhady, ‘A Usable Past: The Public Trust in Australia’, above n 137.
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See discussion in Chapter 3 B 2 (b). In particular, the discussion of the rejection of a right to bathe in
Blundell v Catterall (1821) ER 1190.
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as the degree to which courts are likely to support the right will depend on their perception
of its utility.1344 This thesis recommends a natural-resource management approach be
applied to the interpretation of fisheries legislation. This approach does not require a full
reconciliation of legal historical debates over the right. Instead, it focuses on the central
concern of fisheries legislation, the appropriate balance between exploiting and
conserving fish.1345
Seen from a natural-resource management perspective, a key characteristic of the
right is that it is a long-accepted background principle of the common law. It underpins
the public’s use of and access to of the marine domain. In this regard, the principal
elements of the right have been long accepted.1346 As a background principle of the law,
the right is a relevant factor for the interpretation of legislation potentially abrogating the
right. An approach that avoids taking definitive positions on the history of the right is
broadly consistent with the adjudicative approach taken in Attorney-General for British
Columbia v Attorney-General for Canada,1347 Harper1348 and in Commonwealth v
Yarmirr.1349 In each of these cases, the court avoided definitively answering historical
questions about the origin of the right while confirming the existence of the right.
The public right is only one of several relevant considerations a court might consider
in a statutory interpretation of the effects of fishing legislation. Other relevant factors in
the interpretation of fisheries law might include; advances in fisheries management,1350
the importance of sustainability,1351 changing approaches to common law rights in
general1352 and the emergence of Indigenous rights.1353 The challenge — with so many
potential contextual factors — is achieving consistency in the application of the right and
certainty for those relying on the right to underpin access to and use of the marine domain.
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See, eg, Gumana v Northern Territory (2007) FCR 349, 375.
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In addition to recommending the adoption of a natural-resource management
approach to fisheries legislation, this thesis proposes to advance consistency and
coherence in Australian law through the confirmation of the right as a background
principle of common law underpinning both public access and use. As a background
principle, the right is a relevant contextual factor to the interpretation of legislation, unless
it is expressly excluded.1354 Where no alternative scheme1355 or set of principles is put in
place, the right should only rarely be found to have been wholly abrogated. To accept an
implication of complete abrogation without a suitable replacement is to accept an implied
intent to leave gaps in the law. Although it is acknowledged that, in some circumstances,
a legislature might intend that gaps be filled in by the courts,1356 such an assumption
should only be reached with caution due to the risk of intended consequences. This thesis
has explored the potential for unintended consequences following from the loss of rights
of access where the public right has been wholly abrogated.
This thesis concludes with a proposed restatement of the right in Australian law. Prior
to doing so, however, the potential implications of this thesis on other areas of the law are
reviewed.
C. The Public Right and other Rights and Interests
In Chapter 7, it is argued that where the right has been wholly abrogated it is possible
that exclusive Indigenous rights in the marine domain might be capable of being
recognised under Australian law. As noted in Chapter 1 there is an extensive body of legal
literature on Indigenous rights. This thesis adds to that literature by identifying the
circumstances in which a recognition of exclusive Indigenous rights is compatible with
the history of the public right to fish; and its later development in Australian law.
More broadly, the right has been cited as a support for arguments on topics as varied
as the origin of property rights1357 and the existence of common law native title.1358 This
thesis has focused on the right as an organising principle affecting the access to, and use
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The survey of Australian legislation in Chapter 6 found no instance of the right being expressly
excluded across a whole jurisdiction.
1355

A comprehensive legislative scheme over use and access could, in theory, fulfil the role of the public
right to fish.
1356

As arguably occurred with the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (Northern Territory) 1976 (Cth). The
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of, living marine resources. This focus precluded a full assessment of the implications
this thesis may have for other areas of the law. The utility of analogies that can be drawn
between the right and other rights and legal interests is, in any event, limited. As
emphasised in Chapter 1,1359 the right is a public right and is not private or proprietary in
nature. Further, as also noted in Chapter 1, the right is legally distinct from the public
right to navigation.1360 If analogies between the public right to fish and the public right to
navigate are limited in utility, then the utility of analogies between the public right to fish
and private rights to lands and waters is even more questionable. That a failure to fully
take into account the public nature of the right to fish can lead to false analogies to other
rights was demonstrated in Akiba v Commonwealth.1361 Comparability between the public
right and Indigenous rights in the marine domain was specifically rejected in that case.1362
Although the public right and Indigenous rights have influenced each other’s
development, this is not the same as asserting that they are similar rights. The public right
is not an inherently stronger or weaker right than Indigenous rights (or statutory rights).
It is a right of a different character.
Furthermore, policy issues related to the marine domain are substantially different to
those on the land. It is not appropriate to treat interests in land — and the history of those
interests — as analogous to interests in the marine domain. As this thesis demonstrates
the marine domain is characterised by a complex set of overlapping public, statutory and
private rights, many of them coexisting rights. Legal concepts familiar to land law such
as rights to exclusive possession are less useful in the marine domain. It is acknowledged
that analogies between the right and interests in land are drawn, for example, Hale’s
analogy between the interest of the king in the marine domain and that of the lord of a
manor.1363 Hale, however, also recognised that the king only had a ‘kind of possession in
the sea’. 1364 That the marine domain is not generally conducive to analysis based on
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occupation and possession has been acknowledged from the times of Hale1365 to more
recently.1366
A similar problem appears to have emerged in other areas of natural resource law
where there are complex interactions between public and private rights. Writing on rights
to water, American legal theorist Epstein, generally a strong proponent of property rights,
observed the problems that arise from treating waters as if they were land. Epstein wrote
that:
With water, the courts make the opposite mistake [of dealing with land rights as a
disaggregated bundle]. They treat it as a single unitary thing for public policy purposes, even
though as a matter of private law, water rights are highly fragmented to reflect the underlying
set of multiple inconsistent uses.1367

D. A Restatement of the Australian Right
1.
The Australian Context
The public right to fish is part of the common law of Australia and was received into
Australian law in the 1800s as part of the English common law. Those aspects of the right
that support unlimited fishing are not consistent with the community’s commitment to
sustainable use, as evidenced by extensive regulation of the right in fisheries legislation.
Furthermore, the right in Australia exists in a marine domain that is subject to a variety
of non-fishing legislative regimes with extensive vesting of areas for public purposes.
Accordingly, the right should no longer be considered fundamental or paramount. It
remains, however, a background assumption of the common law of Australia that the
public has a right to use and access the marine domain. It is of particular interest to
recreational fishers, who do not have a positive statutory right to fish or a statutory right
to access the marine domain to fish. As a background assumption, it retains utility as a
starting point for the interpretation of legislative regimes over the marine domain. As
competition to the marine domain increases, the right can assist in the resolution of
conflict by providing a common background underpinning the interaction of different
legislative regimes, each with their own purposes.
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Although no longer a fundamental common law right, the right should still only be
abrogated by clear words or necessary implication. This test is, however, not to be as
stringently applied to the public right as it is for proprietary rights. Accordingly, the same
words might abrogate the public right, but not proprietary rights or common law rights of
a more fundamental nature. Consistent with Australian legal practice to statutory
interpretation, what constitutes a necessary implication will vary form case to case. Both
text and context are important considerations. Guiding that assessment, some general
principles are applied to specific types of legislation below.
2.

The Right and Legislative Interpretation
a) Fisheries Legislation and Abrogation
Where an Australian legislature regulates fisheries, by necessary implication to
achieve its intended effect, the right must be partially abrogated. As Justice Brennan in
Harper stated:
The public right of fishing for abalone in State fishing waters is thus abrogated and
private statutory rights to take abalone in limited quantities are conferred on the holders of
commercial and non-commercial abalone licences. The Regulations thus control the
exploitation of a finite resource in order to preserve its existence.1368

In the pursuit of the goal of good natural-resource management, fisheries legislation
may contain provisions intended to emphasise the breadth of the law’s powers to regulate
a fisher’s take of fish. Legislation strictly regulating the use of marine resources does not
necessarily intend the removal of rights of access to the marine domain. Potential gaps in
the law governing the marine domain may in fact make effective natural-resource
management more difficult to achieve. A key interpretative factor is the
comprehensiveness of the relevant statutory scheme, including the degree to which the
abrogation addresses questions of access and use across the marine domain. Other
indications of legislative intent to wholly abrogate can be found in statutory provisions
such as clear and explicit assertions of ownership of fish. The loss of the right can create
uncertainty over the impact on public rights of access and use where no replacement
scheme is in place. As noted in Chapter 1, ten years after the decision in the Blue Mud
Bay Case no comprehensive replacement scheme integrating recreational commercial and
proprietary rights had been put in place.1369
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b) Non-Fisheries Legislation
Where regulation of fishing is not an intended purpose of legislation, but an impact
on public rights of use or access is obvious in the circumstances, then the right should be
abrogated, but only to the extent this is required to achieve that obvious effect. This
includes, for example, sea closures for defence purposes and closures of areas of harbours
for public safety.
Where the regulation of fishing is one of a range of legislative purposes, then the
choice of the appropriate test for a necessary implication is less clear, with the potential
applicability of either the test of intended effect or a stricter test of obviousness. Context
is relevant to the question of whether legislative words are intended to emphasise control
over natural resources1370 or abrogate or extinguish the right. In interpreting legislation, a
court should prefer constructional choices that support coexistence with the right.1371
Removing regulated common law rights of access and use under fisheries legislation can
undermine practical arrangements for management, especially where no comprehensive
replacement scheme has been implemented.
3.
Private Estates to the Low Watermark:
The English common law position that the right has a ‘paramount’ status is
inconsistent with general treatment of the right by Australian courts, including the
classification of the right as a non-fundamental common law right. Furthermore, as there
is no Crown Estate in the marine domain in Australia the legal context in which the right
operates is radically different. Accordingly, in Australian legislation the creation of rights
equivalent to a fee simple estate in the marine domain should generally be a sufficient
basis for a finding the right has been abrogated by necessary implication.1372 The extent
of this abrogation would still need to meet the test of being obvious. Adopting such a
position would reduce confusion about the interaction between rights of the public and
the rights of those holding a proprietary title, especially those holding a title that would
otherwise have given exclusive possession.1373 This may already be the pragmatic
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approach of the Australian lower courts.1374

4.
Revival of an Abrogated Right
Consistent with the position in England, at the time of reception of English common
law into Australian law, the public right is not a creature of the prerogative or, at the very
least, not solely a creature of the prerogative. Where abrogatory legislation is repealed or
amended, or an abrogatory event passes away on some other grounds, the right should
revive. In other words, abrogation should not amount to extinguishment. Consistent with
High Court authority that the presumption of necessary implication is applied more
strictly to proprietary rights,1375 however, only very clear legislative intent would lead to
the revived public right displacing displacement of proprietary rights gained in the
meantime. This approach to the revival of the right preserves its character as a public, not
proprietary, right and as a general background principle of the common law. The
alternative to revival is extinguishment. The marine domain would then become a
patchwork of areas, some covered by the right and others not covered. Assessment of the
extent of the right would then require extensive historical analyses of rights granted and
then repealed or expired and the history of repealed legislation.
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